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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Patrick Martin Van Orden 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science  
 
September 2018 
 
Title: The Foreign Policies of Revolutionary Leaders: Identity, Emotion, and Conflict 
Initiation 
 
 
This manuscript addresses an important empirical regularity: Why are 
revolutionary leaders more likely to initiate conflict? With the goal of explaining this 
regularity, I offer an identity-driven model of decision making that can explain why 
certain leaders are more likely to take risky gambles. Broadly, this manuscript provides a 
different model of decision making that emphasizes emotion and identity as key to 
explain decision making. I offer a plausibility probe of the identity-driven model with 
four in-depth case studies: The initiation of the Iran-Iraq War, the initiation of the Gulf 
War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the start of the Korean War. I use the congruence 
method and process tracing to test the plausibility probe. I find strong support in two 
cases—the initiation of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War—and mixed support for the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Korean War.  
 
v 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Patrick Martin Van Orden 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 University of California at Riverside, Riverside California 
 University of Montana, Missoula 
  
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science, 2018, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, Political Science, 2012, University of California at Riverside 
 Bachelor of Arts, University of Montana, Missoula 
  
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 International Relations  
  
 Comparative Politics  
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Specialist, U.S. Army, 2007-2010 
  
 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
vi 
 
  
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2012-17 
 
 Mitchell Summer Funding Award, University of Oregon, 2016 
 Mitchell Summer Funding Award, University of Oregon, 2015 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Tuong Vu. I could not have asked for 
a better advisor. Professors Vu’s guidance, patience, and support was indispensable and I 
am extremely grateful. I would also like to thank my committee members. Professor Jane 
Cramer, Professor Lars Skalnes, and Professor Angela Joya, all read the manuscript and 
offered valuable critiques, suggestions, and guidance. The manuscript was much 
improved due to their direction and support. I would also like to thank my parents. My 
parents constantly stressed the importance and value of education and without their 
support, none of this would be possible.    
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
II. THE LITERATURE, THEORY, AND METHODS .............................................. 20 
 The Literature......................................................................................................... 20 
 Systemic-level Explanations ............................................................................ 20 
 State-level Explanations................................................................................... 24 
 Individual-level Explanations ..........................................................................   29 
 Theory: What is missing? National Identity and Risky Decisions ........................ 31 
         A State’s NIC ................................................................................................. 34 
         From a NIC to Emotions to Behavior ............................................................ 38 
              NIC based Fear—the Solidarity Dimension .................................................. 38 
         NIC Pride—the Status Dimension ................................................................. 41 
              Hypothesis...................................................................................................... 42 
         Nested Identities............................................................................................. 43 
       Methods................................................................................................................. 45 
         The Establishment of the NIC........................................................................ 46 
              The Independent Variable: the NIC ............................................................... 46 
x 
 
             Chapter Page 
 
              The Dependent Variable ................................................................................ 46 
               Case Selection ............................................................................................... 49 
              A Note on Case Selection .............................................................................. 52 
              Congruence Testing and Process Tracing ...................................................... 53 
              Methodological Caveats................................................................................. 54 
III. SADDAM HUSSEIN ............................................................................................ 59 
 Explanations for the Iran-Iraq War ........................................................................ 60 
 Explanations for the Gulf War ............................................................................... 66 
      Saddam’s NIC: Solidarity and Status .................................................................... 70 
  The Solidarity Dimension: “The Three Circles of Hostility” .................... 70 
   Americans: “Conspiring Bastards” ..................................................... 71 
  The Zionist Entity ................................................................................ 72 
                           Iran: “The Yellow Storm” ................................................................. 75 
                     The Status Dimension: “The Central Post of the Arab Nation” ............. 79 
      Case Study: The Iran- Iraq War ............................................................................. 80 
                        Fear: “The Hidden power of the Shia” ................................................ 80 
                        Pride: “We have to stick their face in the Mud” .................................. 84 
xi 
 
Chapter Page       
 
     Case Study: The Gulf War ...................................................................................... 91 
                        Fear: There is a conspiracy to weaken the Arab Nation ...................... 91 
             Pride before the fall .............................................................................. 100 
      Conclusion .............................................................................................................  110 
IV. FIDEL CASTRO ................................................................................................... 112 
      Why Did Castro Accept the Weapons? ................................................................. 114 
 Did Castro have a Choice? ..................................................................................... 119 
      Castro’s NIC .......................................................................................................... 120 
  The Solidarity Dimension .......................................................................... 120 
                  The Status Dimension ................................................................................ 124 
     Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis  .................................................................. 126 
                  The Pride Dimension ................................................................................. 126 
                  The Fear Dimension   ................................................................................. 139 
                  Conclusion…………… ............................................................................. 143 
V. KIM Il-SUNG ......................................................................................................... 145 
      Explanations for the Korean War .......................................................................... 145 
 Kim Il Sung’s NIC ................................................................................................. 148 
xii 
 
Chapter Page 
   
  The Solidarity Dimension .......................................................................... 148 
                  The Status Dimension ................................................................................ 155 
     Case Study: The Korean War ................................................................................. 157 
                  The Pride Dimension ................................................................................. 157 
                  The Fear Dimension   ................................................................................. 174 
                  Conclusion…………… ............................................................................. 181 
VI. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 183 
      Limitations of the Identity-Driven Model of Decision Making ............................. 188 
             The Problem of Aggregation ..................................................................... 188 
                  Fear and Risk Taking ................................................................................. 193 
                  The Outside-in Critique ............................................................................. 195             
      Policy Recommendations....................................................................................... 197 
                  Be Aware of the Fear Dynamic ................................................................. 199 
                  Be Aware of the Pride Dynamic ................................................................ 201 
                  Conclusion ................................................................................................. 202 
APPENDIX: DISCUSSION OF SOURCES ............................................................... 203 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................ 237 
xiii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
 
1.    All Leaders ............................................................................................................ 37 
2.   Selected Leaders……….. ......................................................................................   43 
3.   Level of Risk ..........................................................................................................   47 
4.   Summary of Findings  ............................................................................................ 187
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation addresses an important question: Why are revolutionary states 
more likely to initiate conflict?1 In answering that question, this dissertation deals with a 
number of corollary questions. How do revolutionary leaders make decisions regarding 
conflict initiation and significant decisions in general? Do they have goals and 
preferences similar to those of non- revolutionary leaders?   
Before proceeding, it may be beneficial to be very clear regarding the purpose and 
scope of this dissertation. This dissertation is serving as a plausibility probe, seeing to 
what extent a theory aimed to explain nuclear proliferation—a theory developed by 
Hymans (2006)—can explain conflict initiation by revolutionary states. The methods 
used to address such a probe are the congruence method and process tracing. The 
methods are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
 The topic for this dissertation sprang from an empirical fact: States that have 
recently experienced a domestic political revolution initiate disputes at higher rates 
(Colgan 2013; Carter, Berhard, and Palmer 2012). Scholarship addresses this relationship 
and this dissertation is situated in the larger causes of war literature and mostly builds 
upon, but also challenges works in the field. It builds upon other works by 
acknowledging that systemic level variables and domestic-level variables are important. 
                                                          
1
 See Colgan (2013).  
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Steven Walt (1996, 1992), in a path breaking and seminal work, argues that war follows 
revolution because revolution results in a number of changes at the systemic level, such 
as changes in alliance commitments and changes in the capabilities of states post- 
revolution. Other works emphasize changes in domestic political institutions following 
revolution (Skocpol 1998; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Carter, Berhard, and Palmer 2012) 
and how those can increase the likelihood of a state initiating a dispute. Changes in a 
number of systemic-level variables as Walt discusses and the changes in the domestic 
political institutions post-revolution are doubtless important.  
With that said, there is a particular lacuna in the literature, which is all the more 
striking in light of the topic of study. The study of revolution and war says surprisingly 
little about the beliefs, preferences, and identities of revolutionary leaders and how that 
influences conflict initiation.2 It is striking because revolutionary leaders are likely to 
have unique identities. After all, they have just self-selected into and risked their lives to 
take part in a revolutionary movement. This dissertation posits that leaders’ identities 
matter. Revolutionary leaders’ identity concpetions, tied to a psychological process that 
involves emotion, pushes leaders in the direction of taking risky actions, which may be 
able to explain why revolutionary states initiate disputes at higher rates.  
This dissertation places special emphasis on the identity conceptions of 
revolutionary leaders. Borrowing from the field of political psychology, more 
specifically, borrowing heavily from the work of Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006), I posit 
that revolutionary leaders are likely to hold unique identities which can then be tied to a 
                                                          
2
 Some make generic statements regarding how revolutionary leaders will differ from non- revolutionary 
leaders. Colgan (2013) and Colgan and Weeks (2015) argue that revolutionary leaders are more likely to be 
revisionist, they hold preferences for changing the status quo, and have higher objective risk tolerances. 
But, these characteristics say little about the identity and beliefs of various leaders and assume the leaders 
are nominally rational.  
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pattern of decision-making. Revolutionary leaders’ believe their states stand for both 
different values than other states and that their states are equal and/or superior to other 
states. This dissertation places emphasis on a pattern of individual, identity driven 
decision making that focuses more on the leader’s self-expression than on changes in the 
external security environment or changes in domestic political institutions (Hymans 
2006). While there is a great deal of validity to the extant approaches that stress changes 
in domestic political institutions and changes at the system level, what is missing is an 
explanation stressing how revolutionary leaders make foreign policy decisions.  
This dissertation is also different from extant approaches in that it employs a 
different paradigm. This dissertation employs the use of constructivist concepts such as 
identity linked to a number of well-established findings in the field of psychology—
hence the label: psychological constructivism.3 It starts with an individual’s national 
identity conception. This conception is rooted in social identity theory which argues that 
a sense of self is made via a never-ending process of social comparison—in an IR 
context, comparing their states to other states.  Key groups serve as comparison others. 
The identity driven model of decision making offered in this dissertation argues that 
actors will experience emotion—specifically fear and pride—when interacting with key 
others over something of meaning or value. The emotions then result in a number of 
behaviors. Fear encourages inflated threat perceptions, a greater urgency to act, lower 
cognitive complexity, and also influences an actors ultimate goals, such as decreasing the 
experience of fear. Pride is associated with behaviors such as, higher relative power 
perceptions, an illusion of control, the need to act autonomously, and a need to impress 
                                                          
33
 Psychological constructivism is a term used by Hymans (2010) and Shannon & Kowert (2011) to 
describe the benefits of marrying research from the field of psychology to inform constructivist concepts 
such as identity and norms. Hall and Ross (2015) argue that individual psychology ultimately provides the 
micro-foundations for such concepts.  
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ourselves with actions. All of these terms will be explained in more detail in the next 
chapter. It is the combination of both fear and pride together that produces the “explosive 
cocktail” that encourages leaders to take action— ‘leaps in the dark.’ They are leaps in 
the dark because they are likely irreversible actions and the ramifications of the actions 
are highly uncertain. Because of the high level of uncertainty leaders are going to rely 
less on calculations—making a decision that approximates a “rational choice”— and a 
leader will rely more on dispositional factors, such as a leader’s identity. The decisions, if 
consistent with the theory offered in this dissertation, should be hasty and ill-thought-out.  
This dissertation is not the first to discuss how misperception can result in 
conflict. Defensive realists stress how elite beliefs and elite perceptions of material 
capabilities are often causally important.4 This is because, in the short term, power 
capabilities may fluctuate and leaders may operate with incomplete information. 
Defensive realists often see, when crafting theories of foreign policy, roles for cognitive 
biases, the role of foreign policy decision making, elite beliefs, and images of adversaries 
(Christensen, 1997, pp. 68–70; Jervis, 1976a, p. Chpt. 6; Khong, 1992; Posen, 1986, pp. 
67–69). Indeed, some of the canonical works in the field feature misperception. Van 
Evera argues that beliefs about offensive dominance, first move advantages, and the 
(mis)perceptions of power fluctuations often result in conflict (Van Evera, 2001, pp. 9–
11). A large body of research documents how WWI was, among many factors, caused by 
an erroneous belief in the cult of the offensive (J. Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1984). For 
Snyder and Van Evera, the military played a large role in propounding the myth; 
organizational theorists emphasize how militaries often craft offensive doctrines because 
                                                          
4
 The discussion of defensive realism was heavily influenced and helped tremendously by Taliaferro's 
(2000) discussion of the assumptions of defensive realism.  
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offensive doctrines require more resources. But Van Evera notes this myth was hardly 
confined to the military: Europeans and other political leaders believed in the myth as 
well. While defensive realists acknowledge that misperception is important, the 
coherence of the research agenda is based largely on the assumption “that the 
international system is mostly, although not exclusively, responsible for states’ external 
behavior” and that “over the long run international outcomes correspond to the relative 
distribution of material capabilities” (Taliaferro, 2000, p. 155).  
This dissertation will take issue with the first claim. The simple fact that elites so 
poorly understood the nature of military capabilities—such as in the case of the erroneous 
belief in offensive dominance and the erroneous belief in defense dominance preceding 
WWII—highlights that the material world must be interpreted—the facts of the 
international system do not speak for themselves. This dissertation will argue that such 
interpretations of material capabilities can vary widely and be extremely causally 
important for explaining conflict initiation. What Saddam, Kim, and Castro, envisioned 
as feasible, others may have viewed to be wildly imprudent. Furthermore, the identity 
driven model of decision making can provide guidance regarding how leaders will likely 
interpret the material world via their own identity conception and how emotion colors 
such an interpretation, in contrast with some defensive realist that point to organization 
politics or elites having incorrect or incomplete information as the sources of 
misperceptions.  
It should be noted that, upon a close reading of defensive realist’s work, this 
dissertation and some of the assumptions of defensive realism are not terribly 
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incompatible.5 For instance, as Taliaferro (2000) notes, “defensive neoclassical realism 
expects an indirect and problematic causal path between material capabilities and a 
state’s foreign policy” (p. 155). This is because foreign policy runs through decision 
making, which runs through people, which runs through perceptions.6 However, 
Taliaferro, saves the causal primacy of systemic level variables by claiming that “Over 
the long run international outcomes correspond to the relative distribution of material 
capabilities.”7  Aside from this statement being empirically unverifiable or unfalsifiable—
one can always wait longer for outcomes to correspond to material capabilities— 
defensive realist carve out space and often find discussions of psychology and decision 
making necessary in order to explain the most important outcomes in international 
politics, in the short term.  
 The case studies to follow display the benefits of the identity driven model of 
foreign policy decision making. While the systemic level variables and domestic level 
variables were important in shaping and precluding certain actions, the identity driven 
model can explain aspects of the conflicts that are not able to be addressed with extant 
                                                          
5
 Legro & Moravcsik (1999) argue that defensive realism use of such unit level variables is actually 
evidence of a “degenerative research agenda.” The charge is that that defensive realists must smuggle in 
such unit level variables to be able to explain outcomes that systemic level variables cannot explain; 
making the defensive realist research agenda increasingly incoherent.  
 
6
 Aaron Freidberg’s assumptions could equally be applied to the assumptions of this dissertation: 
“Structural considerations provide a useful point from which to begin the analysis of international politics 
rather than a place at which to end it. Even if one acknowledges that structures exist and are important, 
there is still the question of how statesmen grasp their counters from the inside, so to speak” (Friedberg, 
2010, p. 8).  
 
7
 It is a testament to academic socialization that the assumptions of various schools of realism – “that 
international outcomes correspond to the relative distribution of material capabilities”(Taliaferro, 2000, p. 
155) – or the ‘bedrock’ assumptions of offensive realism by John Mearsheimer —“no state can be certain 
of others’ intentions” and “actors are rational” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 30–31)– are taken  more seriously 
than findings in the field of psychology. Findings in the field of psychology are empirically documented 
features of human decision making. While the latter are merely assumptions, often taking on a normative 
quality about how states should behave, if only they could see the material world clearly.  
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theories. For instance, I argue that the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein has to be 
understood with reference to Saddam’s belief in a conspiracy—a non-existent 
conspiracy—to weaken the Iraqi state and Baathist project. Saddam perceived a 
conspiracy, orchestrated by the U.S. with Israel and Kuwait as conspirators, via the 
manipulation of oil prices. All the more interesting is why exactly Saddam was so 
threatened by the U.S., in light of the fact that the U.S. and Saddam held some of the 
same strategic objectives and the U.S. was aiming to normalize relations with the Iraqi 
regime during this time. Furthermore, I argue that Saddam was overconfident in his 
theory of victory—he was both overconfident that the U.S. would not intervene and that 
if the U.S. did intervene, the U.S. lacked the resolve to push the Iraqi Army out of 
Kuwait. It was the combination of inflated threat perceptions and overconfidence that 
encouraged Saddam to take such a ‘leap in the dark’ and invade Kuwait. Saddam’s 
National Identity Conception (NIC) provided the backdrop to conclude that the U.S. 
could not be trusted and the prism to view the U.S.’s actions in the most nefarious light. 
Saddam’s NIC also placed emphasis on Iraq being a powerful state—“the central pole in 
the Arab Nation”—and contributed to a general level of overconfidence, which can 
explain why Saddam appeared to be confident in the likelihood of success. It also can 
explain why he made this decision without extensive prior calculation: “Some decisions 
just feel right and can be made with less information, such as U.S. perfidy and the 
greatness of the Iraqi nation.” Rational choice theories can explain the same level of 
overconfidence with reference to information asymmetries: Saddam was provided faulty 
information about Iraq’s capabilities. However, one would expect Saddam to become less 
confident in victory as more information about U.S. resolve and capabilities were 
revealed, which as the case study shows, does not appear to be the case.  Overconfidence 
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and the inflated threat perceptions are better explained with reference to political 
psychology. The theory of identity-driven foreign policy offered in this dissertation links 
national identity to a psychological process that involves emotion influencing both threat 
perceptions and one’s confidence in victory.  
In the sample of cases, I argue that the identity model of decision making is much 
better able to explain key aspects of the risky decisions than extant theories which focus 
more on the changing incentives or external security environment. Below are brief 
summaries of the cases analyzed.  
Saddam Hussein and the Initiation of the Iran-Iraq War  
 The case study finds strong support for the identity driven model of decision-
making. There was an apparent urgency to act as Saddam gave his military only a few 
months to prepare for the invasion. A senior aid to Saddam urged caution, captured in 
recordings made available after Saddam’s fall. The aid argued that such an attack would 
require more time to prepare, but Saddam pushed ahead. While the Iranian Revolution 
posed a number of challenges to the domestic stability of the Iraqi regime, according to 
Bengio (1985), Saddam overestimated the threat from Shia agitation (or domestic 
subversion from Iran), thus providing evidence for exaggerated threat perceptions.  
Saddam also displayed a lower degree of cognitive complexity. A rational for the timing 
of the invasion hinged on the Iranian Air Force being grounded due to the tumult and 
purges stemming from the Iranian Revolution. Air clashes between Iran and Iraq before 
the initiation of the conflict showed that while the Iranian Air Force may have been 
relatively weakened, the force was not grounded and was a modern and capable air force. 
In terms of the pride dimension, Saddam displayed an illusion of control, overlooking 
important details in the implementation of policy, such as not having the capabilities to 
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destroy the Iranian Air Force on the ground in the initial air campaign. The illusion 
involves actors being insensitive to the unintended consequences of a decision, such as 
the attack not precipitating the collapse of the Iranian regime or forcing Khomeini to sue 
for peace, but actually allowing Khomeini to consolidate his power. Pride also influences 
an actor’s ultimate goals. Saddam appeared to derive utility not just from potentially 
taking territory and halting subversion, but from asserting his dominance and displaying 
his leadership on a level equal with Iraqi’s natural ‘place in the sun.’ Saddam displayed 
higher potential power perceptions as well, a predictable behavior stemming from the 
emotion of pride.  
Saddam Hussein and the Initiation of the Gulf War  
 Evidence suggests that Saddam decided to attack Kuwait in the summer of 1990 
with an apparent urgency to act. Saddam made the decision shortly before invading, 
leaving the military to scramble to prepare. Saddam believed to be subject to an 
international conspiracy that did not exist, validating the hypothesis that revolutionary 
oppositionalists will make threat assessments that are ‘exaggeratedly high.’ In terms of a 
lower level of cognitive complexity, Saddam relied on crude beliefs in his assessments of 
U.S. coalition military capabilities, believing that taking the initiative and the superior 
moral of the Iraqi Army would ensure victory. The illusion of control was on display as 
well. Saddam not only likely decided to invade knowing outside involvement was a 
possibility (U.S. intervention), but even as a number of uncertainties were resolved 
regarding the American led coalition’s willingness and ability to eject the Iraqi Army 
from Kuwait, was still not only optimistic about the likelihood of success, but optimistic 
about his ability to negotiate a cease fire right up until the beginning of the ground 
campaign. Pride encourages the need to act autonomously as well. Saddam appeared to 
10 
 
be receiving positive utility—aside from the material benefits of invasion—in putting 
these ‘arrogant’ Kuwaitis in their place. Saddam also displayed higher relative power 
perceptions, remaining optimistic about success.  
Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis  
 Castro did not appear to be overly concerned about two major issues with the 
deployment of nuclear weapons on Cuban soil: the likelihood of the weapons being 
discovered by the U.S. before they were emplaced; and, if the weapons were discovered, 
what a likely U.S. reaction would be. Both of these facts suggest that Castro displayed an 
illusion of control: Castro was both unconcerned about important aspects of policy 
implementation and insensitive to an unintended consequence, a premature U.S. 
discovery and reaction. While Castro’s primary motivation was to deter a U.S. invasion, 
possessing the weapons also likely offered non-material benefits. The weapons offered 
the Cubans a degree of equality with the U.S., which had the potential to be supremely 
gratifying, suggesting Castro was deriving utility from acting autonomously, which can 
also explain why the deployment was arguably larger than necessary to simply deter an 
invasion. In terms of the fear dimension, there was an urgency to act. Castro reacted 
quickly to the Soviet proposal and agreed to the deployment in a matter of days. Castro 
was trying to reduce the uncomfortable experience of fear as well, by doing something or 
anything, explaining why serious logistical and political challenges were overlooked. 
Doing something—even if unlikely to succeed— may help an actor alleviate the 
uncomfortable experience of fear. While it is difficult to conclude that this is a case of 
exaggerated threat perceptions, due to the clearly hostile actions of the United States, 
Fidel did hold an entrenched enemy image of the United States that ensured that signals 
would be interpreted in a hostile fashion.  
11 
 
Kim Il- Sung and the Korean War 
The case of the start of the Korean War, Kim’s invasion of South Korea, offers 
partial support for the identity driven model of decision making. The illusion of control 
was on display regarding assumptions about the initial invasion. Kim was warned that 
U.S. intervention was a possibility but dismissed warnings, reasoning that U.S. 
intervention was either unlikely or would be too late to make any difference. The plan 
hinged on speed: The North needed to advance quickly to precipitate the southern 
government’s collapse and to make U.S. intervention less likely. Yet, the NKA did not 
possess the means to move as quickly as necessary. They lacked equipment to cross 
bridges and faced onerous supply lines that could not support advancing units, suggesting 
there was an inattention to the details of policy implementation, suggesting an illusion of 
control. Kim’s plan hinged on a concomitant uprising of southern guerrillas in support of 
the Northern invasion. However, in the spring of 1950, reports reached the North 
describing the southern partisan campaign as being exhausted. According to the 
assumptions of rational choice, Kim should update beliefs with new information, which 
should have tempered Kim’s optimism about the strength and level of support from 
southern partisans. The fact that he did not, is consistent with low cognitive complexity. 
Other aspects of the identity driven model of decision making are more difficult to test. 
For instance, because the KPA held a number of objective advantages, we cannot 
conclude that Kim saw his state as possessing an unjustified amount of relative power, 
and that he therefore had unjustified relative power perceptions. Still, the North faced 
logistical challenges, which meant the South-Korean government would have to collapse 
quickly for the campaign to be successful, possibly vitiating the North’s advantages. 
Overall, this case offers partial support for the theory.  
12 
 
This dissertation was motivated by a number of trends in the field that have 
neglected the more human aspects of political science. Specifically, the neglect of 
emotion in the field of political science and IR; the dominance of rational choice as the de 
facto model of decision making,  and the discounting of the importance of individual 
attributes in political analysis.  
The neglect of emotion is all the more striking because emotion is essentially 
what gives meaning and value to our own lives: Our lives would be flat and colorless 
without affective experience, something most intuitively understand. It is no surprise that 
often our most salient memories are likely to be emotionally charged (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). As Elster (2009) notes, nearly all human motivation is ultimately housed in and 
involves emotional components.  Wars and revolutions should be saturated with 
emotional salience; leaders are not debating the various benefits of optimal tariffs, but 
making decisions that will likely result in human death. Yet, prominent IR works, even in 
the field of security studies, often portray human struggles as impersonal, essentially 
affectless struggles over material resources. In addition, individual leaders are posited to 
be homo economicus: making rational choices and, after the decisions are made, leaders 
accurately assess and carefully calibrate future decisions with updated information. 
International relations theory did not always portray human actions in such unrealistic 
terms: classical realist texts are full of references to honor and glory and how said 
emotions can result in human folly (Crawford, 2000).  
The neglect of the study of emotion is no longer justified for one simple reason: 
Any theory of decision making and thus any theory of foreign policy behavior has to 
account for emotion and its influence on decision making. The idea of emotion and 
reason as being separate, delineated spheres of operation when making decisions, 
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understood in Aristotlean terms as a chariot being pulled by two horses—one emotion 
and one reason—simply cannot be supported any longer. Research has also challenged 
the idea of emotion as somehow an impediment to reasoning—one has to ensure that 
emotional reasoning does not triumph over more prudent, rational reasoning. Both 
conceptions have given way to a more nuanced understanding of emotion and cognition. 
According to this more nuanced view, the cortical regions of the brain—areas of the 
neocortex that are responsible for reasoning—and the so-called ‘limbic areas of the brain 
(areas that are activated when one experiences emotion) are deeply intertwined. This 
suggests that emotion influences cognition and that cognition influences emotion 
(Sapolsky, 2017). Rather than explaining deviations from rational decision-making, 
emotion is now considered to be a necessary element in rational decision-making, 
emotions is now considered to be a necessary element in rational decision-making. As 
McDermott (2004) notes “individuals who cannot reference emotional memory because 
of brain lesions are unable to make rational decisions at all” (p. 153).  
Decisions that may be especially worthy of study in IR are likely to have a large 
emotional component. Emotion arouses an individual to take action. It is also one of the 
more effective ways by which humans change goal emphasis and is essential to help 
sustain behavior in difficult situations.  What does this mean for the study of IR? It means 
that emotional components may be involved with many of the most interesting aspects of 
IR and the most interesting aspects reference emotion. In sum, to understand foreign 
policy decision making there is simply no way around studying emotion and 
consequential political phenomenon is likely to have emotional components (McDermott, 
2004). 
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 So if emotion is so important in terms of decision making, why has emotion been 
neglected in the study of international relations? Methodological and ontological 
commitments, such as realism’s state-centric emphasis and its focus on structural forces, 
convinced some in the field that you really did not have to have any understanding of 
decision-making at all; Waltz’s (1979) famous structural model is exemplary of this type 
of thinking.
 8 But, while structure is essential in shaping the broad contours of state 
behavior, as Rose notes “people who cannot move beyond the system will have difficulty 
explaining most of what happens in international relations” (Rose, 1998, p. 165). The 
case studies that follow highlight Rose’s point: In the decisions analyzed, the systemic 
material forces shaped and precluded some outcomes for sure, but did not determine the 
decisions made. There is simply too much slack in the international system and room for 
agency.  
Another way around studying decision making, which may explain the neglect of 
emotion in the study of IR, is to adopt a rational choice framework. In this situation you 
can explain behavior with reference to what choice maximizes a utility function. Actors 
should make relatively similar choices when faced with increases or decreases in utility 
based on their preferences. Of course, various models of rational choice make different 
assumptions and there is room for actors holding different preferences, but all actors 
should respond to incentives in a manner that increases utility. Assuming a state to be a 
unified rational utility maximizer allowed for parsimonious models to be developed that 
hinged on changing structural variables and how that could influence a state’s ‘decision.’ 
Rational choice may be understood as a normative model of decision making and some 
                                                          
8
 Waltz did not offer a theory of foreign policy and thus bypassed the issue of decision making. See 
Bessner and Guilhot (2015) for a fascinating discussion of both classical realism’s emphasis on decision 
making and why Waltz neglected it.   
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decision makers may, in fact, make decisions that resemble a rational choice, but there is 
an increasingly large amount of experimental evidence that humans do not make 
decisions in a manner that resembles rational choice.9 Decision makers violate basic 
assumptions regarding transitivity. Simply asking a question in a different ‘frame’ leads 
to different responses when actors are interpreting the exact same information (See 
Hafner-Burton, Haggard, Lake, & Victor, 2017). More importantly, works in the field of 
political science have documented how elites— actual decision-makers in an IR 
context—may deviate systematically from rational choices. Most of this work has 
focused on so call ‘cold,’ cognitive biases. Biases of this sort are largely products of our 
brain’s inherent limitation in processing information. This extremely productive research 
agenda has shed valuable light on how cognitive biases affect foreign policy (Yetiv, 
2013), the role of schemas and analogical reasoning and how that influences an actors’ 
understanding of a situation (Houghton, 2001; Khong, 1992), and how fundamental 
errors of attribution can cause actors to discount situational factors and privilege 
dispositional factors in explaining another’s choices (Jervis, 1976).   
Just as elites are not immune to cognitive biases, emotion is a likely similar 
influence on elite decision making. There is a great deal of experimental evidence to 
support this conjecture. As Damasio (1996) showed, actors may not only calculate the 
future gains of a particular decision—as rational choice would predict—but also imagine 
how they would feel when they make a decision, as documented in Damasio’s influential 
somatic marker hypothesis. Haidt (2012) and others show how patterns of motivated 
reasoning, housed in emotional components of the brain, are in the “driver’s seat” of 
                                                          
9
 Rathbun, Kertzer, and Paradis, (2017) offer a theory for why some people may make decisions that 
resemble rational choices: those that are pro-self and have a high need for epistemic knowledge are more 
likely to make rational choices; the authors move in the right direction, offering micro-foundations as to 
why some may employ different styles of decision making.  
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decision making with rationality serving as the means to ‘rationalize’  our intuitions, 
when individuals contemplate moral decisions. Often when people make moral 
judgements, they know something is wrong but cannot explain why. Such ‘moral 
dumbfounding’ displays how some decisions just don’t feel right, with actors then 
scrambling to construct explanations to justify said decisions (Haidt, 2012). Researchers 
in political science can cling to rational choice models that offers the ability to simplify 
reality and impose order on a disordered process, which may explain some phenomena 
adequately. But, eventually, researchers will have to acknowledge that emotion is an 
unavoidable aspect of decision making and try to develop more realistic models of human 
decision making.  
This dissertation also contributes to a growing field that places particular 
emphasis on the attributes of individual leaders. In political psychology explanations can 
stress the causal primacy of the situational context: Put any individual in a certain 
situation, and he/she would react in a similar manner (See Houghton 2008). Likewise, 
some IR theories assume states will react in a similar fashion to the same systemic 
pressures. Just as states may act differently when faced with similar systemic pressures 
due to different domestic political institutions, variation on the individual dimension may 
cause individuals to react different to a similar situations. This dissertation stresses the 
importance of differences among individual leaders. In the case studies to follow, I will 
argue that studying the identities of individual leaders is important. A leader’s identity 
provides the background and the raw fuel for emotional experience. The social 
construction of one nation standing for different values—a leader holding sharply 
dichotomizing identity conceptions—and ideas that a leader’s nation deserves its “place 
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in the sun” provide the material for interpretation: “I should fear that state because they 
hold different values; we can win this war because we are a great nation.”  
The methods used for the plausibility probe include congruence testing, to 
establish if the predicted hypothesis match the outcomes. Process tracing is used as well 
to test the validity of both the theory offered in this paper and to test the theory against 
theories in IR (see Chapter 2 for a more details regarding data and methods). The 
beginning of each case study start with an assessment of alternative explanations. Implicit 
and explicit comparisons are offered as well in the case studies to gain more variation; 
counterfactuals are employed as well to offer plausible alternative paths of behavior for 
revolutionary leaders.  
Often researchers and the public are attracted to the idea that causes of action are 
somehow “hydraulic,” referring to the motivation for people to seek a unitary and single 
cause for actions (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). If a domestic explanation is emphasized this 
then detracts from a competing theory in a “zero sum” fashion. This dissertation 
emphasizes that the psychology of revolutionary leaders is an important cause of 
behavior. However, most complex outcomes have a number of causes. A domestic 
institutional explanation or a structural realist explanation is not invalidated when 
emphasizing an identity-driven model of decision making. Rather, the variables at the 
structural or domestic level may act as important permissive conditions, providing the 
scope conditions for a psychological explanation. Conversely, if structure is 
overwhelming and domestic political institutions are highly constraining, then individual 
attributes would likely be less important and thus non-operative (Jervis, 2013). In the 
sample of cases offered in this dissertation, the structural conditions did not determine in 
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a mechanistic fashion the choices of leaders and domestic political institutions did not 
overly constrain the leaders in question.  
A brief word is necessary regarding the data used to test this theory. I rely on both 
primary sources and secondary sources to reconstruct the decisions made. Secondary 
sources are extremely valuable and it would be wise to rely on extant studies of foreign 
policy decision making based on thorough research by area studies experts. Primary 
sources are used in the case study of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. A wealth of 
documents and recordings were discovered after the fall of Baghdad and made available 
to researchers by the Conflict Records Research Center. Unfortunately, the Cuba and 
Korean cases pose significant challenges for researchers. Soviet archives have opened up 
allowing researchers to get glimpses at Cuba and Korea via Soviet records, yet these 
regimes are still opaque and difficult to analyze. This should not discourage researchers 
from studying these regimes, because, if it did, researchers would then allow the data to 
determine the question and study only states that are transparent. Researchers should try 
to avoid being like the proverbial ‘drunk’ under the streetlight, looking for his keys where 
the light is good rather than where the keys were actually lost.  
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses extant approaches 
explaining the relationship between revolution and war. The identity driven model of 
decision making as applied to the behavior of revolutionary states, the data used, case 
selections, and the methods used to marshal evidence for the theory is also discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 provides a study of Saddam Hussein’s decision making, in two 
instances, namely, leading up to, the launch of the Iran-Iraq War and to the launch of the 
first Gulf War. This is by far the largest section of the dissertation and for good reason: 
Saddam was involved with three wars in relatively recent history. An study even 
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narrowly focused on explaining Saddam’s decisions is extremely valuable. Chapter 4 is a 
case study of Castro’s decision to place nuclear weapons in Cuba. Chapter 5 is a case 
study of the start of the Korean War. Chapter 6 offers some concluding thoughts.  
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CHAPTER II  
THE LITERATURE, THEORY, AND 
METHODS  
 
 
The Literature  
What is the relationship between revolution and war?10 Structural realists argue 
that revolutions are important as they influence variables at the systemic level of analysis. 
A research agenda in the spirit of a liberal IR theory stresses the ways in which 
revolutions change the capabilities of states and a state’s domestic political institutions. A 
third group emphasizes the attributes of revolutionary leaders.  
Systemic-level Explanations 
There is much to be admired in Walt’s Revolution and War (Walt, 1996). He 
outlines a number of important systemic ramifications following domestic political 
revolutions. In an apparent departure from structural realism, Walt also uses a number of 
ideological variables to explain the relationship between war and revolution. Yet, Walt’s 
analysis is more helpful in outlining the permissive or aggravating conditions that link 
revolution to war.  
Walt discusses a number of ways domestic political revolutions influence 
variables at the systemic level. Revolutions change the capabilities of states and their 
                                                          
10
 Some discuss the relationship directly, such as: (Colgan, 2013c, 2013a; Colgan & Weeks, 2015a; Foran, 
2005; Goldstone, 1996; Goodwin, 2001; Kurzman, 2005; Lohmann, 1994; Maoz, 1989; Skocpol, 1979; 
Tilly, 1996; Walt, 1992a, 1996a) 
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alliance arrangements. Capabilities are diminished in the short term as the revolutionary 
state experiences the tumult of revolution. Temporary weakness invites opportunistic 
aggression from other states as they seek to exploit ‘windows of opportunity’ – such as 
the Japanese and Polish invasions of the USSR in 1919-20 (Walt, 1992b, p. 331). It is 
important to note that in this case the aggressor is not necessarily the revolutionary state. 
The change in capabilities can also lead to enhanced security competition as third parties 
may take actions to maintain their relative positions.  
Revolutions can destabilize patterns of alliances and security commitments. South 
Vietnam post-1975 left SEATO; the USSR, following the Russian Revolution, left the 
Triple Entente; and the Iranian Revolution resulted in the U.S. losing an ally in the region 
(Halliday, 1999). Changes in alliance patterns generate uncertainty and destabilize 
alliance commitments. This can cause states—not just revolutionary states— to be less 
secure post-revolution, prompting action.  
Misperception, according to Walt, is another route to conflict and war. Spirals of 
suspicion emerge as leaders of other states are unsure about the new revolutionary state’s 
intentions, often aggravated as previous channels of communication are closed. In poor 
information environments, leaders rely on ideology to help interpret the intentions of 
other leaders. In this context, minor disputes may cascade into lurid provocations. 
Related to misperception, revolutionary states may be overly optimistic about the 
likelihood of success in exporting revolution. Walt awkwardly frames this as contributing 
to offensive dominance, in the context of the offensive-defense balance. Defensive 
realists see the security dilemma exacerbated when states are in the realm of offensive 
dominance. The revolutionary state is confident that the revolution will spread to other 
states, while non-revolutionary states feel the necessity to extinguish this movement for 
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fear of demonstration effects. One state is emboldened with a messianic belief in the 
inevitability of its cause; the other state is sensitive to cascading demonstration effects. 
This dynamic leaves both sides primed for action.  
In sum, Walt links a change in capabilities to conflict via temporary weakness and 
a clash of preferences. Walt links ideological change to spirals of suspicion, 
misperception, and perceptions of offensive advantage. These prompt revolutionary states 
to be conflict prone.  
This approach faces a number of limitations, not the least of which are empirical 
problems. Walt argues that conflict is a byproduct of systemic-level changes, and not the 
revisionist strategies of revolutionary states. If the latter was the case, the origins of 
conflict would be more directly found in leaders’ ideological convictions or in the 
domestic politics of revolutionary states.   
Contra Walt, a number of empirical studies have found that revolutionary states 
are more likely to be the initiator of disputes and not the victim of another state’s 
aggression.  This requires some elaboration because Walt and Colgan make conflicting 
claims about the empirical record. Walt supplies evidence that in his universe of cases, 
revolutionary states acted with restraint and conflict stemmed from non-revolutionary 
states’ aggression. At times, this is the case: Poland invaded the USSR in 1920 and 
Somalia attacked revolutionary Ethiopia (Walt, 1992). Colgan, after expanding the 
universe of cases, paints a different picture. Colgan notes that “states with revolutionary 
leaders are more likely to act as attackers than as defenders.” Colgan finds, as well, that 
“the increase in a revolutionary states propensity to instigate conflict, compared with 
non-revolutionary states, is higher than the increase in its propensity to act as the 
defendant” (Colgan, 2013, p. 676). “Revolutionary states have a higher rate as both the 
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instigator and the defender in MIDs, but the former is far more important in driving the 
overall rate,” Colgan concludes (2013, p. 676). This is not easily reconciled with Walt’s 
theory as he posits that conflict is the byproduct of systemic changes not the revisionist 
preferences of revolutionary states. If Walt was correct and conflict was a byproduct of 
systemic changes, the initiation of disputes should not be disproportionately started by 
revolutionary states.  
A second issue surrounds misperception as a cause of conflict. This may be acute 
between revolutionary and non-revolutionary states as differing ideological perspectives 
may exacerbate misperception (Haas, 2005). However, this underemphasizes both sides’ 
dedication to confrontation which may stem from ideological convictions (Halliday, 
1999).  Leaders of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements may hold 
beliefs that spur or demand confrontation, in which case treating conflict as based on 
misperception misses the point. Secondly, given that many revolutionary movements are 
nationalistic and anti-imperialist, it overlooks the importance of historical grievances. As 
Halliday argues, the “rhetoric of revolution reflects a long history of resentment of 
external domination, real and imagined, which no foreign policy adjustment by the state 
which is the object of that hostility, can remove” (Halliday 1999, p. 300).   
Regarding the export of revolution and the offensive-defensive balance, Walt is 
correct to note revolutionary states’ dedication to exporting revolution. Still, because this 
dedication has little relationship to any objective supply of military technology, this can 
easily be seen as an ideological variable—as leaders either believe erroneously in their 
ideals. Psychological aspects—particularity emotion—may play a larger role in this 
process.  
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 Other realists also miss important ramifications of revolutions as they ignore the 
ideological dimensions of the phenomenon. This is unfortunate as many classical realists 
stress the importance of both the domestic politics of the revolutionary state and the 
ideological, non-material component of revolution (Carr, 1985; Kissinger, 2011a).11 For 
structural realists who stress the importance of balances of power, a change in the balance 
of power is destabilizing, in the short term, as it can increase or decrease a state’s relative 
power. Implicit in this analysis is the balance of power being restored. The French 
revolution induced a balancing coalition that not only contained Napoleonic France but 
also restored the Bourbon Monarchy, thereby removing the perturbation.  The concept of 
restoring the balance is misleading as the French revolution was important not just due to 
the perturbation of the balance of power, but also due to the articulation of new ideas 
regarding the legitimate relationship between rulers and ruled (Halliday, 1999a). In this 
sense, ‘restoring’ the balance of power is impossible as the revolutionary ideas have 
irreversibly influenced other revolutionary movements and undermined the legitimacy of 
other regimes.  
The State Level Explanation 
This group of explanations locates the origins of foreign policy in the attributes of 
the state itself. Revolutions may drastically change a number of the major attributes of 
the state. States may be more centralized and better able to prosecute military campaigns 
after revolutions and changes in domestic political institutions may leave leaders with 
little or no institutional checks on executive power. Another group of explanations sees 
                                                          
11
 Carr’s analysis is primary an analysis that stresses the young Bolshevik state’s struggle for survival, yet 
he makes numerous observations about the importance of revolutionary ideology.  
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foreign policy as being the ‘externalization’ of domestic politics.12 In the context of a 
revolutionary movement, foreign policy may be used to isolate and justify the destruction 
of internal ‘enemies’ of the movement.  
 Revolutions may change the capabilities and formal political institutions of the 
state, resulting in states being more centralized post-revolution, which increases the 
state’s ability to fight and execute military campaigns. As the state’s ability to wage war 
grows, the state may see the use of force as a more effective means to realize its goals. 
Skcopol’s explanations for social revolution are of note for two reasons: One, her 
explanation is state-centric, states must be weakened before a social revolution is 
possible; two, the origins of social revolution are found in the pressures emanating from 
the international system, as traditional states are unable to compete with powerful 
neighbors, thus undermining the legitimacy of the ruling elites (Skocpol, 1979). 
Competition may take the form of military defeat.  France was both weakened and 
defeated in the Seven Years’ War preceding the French Revolution. The defeat of the 
Chinese by Japan and the Ch'ng dynasty’s inability to resist foreign encroachment partly 
explains the Chinese Revolution of 1911; the Russian Revolution was triggered in part by 
the setbacks in the First World War (Halliday, 1999a).  The approach frames revolutions 
as traditional states, not fully ‘modern,’ being replaced by more centralized states with 
modern bureaucracies, partly as a result of external pressures. Skocpol’s later work 
outlines how the revolutionary process, the process of consolidating new state 
organizations, produced states—in this case China, Russia, and France—that were more 
centralized and better able to mobilize their citizens post-revolution; “all three social 
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 R. S. Snyder (1999) sees revolutionary states’ confrontation with other states as an “externalization” of 
domestic politics in the revolutionary state. This will be discussed in more detail shortly.  
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revolutions markedly raised their nations’ capacities to wage humanly costly wars” 
(Skocpol, 1988). States are better able to do this because the revolutionary process 
increases a state’s capacity for mobilization and inculcates a national identity.  
 The capacity for mobilization is increased because during ‘revolution 
interregnums’ elites are competing for authoritarian control. The process places a 
premium on incorporating previously excluded groups, who are encouraged to join 
revolutionary organizations for both material benefits and via ideological indoctrination.  
Second, popular participation is necessary especially for membership in organizations 
that subdue other competing ‘radical’ groups. Organizations are created—organizations 
such as armies, administrations, committees, and surveillance groups— to consolidate, 
control, and exclude other competing groups.  Ideology may be a key aspect in this 
process as elites use ideology and nationalism in order to mobilize their populace to take 
part in a risky activity, revolution. What this means is that revolutionary states emerge 
from the process with stronger political apparatuses which are better able to perform 
activities essential for war fighting.  
 If judging the capacity for mobilization by the force under arms and defense 
budget burdens, revolutions do result in post-revolutionary states holding larger and 
better funded militaries. (Carter, Bernhard, & Palmer, 2012), note that in a 
comprehensive sample of post-revolutionary states, “(states) that have experienced a 
social revolution have larger militaries and allocate more of their economic resources to 
the military than do non-revolutionary states” (2012, p. 452). Furthermore, they find that 
post-revolutionary states are more likely to win the wars they fight, when compared with 
non-revolutionary states regardless of which state initiated the conflict. They also find, 
consistent with Colgan’s findings, that revolutionary states “are on average, more likely 
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to initiate an interstate war” (Carter et al., 2012),  arguing that the increases in military 
capability may have been undertaken for aggression, not for  bargaining leverage or 
merely to intimidate.  
 State building may not just involve building more capable militaries. R.S. Snyder 
argues that the foreign policy of revolutionary states should be viewed as part of the 
‘radicals’ desire to consolidate power in the context of domestic politics in the 
revolutionary state. Radicals initiate conflict with the U.S. to “externalize their domestic 
conflicts with the liberal bourgeoisies, who were previously part of the revolutionary 
coalitions”  (R. S. Snyder, 1999). This confrontation accomplishes two goals: First, it 
allows for the revolutionary regime to maintain the high degree of mass mobilization; 
second, it allows for the radicals to isolate and destroy the bourgeois elements who may 
have previously been part of a nationalist revolutionary movement. The bourgeoisie may 
have ties to multinational corporations and would therefore likely be impediments to 
realizing domestic revolutionary goals. This approach has a number of strengths as it has 
the ability to explain cases where Walt’s spiral of suspicion is absent. Snyder notes that 
the U.S. maintained relatively cordial relations with Marxist regimes in Africa.  Cases 
where relations deteriorated, Snyder argues, were provoked by the revolutionary state, 
revealing that the confrontation is a product of domestic politics in the revolutionary 
states and not merely caused by the misperceptions and spirals of suspicion in the 
aftermath of revolutions. Second, it takes seriously the revolutionary states leaders’ 
ideology and can explain the higher rates of conflict initiation of revolutionary states. 
Thus, Snyder sees the states in his sample—Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua —as provoking 
confrontation, because confrontation helps the radicals attempt to remake domestic 
political coalitions.  
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 A revolution may result in a ‘personalist’ authoritarian system. In systems of this 
type, leaders are free from institutional constraints. One strain of democratic peace theory 
argues that the differences in rates of conflict between democracies and non-democracies 
are to be found in the differences in the degree of political institutionalization. Leaders in 
democratic systems are constrained by a web of formal rules, which can involve veto 
players (including the public) having to acquiesce in the initiation of conflict. 
Institutionalization can vary not just from democracy to non-democracy, but in the realm 
of authoritarian systems.13 Authoritarian party systems have mechanisms to check the 
autonomy of leaders, say via politburo procedures or systems of party hierarchy; military 
juntas may have systems to discourage capricious actions by military rulers. Empirically, 
personalist states are more likely to initiate conflict compared to all other states, including 
other states with authoritarian political systems (Colgan & Weeks, 2015a). Colgan and 
Weeks (2015) stress the interaction of the personality type of revolutionary leader and 
personalist rule that results in the highest likelihood for a state to initiate conflict.  
  There are a number of limitations in this approach. Colgan and Week’s 
explanation does little more than provide an outline of permissive conditions. For 
instance, Colgan, specifies the interaction of oil wealth and regime type (Colgan, 2013c). 
The interaction of oil wealth and a state experiencing a domestic political revolution 
results in a higher likelihood of the state being the initiator of a dispute. However, Colgan 
(2013) notes that non-revolutionary petro-states do not initiate disputes at higher levels 
than states at large, which refocuses attention back to the importance of the ideology of 
the revolutionary movement, as the possession of oil wealth appears to be a necessary but 
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 There is a large literature in the field of comparative authoritarianism; see Debs & Goemans, (2010; Lai 
& Slater, 2006; Pickering & Kisangani, 2010; J. L. Weeks, 2012) 
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not sufficient explanation. The lack of domestic political institutional constraints can be 
viewed in a similar fashion, as being a permissive condition. Furthermore, Colgan can 
say only that the revolutionary movement self-selects for leaders that are risk-acceptant 
and desire to challenge the status quo, which cannot explain why revolutionary states 
clash with particular states and why such conflict may take such heightened intensity.  
 Snyder addresses directly the relationship between revolution and conflict. Synder 
can link domestic political conflicts with the foreign policy of revolutionary states, with 
an appreciation of the ideological dimensions as the domestic political struggles are 
animated by various ideological convictions. Skocpol’s work has similar strengths, as she 
sees the domestic political institutions as being endogenous to the actual revolutionary 
movement, as leaders may build states that are able to carry out swift and drastic reform, 
which would involve executive autonomy. A limitation of Skocpol’s work involves the 
under-determination of mass mobilization and increases in war fighting capabilities, as 
increases in military strength may, again, not be able to explain the targets of conflict.  
Individual-level Explanations  
Leading any political movement—revolutionary or within the confines of 
democratic competition—is risky. The amount of risk leading a revolutionary movement 
may be much higher, as revolutionaries could be killed in the pursuit of their goals, while 
leaders in other systems may face less drastic consequences. Individuals, when pondering 
the decision to be revolutionaries, self-select in or out of revolutionary movements. 
According to Colgan (2013) this makes revolutionaries, more risk-tolerant compared to 
the general population. Risk-tolerance is linked to conflict initiation due to the higher 
utility risk-tolerant individuals gain from gambles. By way of example, someone who is 
risk neutral is indifferent between a one dollar certain payoff and a ten percent chance of 
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a 10 dollar pay-off.  Someone who is risk-tolerant chooses the gamble. According to 
Colgan (2013), military disputes can be viewed as risky gambles; those with higher risk 
tolerances are more likely to ‘roll the dice.’ Furthermore, risk-tolerance as a personality 
preference “is relatively stable over time for an individual and quite stable across 
different people,” which explains, according to Colgan (2013), why revolutionary leaders 
initiate disputes at higher rates (2013, p. 661). In addition to being risk-tolerant, 
revolutionary leaders are ambitious as well. Leaders of this type not only may want 
power as an end in it-self, but “revolutionaries are systemically more likely to come to 
office with a desire to change the status quo in society” (Colgan 2013, p. 663). In sum, 
revolutionary leaders possess two personality traits: They are likely to be more risk-
tolerant than the general population and they are likely to want to change the status quo. 
According to Colgan (2013), the two traits make leaders more likely to initiate conflict.  
Establishing that revolutionary leaders are risk tolerant may be the first step in 
developing a richer understanding of the foreign policy of revolutionary states, as it is not 
entirely clear what risk-tolerance or ambition means outside of a belief system or an 
ideological framework, as ideology defines risk. Ideology may provide a sense of identity 
which animates the leaders’ drive to change the world. Colgan’s approach sees leaders as 
being under-socialized as well. Leaders may not hold objective understandings of risk but 
see their obligations as necessary duties to their fellow comrades. Castro’s dedication to 
revolution abroad could be viewed not as being “ambitious” but rather as manifestations 
of his feelings of obligation or solidarity. Second, Colgan’s theory says little regarding 
revolutionaries’ actual goals, other than the goals being “ambitious” as ideology would 
define the goals. In this sense, this approach has a similar limitation: risk-tolerance and 
ambition may be a permissive condition.  
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 Most of the explanations have a difficult time explaining disputes, which 
revolutionary states are more likely to initiate. Structural realists’ approach can outline 
the context in which conflict takes place which is undoubtedly important. A state’s 
relative power compared to another state is of course important, but cannot explain a 
particular foreign policy decision. The same limitation applies to theories that stress a 
leader’s autonomy. Building on Jacques Hymans’ study about the psychology of decision 
making involving nuclear weapons, below I offer an alternative explanation using a 
national identity conception (NIC) linked to a cluster of psychological variables. The 
psychological variables can explain why revolutionary states are more likely to initiate 
conflict.  
Theory: What is missing? National Identity and Risky Decisions 
What is needed is a theory that can explain the initiation of conflict and why 
revolutionary states are more likely to initiate conflict. Ultimately all decisions are made 
by individuals and while some models, perhaps in the interest of parsimony, may exclude 
emotion and psychological variables, emotion may be the key to explain why 
revolutionary states, populated with certain types of leaders, initiate conflicts at higher 
rates. Leaders and the emotion they experience figures prominently in this analysis. 
When actors experience fear and pride in conjunction, it may push leaders in the direction 
of taking “leaps in the dark,” making it more likely leaders of this type will engage in 
risky gambles, and thus be able to explain a great deal of behavior of revolutionary states 
that seem perplexing from a rationalist standpoint.  
The initiation of certain types of conflict can be seen as a “leap in the dark.” 
Invasions or military actions that are irreversible and trigger counter events that are 
difficult to predict in advance—how another actor will respond to an invasion for 
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example—I consider to be “leaps in the dark.” Contrariwise, a circumscribed military 
action—such as probing an enemies boundary—are less “leaps in the dark” and thus not 
as amenable for this analysis, as the action itself may be not as consequential and involve 
less uncertainty.14 “Leaps in the dark” are decisions that have high degrees of general 
uncertainty and are unlikely to be subject to a strict cost–benefit analysis. Even 
practitioners of rational choice acknowledge that decisions that are non-routine, have 
ambiguous components, and entail elements of surprise are unlikely to be amenable to a 
cost–benefit calculation. “For if you cannot calculate the risks involved, you cannot 
determine if you are willing to accept them,” writes Hymans (2006, p. 11). 
Hymans defines a national identity conception (NIC) as an “individual’s 
understanding of the national identity—his or her sense of what the national identity 
stands for and how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international 
arena” (Hymans, 2006, p. 18). Leaders will likely attain this conception in their youth 
and—especially revolutionary leaders—will develop an individual, subjective 
understanding of their national identity.  Some may be identity entrepreneurs: they are 
instrumental in framing their nation’s identity.  While fascinating, the sources of this 
identity is beyond the scope of this study.   
Note that Hymans sees the NIC as being an individual identity.  An individual 
approach is needed because what is missing in the use of national identity to explain 
outcomes is the marriage of national identity to a psychological process. Constructivists, 
in the spirit of sociological institutionalism, use national identity to explain why states do 
pursue certain paths based on the ‘logic of appropriateness.’ National identity is a shared 
understanding—a ‘social fact.’ Due to these social facts some policies are simply 
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 Hymans’s personal communication with author 4/9/2017.  
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‘inconceivable’ (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999). Although valuable in explaining why 
some options are not considered, this approach has a difficult time explaining specific 
outcomes.  National identities have to be linked to a cluster of emotional attributes that 
accompany national identity.  
Hymans’s approach differs from Walt’s in two important ways. One, it offers a 
sharp contrast to a rational actor model. Although there may be rational explanations for 
costly wars (see Fearon, 1995), some conflicts may be better explained as stemming from 
emotional sources, not a rational cost-benefit calculation. Secondly, Hymans sees the 
NIC as being “a conception as opposed to a mere perception of contemporary reality” 
(2006, p. 19). Standard treatments of misperception see non-material variables as 
skewing objective reality due to cognitive bias or limits in human cognition.  Hymans 
notes ‘big decisions’ are extremely complicated; actors are in the realm of high 
uncertainty. In that context, decisions are more likely to be expressions of national 
identity versus a cost-benefit calculation.  
The NIC is a self–other comparison. Who are the key comparison other(s)? The 
key comparison others “are outgroups that serve as the primary basis for in-group self-
definition’” (Hymans, 2006, p. 24). In social identity theory, it is the comparison between 
“us” and “them,” via similarities and differences, which clarifies our own sense of self 
(Tajfel, 2010; for self-categorization theory, see Hogg & Turner, 1987; for a critique and 
comparison, see Huddy, 2001). The key others need not be limited to another specific 
state, but can be a group or set of nations—such as the “communist bloc.” An individual 
can have multiple identities that are activated based on what identity is contextually more 
salient (Huddy, 2001). The “nationalist” identity is likely activated when interacting with 
key others. Holsti (1970) argues that states have various roles in the international system 
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which is defined by virtue of their places in the system. Hymans, in contrast, argues that 
comparison with an ‘other’ is essential in the process, as Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
argues that we sharpen our own conception of self by means of a comparison with key 
‘others,’ not merely by virtue of a role in the system.   
Because this project borrows heavily from Hymans, it is important to note how it 
differs. One, Hymans is explaining why states desire to obtain a nuclear weapons. 
Hymans conceptualizes the decision to acquire a nuclear weapons as risky. So, although 
the decision is different, both projects see the dependent variable as risky foreign policy 
decisions. Two, Hymans argues and applies the NIC to all leaders; this project focuses 
more narrowly on revolutionary leaders. The narrow focus is justified because it is the 
working hypothesis that revolutionary states will score high on both the solidarity and 
status dimension (these concepts will be explained shortly). The concepts that Hymans 
applies to all states promises to explain why revolutionary states would be more likely to 
make risky decisions. With that said, the NIC concept could apply to all states and 
especially counter-revolutionary ones, yet it is the working hypothesis that most non-
revolutionary states would not score high on the status and solidarity dimensions. The 
second reason for the narrow scope is for issues of manageability; I am interested in 
explaining why revolutionary states are more likely to engage in military disputes. Hence, 
the case selection is focused on revolutionary states—but this should not preclude the 
possibility that the theory applies to all states.  
 
A State’s NIC  
 I understand a NIC as involving two key dimensions. The first, the solidarity 
dimension, “what a nation stands for,” will be associated with fear; the second, the status 
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dimension, “how high the nation naturally stands,” will be associated with pride 
(Hymans, 2006). 
 The status dimension involves “a self-definition of how high ‘we’ stand relative to 
‘them’ in the international pecking order: are we naturally their equal (if not their 
superior), or will we simply never measure up (Hymans, 2006, p.23)?” There are two 
important points often overlooked in the literature on identity and conflict. One, as 
Hymans notes, not all states automatically assert their equality with other states. Some 
states may accept their subordinate status as subalterns (Parry, 2004). Revolutionary 
states may be especially unlikely to accept their subordinate status. Revolutionary 
movements often involve building a national identity, asserting equality with a 
hegemonic power. For instance, as Patterson notes, Castro chafed at the U.S’s authority 
in the hemisphere as “Castro vowed to jettison altogether its dependent status (Paterson, 
1995a, p. 12).”  Part of jettisoning the dependent status is an assertion of equality with the 
U.S. The second caveat involves the identification of a ‘key comparison other.’ As 
mentioned, it is the comparison with key ‘others’ that help the revolutionary state form its 
own identity.  Hymans notes as well that states may feel a pressing need to assert their 
equality in times of status uncertainty—such as during times new states are emerging on 
the international arena (Hymans, 2006). 
In order for the status mechanism to function, states have to believe in their ability 
to effectively compete with a key comparison other. Revolutionary states could hold 
inflated assessments of their capabilities, as they may embrace an excessively optimistic 
understanding of their ability to compete with the key comparison other. The Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, after expelling the United States from South Vietnam, embraced 
the view that “everything is entirely possible” as they just beat the world’s superpower 
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(Chanda, 1988, p. 42). As will be discussed, the status dimension is married to a host of 
behaviors stemming from the emotion of pride.   
 The solidarity dimension’s key question “is whether ‘we’ and ‘they’ naturally 
stand for similar or different interests and values” (Hymans, 2006, p. 22). This could be 
particularly pronounced for revolutionary states; it is likely revolutionary and non-
revolutionary leaders differ dramatically in their core values. For instance, the Russian 
Revolution led to a communist regime which claimed to advance a different model of 
economic organization, claiming superiority over a market-based system. The Iranian 
Revolution led to a religiously based movement, which claimed legitimacy based on 
traditional or religious sources, rather than, a rational-legal authority.   
A brief word is necessary regarding an important disagreement within SIT as 
applied to the field of International Relations. Mercer suggests that the mere existence of 
different groups is a sufficient condition for conflict between groups; groups essentially 
construct clear black and white dichotomies between their in-group and all others 
(Mercer, 1995). However, Hymans argues that this is an oversimplification, meaning that 
“’us and them’ should not be taken to be synonymous with a feeling of ‘us against 
them.’” The competition is lessened when the two groups’ identity is “perceived to be 
nested within wider, ‘transcendent’ groupings” (Hymans, 2006, p. 22).  
The transcendent identity provides a basic commonality which undermines a 
black and white dichotomization (Sherif, 1958). For instance, citizens of Norway and 
Sweden could—while not abandoning their particularistic Norwegian or Swedish 
identity—identify as European. The transcendent identity can explain why two different 
groups may compete but conflict is unlikely, while two groups with “starkly 
dichotomizing identity conceptions,” not nested in a transcendent identity, would be more 
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likely to engage in conflict (Hymans, 2006, p. 22). It is likely revolutionary leaders and 
non-revolutionary leaders would hold just such sharp dichotomizing identity conceptions. 
It is the working hypothesis that revolutionary states would score high on the solidarity 
dimension and the status dimension.  
 The ideal-type revolutionary leader would fit in Table 1’s top right corner. 
Leaders in the top right score high on the status scale, as they are asserting their equality 
or superiority with key others. Revolutionary leaders would likely be high on the 
solidarity scale, as revolutionary leaders advance starkly different values compared to key 
others. These values are unlikely to be nested in an overarching transcendent identity. 
Table 1 below captures the interplay between the two.  
Table 1. All Leaders  
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From a NIC to Emotions to Behavior 
This section will outline how the NIC translates into emotions which make riskier 
decisions more likely. Three points have to be made briefly before proceeding. First, the 
emotions drive the decision making process, according to Hymans, not merely limit the 
possible paths of actions. Second, as noted by SIT theorists, many have multiple 
identities. Turner and Hogg argue that individuals contain multiple ‘levels of self’ 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). For instance, when one is at work 
one assumes a certain identity. Leaders of states find themselves in the realm of their 
“national level of self” when they are acting as state leaders. The previous point is 
connected to the third point, which is that the emotions are activated when the national 
self comes into conflict with key comparison others. Salient national memories are 
activated and drive the emotions and the decision making process (A. D. Smith, 1991). 
National tales of oppression, tragedy, or triumph, which leaders may not personally 
experience, provide the material for NIC based emotional memory (Horowitz, 2003; R. 
Petersen, 2017; R. D. Petersen, 2002).  For instance, when Japan and China spar over 
various islands, leaders could experience highly charged emotions that are fed with past 
tales of aggression and subordination. The conflict could be much deeper than mere 
maneuvering for the material rights to an island.   
NIC based Fear—the Solidarity Dimension  
 Why would a revolutionary leader experience fear when interacting with a key 
other? It is likely that the state leader will feel fear because of the stark black and white 
dichotomization between the values of the revolutionary state and the values of a key 
non-revolutionary state. The fear is based in a real appreciation for the other state 
undermining or trying to subvert the revolutionary state, as non-revolutionary states may 
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see their security threatened by the success of revolutionary movements. Many times 
counter-revolutionary movements are in fact subverting the revolutionary state, although 
this may be immaterial as the revolutionary state may believe that they are ‘surrounded’ 
by hostile states.15 Revolutionary France provides an example. By 1791 leaders of the 
Brisstin Party were ‘paranoid’ about the likelihood of survival in a monarchical world, 
“members of these parties believed that the conservative powers were firmly committed 
to counter-revolutionary efforts, both through external force and sponsoring ideological 
fifth columns in France” (Haas, 2005, p. 50). Paranoia can create self-fulfilling 
prophecies. “Assuming enmity, politicians dedicated to opposing ideological beliefs 
frequently take actions that ensure such a hostile relationship” writes Hass (2012, 421).16 
The beauty of this conception of fear is that it just has to establish leaders’ fear of 
subversion, which can be a correct or incorrect assessment of the actions of other states.  
 Fear of the other results in a number of cognitive and behavioral changes. Fear 
leads to a higher level of threat perceptions (F1), which can result in higher threat 
perceptions. It can also result in a ‘tunnel vision’ dynamic where actors are fixated on and 
attribute undue significance to the threat (Cohen, 1978; Izard, 1991).  
 “Lower cognitive complexity” (F2) accompanies fear. Lower cognitive 
complexity is described by Stein as an actor’s inability to make subtle distinctions and 
see nuance when confronted with new information (Stein, 1994a). There is also the 
tendency to conflate threats; simple solutions for different problems are embraced, which 
can result in decision makers seeing the use of military force as being more efficacious 
                                                          
15
  See Hunt (2009) for a discussion on the United States’ antipathy towards social revolution.  
 
16
 It was Kennan’s famous assertion that the USSR was engaging in just this type of self-fulfilling 
prophesy: “It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is 
his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound 
eventually to be right” (X., 1987, p. 856).  
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(Andersen & Guerrero, 1997). For instance, Saddam Hussein reportedly embraced simple 
narratives about both the U.S. and Israel’s ability to orchestrate conspiracies worldwide. 
Although there may be some truth to this, this conspiracy narrative reached epic 
proportions with Hussein seeing Israel and the US as being behind every move in the 
Middle East. This conspiratorial mindset led to Hussein’s baffling conclusion that the US 
was somehow behind the Iranian revolution (K. M. Woods, Palkki, & Stout, 2011a).  
A greater urgency to act (F3) accompanies fear. A leader may feel the need to 
take action, particularly hasty action. In doing so, the decision maker relies on 
stereotypes, terminates the search for more information, and encourages a halt in the 
analysis of information (Witte, 1996). 
The final mechanism involves the actors’ desire to eliminate the uncomfortable 
experience of fear (F4). Trying to eliminate this discomfort can take precedent over 
eliminating the danger (Witte, 1996).  Hymans argues this mechanism can explain a 
number of irrational reactions to danger: “from the ostrich approach to simply sticking 
ones heads in the sand, to witch hunts and the appeal to protective deities, or the 
acquisition of totems of power” (Hymans, 2006a, p. 32)  
 The identity based psychological mechanisms involving the emotion of fear, has 
the ability to explain why revolutionary states are more likely to initiate conflict. Yet, 
when viewed with the NIC pride mechanisms to be discussed next, not only do leaders 
feel the pressures to act, pride brings a menu of cognitive changes that push in the 
direction of taking action.   
 
 
NIC Pride—the Status Dimension  
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As mentioned, pride measures how high the state holds itself relative to a key 
comparison other.17 The pithy statement “pride before the fall” is telling, as pride, like 
fear, leads to a number of cognitive and behavioral effects. Pride can result in the 
decision maker seeing her state as possessing an undue amount of relative power (P1), 
which can lead to unfounded assumptions about a state’s ability to affect other states.  For 
instance, Hussein believed before the invasion of Iran in the Iraq-Iran War, that the 
invasion would essentially speed-up the collapse of the Iranian regime. Saddam posited 
that an invasion would force Khomeini to move forces to the front which would let 
Bazargan—a rival power broker who was considered to be more moderate—to revolt and 
overthrow Khomeini. This invasion was launched under the assumption that Khomeini’s 
had a precarious hold on power (Murray & Woods, 2014b, p. 129). 
 The illusion of control (P2) accompanies pride. The illusion gives actors the 
feeling of being not susceptible to mistakes or accidents. The illusion results in shortened 
searches for information and insufficient attention to the implementation of policy, 
specifically attention to the unintended consequences of a particular policy (Competence 
considered, 1990).  
The need to act autonomously (P3) can accompany pride. Hymans argues that “it 
(pride) produces positive utility from the act of standing alone” (Hymans, 2006a, p. 34). 
This may explain why some revolutionary states may engage in perplexing acts from a 
rational-choice standpoint. They may attack more powerful neighbors with the goal of 
safeguarding their autonomy. Kissinger described the psychological dimensions of the 
Yom Kippur War. He argued that a factor in the attack on Israel was the desire by Sadat 
                                                          
17
 A basic definition involves general and specific uses of the term pride: a sense of one’s value (general) 
and specific pleasure based on achievements (specific) (Elster, 2000; Nathanson, 1994).  
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to break the ‘illusion of Israeli dominance,’ following the lopsided route in the Six-Day 
War.  Sadat understood that early success in the Yom Kippur War and a display of 
tactical proficiency would make it harder for Israel to continue to dominate the Arab 
states (Kissinger, 2011b) 
 Pride as an ends in itself (P4) is the final mechanism linking pride to risky 
foreign policy decisions. As Jervis notes, at times states desire to acquire nuclear 
weapons to buttress their confidence in addition to responding to objective threat (Jervis, 
1989). This mechanism conceptualizes pride as trying to convince actors in the state of 
the nation's self-worth and impressing other actors in the international system. Leaders 
that score high on the status and solidarity metrics, leader I label revolutionary 
oppositionalists, should display the mechanisms articulated above.  
 
Hypothesis  
H1: Revolutionary oppositionalists will display the above discussed fear (F1-F4) related 
psychological mechanisms in their decision making process.  
 
H2: revolutionary oppositionalists will display the above articulated pride (P1-P4) 
related psychological mechanisms in their decision making process.  
 
As Hymans notes, related to the acquirement of nuclear weapons, the interaction 
of pride and fear can be viewed as a two-step process. The fear feeds into the assessment 
of risk, which, in general, encourages leaders to overestimate the threat. Secondly, 
leaders are unduly confident in their ability to deal with or address the threat due to the 
cluster of behavioral attributes that accompany pride. Applying this same two-step 
43 
 
process to the initiation of military disputes, the mix of pride and fear could explain why 
revolutionary states are involved in a disproportionate amount of conflict. Table 2 
displays the interaction. 
 
Table 2: Selected Leaders  
Level of Fear  Equal to Key Other—
Medium Pride 
Better than Key Other—
High Pride  
High  Fidel Castro: Castro though 
U.S. invasion forthcoming; 
U.S. aiming to overthrow 
Castro (Bay of Pigs) and U.S. 
implementing economic 
policies to destabilize Cuba; 
level of fear high.  
Saddam Hussein 1980: 
Saddam feared overthrow via 
domestic subversion. Iranians 
directly aiming to overthrow 
Saddam and fomenting 
revolution and instability in 
Iraq; level of fear high.  
Medium   Saddam Hussein 1990: 
Kuwait part of a plot to 
destabilize the Iraqi regime; 
not a direct, immediate threat 
but a “war waged by other 
means” and would ultimately 
weaken Saddam’s regime; 
level of fear medium.  
 
Low   Kim ll-sung: North Korea 
possesses conventional 
superiority over South Korea; 
U.S. removed troops from 
region; level of fear low. 
 
Nested Identities  
Leaders’ identities may be nested in larger identity groupings. A nested identity in 
a larger grouping may influence a leader’s sense of efficacy, which is important for this 
analysis. To reiterate, an adequate sense of efficacy is essential to embolden leaders to 
ultimately take such ‘leaps in the dark;’ leaders that do not possess such efficacy are 
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unlikely to see their states as being able to effectively compete with key others. 
Remember, as the literature in Social Identity Theory notes, often identity conceptions 
are nested in other, wider identity conception groupings. For instance, Castro saw his 
state as holding different values than the United States. But he also saw his identity as 
being nested in a larger identity, that identity being a socialist state, sharing the same 
values as other socialist states. This larger identity grouping can have important 
ramifications in terms of a leader’s sense of efficacy. Being part of a revolutionary 
vanguard may embolden leaders to take further risky actions, not only because they may 
expect support from other socialist states—The Cuban Missile Crisis would simply not 
have taken place without Soviet support and Kim needed Stalin’s approval for his 
invasion—but because revolutionary states often think of themselves as being in the 
vanguard of a revolutionary movement. In the Cuban case, as discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, Castro considered himself the leader of the communist movement in Latin 
America, part of a vanguard bringing revolutionary change throughout Latin America. 
Such a small state playing such an outsized role may seem incongruous, but, as the 
Cuban Revolution demonstrated, the importance of objective conditions were grossly 
exaggerated. In Cuba, Castro led a revolutionary movement with few men and resources, 
why could Cuba not lead the revolution in Latin America? A similar dynamic may be 
seen in the case of Vietnam—a case not analyzed in depth in this dissertation. The 
Vietnamese Communists successfully unified their country, besting a more technically 
sophisticated western nation, which could then serve as a model to be emulated by other 
revolutionary states (Vu, 2016). This dynamic likely translates into a higher level of 
pride. In sum, leading a successful revolution and then claiming to be part of the 
revolutionary vanguard, should reinforce a leader’s sense of pride.  
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 Leaders may also have a national identity that conceptualizes their nations as 
being surrounded by hostile forces—Hymans refers to this as an ‘us against the world’ 
type dynamic. Paradoxically this may reinforce a level of pride. Surviving the 
machinations of other states that surround you may result in a leader seeing his state as 
being the only state capable of surviving in such an environment. Thus, while one would 
expect that being surrounded by hostile neighbors would result in a siege type mentality, 
the idea that a state can survive and even thrive in such a hostile environment may 
contribute to a sense of pride as well, providing evidence that only truly unique states can 
survive in such dangerous environments.  
 
Methods  
This project can be broken into two distinct steps. The first is to establish that the 
leader(s) in a state that has experienced a domestic political revolution score high on both 
the status and solidarity metric.  The NIC is the key independent variable. The second 
step is to link the psychological variables to key foreign policy decisions. It is essential to 
link the cluster of psychological attributes to outcomes. The link is essential and should 
display the strength of this theory. Care needs to be taken to display the risky decision 
was made not primarily because of changes in systemic level variables (Walt); or because 
of attributes of the state (Weeks and Colgan); but because of the NIC and the emotions 
that follow. Each case study outlines the limitations with the extant explanations and how 
emotion is key to explain otherwise unexplainable aspects of the leader’s behavior.  
The Establishment of the NIC 
Borrowing a definition from Colgan, this project defines a revolutionary leader 
“as one who transforms the existing social, political and economic relationship of the 
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state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions of society” (Colgan, 
2013b, p. 658) A revolutionary state “is simply a state/government where a revolutionary 
leader is currently in power” (Colgan, 2013, p. 658). Note this definition is consistent 
with Walts,’ but different from Skocpol’s, as she focuses on ‘social revolutions.’ A leader 
who takes power in a coup, assassination, or revolt would not be a revolutionary leader 
unless accompanied by “substantial transformation of social, economic, and political life” 
(Colgan, 2013, p. 658).  
 
The Independent Variable: the NIC  
The key independent variable is the NIC. The NIC can be established via the use 
of secondary sources and by making use of actors’ speeches and writings. Care is taken to 
ensure that actors’ writings and speeches are not just used instrumentally—to advance 
some political cause—but actually believed by the actor in question. Biographies and 
works by area specialist can help construct a national identity conception of key leaders.  
 
The Dependent Variable  
 The dependent variable is risky foreign policy decisions. Risky foreign policy 
decisions or ‘leaps in the dark’ need to be used because of the problem with using a 
measure such as war. War, being a dyadic measure, may fail to emerge even in the 
context of a risky foreign policy decision. Cuba is the classic example: It adopted a 
provocative foreign policy while never actually fighting a ‘war’ with the United States. 
Foreign policy as a dependent variable would be needlessly encompassing, as what flows 
from this theory is essentially a prediction that revolutionary leaders will make risky 
decisions. In many ways the dependent variable is ideal: wars are risky endeavors. While 
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risky behavior may not be a sufficient condition for war, the behavior may be able to 
explain why revolutionary leaders initiate disputes at higher rates.    
 The cases, to be discussed shortly, feature significant variation on the dependent 
variable—risky foreign policy decisions. As Vertzberger (1993) notes, in order to 
understand decision making, risk has to be understood as both subjective – as understood 
in the context of an individual’s beliefs—and objective—as reflecting aspects that 
represent facts less amenable to interpretation. An assessment of risk should also involve 
an appreciation for what can happen if an actor fails to act. Table 3 summarizes the level 
of risk.  
 
Table 3. Level of Risk  
Decision/Degr
ee of 
objectivity in 
assessing risk 
Most 
objective 
Relatively objective Less 
objective 
Least 
objectiv
e 
Tota
l 
Assurance of 
war 
(irreversibilit
y of 
decision) 
Compared 
material 
capabilitie
s of 
warring 
parties 
Compared 
capabilitie
s of 
potential 
allies 
Likelihood 
of outside 
interventio
n 
Danger 
if not 
acting 
Iraq-Iran + - o o + + 
Iraq-Kuwait + ---- ++++ + + +++ 
Cuba-US - o ---- - ++++ -- 
North-South 
Korea 
+ -- o + o o 
 
Plus (+) means more risk 
Minus (-) means less risk 
Zero (o) means neutral 
 
 
48 
 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait entailed the most amount of risk. Saddam was 
confident, for good reason, that the Iraqi Army would not face significant resistance from 
the Kuwaitis. However, the possibility of intervention by a powerful ally of Kuwait—the 
United States—made this a very risky decision. There was also a risk in not taking action. 
Saddam thought that the Kuwaitis and the U.S. aimed to destabilize his regime via the 
manipulation of oil prices (F. G. G. Gause, 2009; F. G. Gause III, 2002). If Saddam did 
not take action, the Kuwaitis would continue to, in Saddam’s eyes, overproduce oil and 
destabilize his regime that was already facing acute financial difficulties (Freedman & 
Karsh, 1995b) 
The Iran-Iraq War involved the direct initiation of hostilities with a much larger 
state. While the Iranian military may have been weakened due to the tumult of the 
revolution, Iran possessed a modern and sophisticated military. Furthermore, Saddam 
could only speculate how the Iranians would react to a direct attack. There was also a risk 
in not taking action. According to Gause (2002, 2009), Saddam attacked Iran to force 
Iran to cease supporting various Shia groups that were destabilizing the Iraqi state. 
Kim’s invasion of South Korea entailed a moderate amount of risk. As discussed 
in the case study, the North Koreans enjoyed conventional superiority over the South 
Koreans. Ambiguity surrounded to what extent the U.S. would intervene and how the 
U.S. would react to an invasion aimed to unify the peninsula.  
Castro’s decision to place nuclear weapons in Cuba entailed much less risk than 
the three other cases. The reaction of the U.S. was a key uncertainty. However, this act 
was much less provocative that a brazen annexation of territory or an invasion. After all, 
as Castro insisted, the USSR had as much right to support their allies as the U.S, and 
emplacing weapons in Cuba was not a violation of international law. The fact that they 
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placed nuclear weapons or “offensive” weapons on the island that could reach the eastern 
seaboard made the decision more provocative in the eyes of the U.S. But, this decision 
was not as explicitly provocative as invading or annexing another state. The decision was 
less risky because Castro had the support of the USSR, a powerful ally. There was a 
significant danger in not acting. Castro primarily desired the weapons to respond to what 
he saw as an imminent invasion of the island by the U.S. The weapons had the potential 
to discourage a U.S. attack. Not possessing the weapons would leave the Cuba vulnerable 
to an invasion. 
 
Case Selection  
 
Cuba, Castro: Halliday notes that Cuba had a long and sustained history of exporting 
revolution (Halliday, 1999b). Castro came to power via a guerrilla campaign and the 
subsequent abdication of Batista. Few would challenge that Castro aimed for profound 
cultural and political change in Cuba. 18 The analysis displays that Castro scores high on 
both the solidarity and status scale. The risky gamble is the decision to move missiles into 
Cuba, precipitating the Cuban Missile Crisis. The analysis to follow indicates that while 
the USSR certainly played a prominent role, Castro did in fact decide to place the 
weapons in Cuba. This decision can be considered a “leap in the dark.” Castro could only 
speculate as to the U.S.’s response to such a novel ‘threat’ and propinquity to the U.S. 
made the move more provocative.    
 
                                                          
18
 For various works on Cuban Foreign Policy see: (Balfour, 2013; Brenner, 1989; Castaneda, 1994; 
Domínguez, 1989; Paterson, 1995b) 
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Iraq, Hussein: Iraq had long been plagued by a series of coups and counter-coups. 
Saddam came to power via a coup in 1968 as the right hand man of Ahmed Hassan al-
Bakr, the president of Iraq from 1968 to 1979. Saddam was a key figure in the regime 
and increasingly consolidated his power, culminating in1979 when Saddam compelled al-
Bakr to give up the presidency, resulting in Saddam as the undisputed leader of the Iraqi 
state. During the period before 1979, Saddam increasingly established his personal 
leadership and by 1977 was in command in all but name (Colgan, 2013c). Saddam was at 
the center of a number of important decisions, specifically the negotiation of the Algiers 
Treaty in 1975 (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001).  
The Baathist regime transformed the structures of government, the economy, and 
aimed for significant changes in societal relations. Regarding the structures of 
government, in 1970, a new constitution was adopted and the Revolutionary Command 
Council was established. There was also a large overhaul of the security services, 
resulting in the creation of four new organizations, which proved to be much more 
intrusive than the security apparatus in previous Iraqi governments, according to Colgan 
(2013c; see also Tripp, 2002; Marr, 2018).  
 The economy was transformed and moved towards socialism. In 1972 the IPC 
was nationalized,19 thereby nationalizing the oil industry. A number of major firms were 
nationalized as well, resulting in most firms in the iron, steel, petrochemical, and 
construction industries being owned by the state. The public sector of the economy grew 
to roughly 80 percent in 1977 from 31 percent in 1968. Nearly half of the urban 
population worked for the state by 1977. Taxes on income and sales were eliminated by 
the Baathist regime. Land reform was undertaken as well, which went considerably 
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 The IPC was a consortium of foreign oil companies.  
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further than land reform efforts in previous regimes (Marr, 2018). State owned-coopts 
were established and both fertilizer and food was heavily subsidized. The Baathist regime 
signed agreements for technical assistance with the USSR and to help construct a large 
oil pipeline as well (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001)  
 The Baathist regime aimed for drastic changes in society. Women’s rights were 
significantly expanded. Article 19 of the constitution now guaranteed “equality of the 
sexes” (Colgan, 2013, p. 104). Women now could drive cars, go to college, dress as they 
liked, and held more than 10 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. More women 
attended both primary and secondary schools: Women’s attendance increased by 60 
percent in primary and climbed from 35 to 45 percent in secondary schools. Women’s 
literacy increased and women enjoyed more economic opportunity, according to Colgan 
(2013c). Women gained standing in Iraqi courts in 1978. As Sasson (2011) documented, 
the party became increasingly involved in public life as well. Party membership “grew 
from a few hundred” to nearly 1.5 million in 1984 and became increasingly active in the 
private lives of members (Colgan 2013, p. 105). The party prohibited the use of last 
names and allowed the consumption of alcohol in Shi’a mosques. The Baath party also 
implemented a number of large scale population relocation projects. For instance, half a 
million Kurds were relocated and the government offered financial incentives for men to 
divorce wives suspected of having Iranian ties.  
Due to the above mentioned changes in the economy, government structure, and 
societal relations, Saddam satisfies the criteria of the leader aiming for “substantial 
transformation of social, economic, and political life” (Colgan, 2013, p. 658). Colgan 
codes Iraq as a revolutionary state. Two risky decisions are analyzed. The 1980 invasion 
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of Iran and the 1991 invasion of Kuwait. As the analysis outlines and discusses in later 
chapters, uncertainty surrounded key aspects of both conflicts.20  
 
Korea, Kim Il-sung: Armstrong documents the drastic social and political change in the 
first five years of Kim’s leadership of North Korea (Armstrong, 2004). The risky decision 
analyzed is the 1950 invasion of South Korea. Recently declassified documents note that 
while Stalin’s acquiescence was required, Kim was the prime mover pushing war to 
unifying the peninsula. The invasion could be considered a risky decision as uncertainty 
surrounded a number of key aspects of the campaign to be discussed.  
 
A Note on Case Selection  
This project does not aim to mimic an experimental method of comparative case 
study analysis. Thus, the cardinal sin of selecting on the dependent variable is not as 
much of an issue.21 This project selects on both the independent variable (leaders likely to 
score high on the NIC metrics, status and solidarity) and on the dependent variable (the 
initiation of risky decisions). As Table Three displays, all the decisions are risky, but 
differ in terms of the level of objective and subjective risk. The selection on the 
independent and dependent variable is justified due to the narrowly tailored research 
question: Why do revolutionary states initiate conflict at higher rates? Note that Colgan 
                                                          
20
 See Colgan (2013c) for more details as Saddam as transformational leader, p. 102-106.  
 
21
 Note that there does not appear to be a solution to this problem of selecting on the dependent variable for 
this research question. While wars are discrete events, what is an observation of a non-war? A sample of 
‘near misses’ could be used, but this would raise the question as to whether the near misses are in fact all 
that different from cases of actual wars. Without a sample of near misses, the universe of cases where a 
decision makers does not engage in a risky decision would be limitless.  
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(2013) and Carter et al (2015) have already established the empirical relationship that 
revolutionary states initiate conflicts at higher rates.  
Some schools of thought in IR argue that scholars should aim for nomothetic 
explanation: explanations that are “law like” and likely to take place across all people and 
states. This analysis has a more modest claim and is more akin to a mid-level theory. 
Leaders that score high on the status and solidarity metrics are likely to match the pattern 
of decision making displayed in the case studies. This dissertation also offers a 
contribution in explaining these important events in world history. Saddam’s invasions, 
Kim’s invasion of South Korea, and Castro placing weapons in Cuba are cases worthy of 
explanation in their own right, even if the theory cannot be extended to explain other 
cases.  
 
Congruence Testing and Process Tracing  
After an NIC has been established, the hypothesis has to be linked to the risky 
decision via the articulated psychological mechanisms. The link can be made via the 
congruence method and via process tracing. Process tracing scrutinizes the decision 
making process to see if leaders’ made decisions based on the articulated hypothesis. The 
strength of process tracing lies in linking the articulated hypothesis to an outcome. In 
contrast to forms of quantitative analysis, it has the ability to establish causality. It has the 
added strength of being able to analyze the decision making process at a number of 
different points in time, which enables the argument to be more rigorously tested. In 
addition to process tracing, the congruence method will be employed to establish if the 
predicted hypothesis match the outcomes (A. L. George & Bennett, 2005).   
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How will this evidence be marshaled? The evidence can be found in a number of 
sources, both primary and secondary. In the case of Iraq, the Iraqi Perspectives Project 
offers an abundance of material, consisting of tapes of conversations with Saddam and 
his inner circle and documents related to war planning. The tapes provide a picture into 
Hussein’s thoughts and fears (K. M. Woods et al., 2011a). Secondary sources are used as 
well to reconstruct decision making. For the Cuban and Korean cases, I rely on secondary 
sources.  
Methodological Caveats  
Are emotions observable?  Crenshaw argues emotions are understudied in IR 
because they are difficult to observe. Emotions may be more difficult to observe, but it 
does not mean they cannot be documented. Crenshaw suggest “diaries, transcripts, and 
…post hoc interviews with actors may help actors understand the role and consequences 
of emotions, paying attention to the subtle ways emotions are expressed, managed, and 
denied, and what happened to those who express emotions in decision making settings” 
(Crawford, 2000, p. 131). Furthermore, this problem is hardly confined to studying 
emotions. International relations as a field of study deals with a number of concepts and 
abstractions that are essentially unobservable, posing similar problems.  
A standard critique regarding studying emotions is that they are transitory and 
short-lived; actors may feel strong emotions at a specific time, but the ephemeral nature 
of emotion means it is difficult to establish when exactly an actor is experiencing said 
emotion. In a laboratory setting, researchers have specific tools to measure the experience 
of emotion in seconds or minutes. Researchers studying emotion from a far do not have 
the ability to specify what emotions an individual is experiencing at a specific time. 
Secondly, critics note that emotions are far too diffuse and complex to be tractable. How 
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do we know what emotion an actor is experiencing when an actor may herself be 
confused about what emotions are being experienced? How do we know an actor is 
experiencing one emotion and that specific emotion? Despite these difficulties, 
researchers in both political science and psychology argue that studying emotions is both 
analytically tractable and valuable (R. Petersen, 2017).22  
Roger Petersen (2017) argues that the study of emotion is both analytically 
tractable and valuable and offers a framework that generates hypotheses based on specific 
emotions. The analytical tractability is nothing sort of a revolution of sorts in the study of 
emotions in the field of social psychology and neuroscience. Jennifer Learner, in a work 
in the The Annual Review of Psychology surveying the recent advances in neuroscience 
and social psychology, finds:  
A revolution in the science of emotion has emerged in recent decades, with the 
potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories. The research reveals that 
emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and 
sometimes beneficial drivers of decision making. Across different domains, 
important regularities appear in the mechanism through witch emotion influence 
judgments and choice (quoted in R. Petersen, 2017, p. 933)  
 
Researchers are increasingly able—instead of throwing-up their hands and claiming that 
emotions are simply too difficult to research—to link specific emotions to behavior. 
Before this revolution, most understood that emotion was important, but due to 
methodological barriers, not analytically tractable. But recent advances in neuroscience 
and social psychology allow researchers to establish that when average actors are treated 
with specific conditions, specific emotions will be elicited, and actors will behave in 
predictable manners based on said emotional experience.  
                                                          
22
 Note that critics of using emotion could likely make the same claim regarding the micro-foundations of 
rational choice: do we actually observe people making ‘rational choices’? Of course not. Furthermore, there 
is an abundance of evidence in the field of psychology that documents how humans actually do experience 
emotions, which would make the theoretical plausibility of the congruence of emotions and action 
tendencies far more reasonable than the heroic assumptions of the rational choice school.   
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Petersen’s (2017) model involves first the articulation of the antecedent 
conditions linked to the action tendencies of specific emotions.  The ‘antecedent’ actions 
are conditions that psychologist have reliably linked to the experience of a specific 
emotion.’23 For instance, most actors with functioning limbic systems will experience fear 
if they think they or their loved ones’ lives are in danger; anger if they feel they have 
been wrong or mistreated. The antecedent condition for anger is being mistreated; while 
the antecedent of fear would be a situation in which on feels their lives are in danger.24 
The antecedent conditions are then followed by specific action tendencies. The action 
tendencies are simply the behaviors associated with the specific emotional experience; of 
particular importance are action tendencies associated with information processing and 
belief formation (R. Petersen, 2017).  
It may be useful to trace this process out with an example of the emotion of anger. 
The antecedent condition for anger is an actor’s perception or the actual harming—an 
actor committed a bad action—against an individual or group. “The action tendency is to 
heighten desire for punishment against a specific actor. Under the influence of anger, 
individuals become ‘intuitive prosecutors’” (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; R. 
Petersen, 2017, p. 933; R. Petersen & Zukerman, 2010). In terms of information 
processing and collection, actors understand the event and objects that are consistent with 
the original cognitive-appraisal dimension of the emotion (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Actors more acutely experience the fundamental attribution error when they are 
                                                          
23
 Petersen uses the term ‘cognitive antecedent.’ I prefer the term antecedent conditions because, as various 
schools in the field of psychology constantly debate, there is a great deal of dispute about the importance of 
the unconscious or cognitive aspects of emotional experience and what is in the ‘driver’s seat’ regarding 
emotional experience.  
 
24
 A colleague of mine when arguing about the futility of the study of emotions taunted me with the 
challenge to: “tell me what emotion I am experiencing right now.” I replied that I did not know, but if 
someone put a gun to your head, we all could predict that you are experiencing fear.  
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experiencing anger, blaming people when they could theoretically blame the ostensible 
situation (D. Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Anger results in more stereotyping as 
well (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).  
Other critiques of using psychology to study IR hinge on the samples and 
experiments used to construct theories in the field of psychology. For instance, to study 
group cohesion a sample of convenience may be used which usually consists of 
experiments using college students. The situations are usually highly regimented, well-
structured, and limit exogenous influence in order to be able to isolate various causal 
mechanisms. Critics argue that the people (college students) and the situations (highly 
structured laboratory settings) do not resemble actual elite decision making. I offer a few 
rebuttals. One, Jervis (1976), Khong (1992), Houghton (2001), and others, showed that 
elites do not decide as rational choice models expect, meaning there is no reason to 
believe that elites are somehow immune from the same basic faulty reasoning as 
documented in a number of psychological experiments. Secondly, because decision 
makers in real world settings may have to make difficult decisions involving substantial 
losses of life, we should expect that emotions have more pronounced influence on elites 
when making these types of decisions. Hence, if anything, controlled experimental 
settings may under estimate the effect of emotion on elite decision making, because, as 
the critics note, the stakes are usually low in laboratory experiments.  
A more substantial critique involves the idea that modern political systems have 
elaborate mechanisms in place to ensure that decisions are not made rashly. Decisions are 
structured via elaborate operating procedures, aiming to reduce the likelihood of making 
decisions that depart drastically from the assumptions of the rational choice model. This 
is a legitimate concern. However, this critique may be less applicable to revolutionary 
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states. Part of the revolutionary process may ensure that leaders have a great deal of 
political autonomy and are unconstrained by various domestic political institutions. As 
mentioned, leaders in personalist dictatorships may find themselves able to make 
decisions unconstrained by such bureaucratic procedures, and thus domestic political 
institutions should be considered to be permissive conditions.   
A more serious concern regarding domestic political institutions involves the 
decision making setting or context. As Janis notes, the decision making context may be 
key to explain certain features such as “group think” and other factors (Janis, 1972). 
Specifically, coup-proofing may result in the military offering bad advice due to a lack of 
professionalism or for fear of retribution (Quinlivan, 1999). In the case studies that 
follow, it does appear that the leaders in the sample did receive candid advice at times. I 
take care to take this concern seriously as I discuss the decision making process.  
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CHAPTER III 
 SADDAM HUSSEIN 
 
Explanations for the Iran-Iraq War   
 
Offensive realists argue the anarchical nature of the international system provides 
powerful incentives for states to expand territorially in the absence of systemic 
constraints (Mearsheimer, 2001). A successful Iraqi attack had the potential to redraw 
territorial lines, force Iran to halt its subversive activities in Iraq, and force the Iranians to 
acknowledge Iraq’s leadership role in the region.  Saddam envisioned a limited war, 
striking a weakened enemy, forcing Iran to make territorial concessions, specifically the 
abrogation of the Algiers treaty (Murray & Woods, 2014a; Razoux, 2015a, p. 10). The 
situation was favorable for an Iraqi attack for two reasons. Saddam believed the Iranian 
Military was weak due to the tumult of the Iranian Revolution (Murray & Woods, 2014a, 
p. 32) . Secondly, post the ‘radical’ turn and Iranian Hostage Crisis, Iran found itself with 
few allies, which predicted few coming to Iran’s aid and a balancing logic predicted 
support for Iraq from the US, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies. According to 
offensive realists, the weakness of Iran’s military and its diplomatic isolation removed 
the systemic constrains for Iraqi aggression. This approach implicitly assumes that a 
different leader would have reacted in a relatively similar fashion when faced with a 
similar opportunity. While the weakness of the Iranian army was a factor in Saddam’s 
decision to invade, this explanation has a number of limitations.  
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 In a broad sense, it sees Saddam’s action as an act of opportunism: taking 
advantage of Iran’s obsolescing weakness. While this may have been a factor, Gause’s 
work persuasively argues that Saddam was reacting more to Iranian provocations than 
taking advantage of Iranian weakness (F. G. Gause III, 2002, 2009).  The timing of the 
attack supports this interpretation: if Iraq was merely driven by Iranian weakness, the 
planning of hostile action should track the weakening of the Iranian military, which 
according to Gause (2002), began in 1977. Iraq did not attack until September 1980, after 
the deterioration of relations and well after the first purges in the military. The timing 
suggests the decision followed a spiral of hostile actions and a deterioration of relations, 
not just Iranian military weakness.  
What was the larger geopolitical context for Saddam’s invasion? A number of 
works emphasize how Saddam was encouraged to invade Iran by the U.S. The U.S. 
provided both a green light and intelligence estimates signaling the weakness of the 
Iranian military, thus, encouraging an Iraqi attack, according to proponents of the green 
light thesis.25 The green light thesis is based on a number of assumptions about how an 
Iraqi attack would advance U.S. goals in the Persian Gulf. The goals included gaining 
leverage over the Iranian regime after the hostage crisis, the U.S. trying to improve 
relations with Iraq after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and based on U.S. statements 
after the invasion indicating that the U.S. stood to benefit from such an invasion (Brands, 
2012).  
                                                          
25
 Aburish, (2000), Fayazmanesh, (2008), and Hiro, (1990) all suggest U.S. complicity.  
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Recent works have been highly critical of the green light thesis, arguing that the 
green light thesis is more myth than reality. 26 Critics of the green light thesis contend that 
it is striking that, to this day, such an explanation still rests on no hard evidence. 
Proponents of the green light thesis rely on statements of former secretary of state Haig 
and on statements made by Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr, former president of Iran. Haig claims 
that Carter gave Saddam the green light via Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Haig 
was not in government at the time and thus could not have any direct knowledge of U.S. 
policy. In addition, professional historians have been critical of Haig’s claim. According 
to Gardner, “Haig’s source may have exaggerated”  (L. C. Gardner, 2010, p. 67). 
Likewise, historians have been critical of Sadr’s claims. Sadr was president of Iran when 
the war began. A number of assertions by  Sadr (1991) in his work My Turn to Speak,—
where the green light thesis is propounded—has been subject to scrutiny. What is also 
telling, according to Brands (2012), is that to this day no hard evidence has surfaced 
corroborating the green light.  
Besides the lack of hard evidence, critics of the green light thesis argue that the 
U.S. had, in fact, much to lose if Saddam invaded. Far from the invasion providing the 
key to solving the Iranian hostage crisis issue, the invasion could have resulted in the 
harming of the hostages. Carter, in his diaries, express just such a concern (Jimmy Carter, 
1995, p. 516). Furthermore, the Carter administration was in the process of trying to find 
a negotiated settlement to this hostage crisis issue at the time, and the invasion would 
have disrupted such negotiations. Moreover, the larger Cold War context aimed to reduce 
Soviet influence in the region. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S policy 
                                                          
26
 “The idea of an American green light for Iraq’s invasion is explored and convincingly debunked in Bryan 
R. Gibson, Covert relationships: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War” (Murray & 
Woods, 2014a, p. 89). See also Raxouz (2015).  
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makers were concerned about Soviet influence in important oil producing regions. Thus, 
U.S. policy makers aimed to avoid any policies that would push Iran into Soviet arms.’ 
An invasion by Saddam could have caused the Iranians to seek assistance from the 
USSR. The invasion could have also resulted in the fragmentation of Iran, providing 
opportunities for the USSR to improve its influence in the region (Brands, 2012).  
Newly available evidence suggest that it is unlikely that Saddam perceived a 
green light from the U.S. Captured tapes emphasize Saddam’s deep distrust of the U.S. 
To be discussed in detail in the following section, Saddam perceived U.S. strategy in the 
region to be aimed at destroying the Baathist project. Hence, it is unlikely that Saddam 
would have taken the U.S. pledges at face value. In addition, captured documents note 
that Saddam was receiving his own intelligence reports regarding the weakness of the 
Iranian military. Thus, he was in no need of intelligence from the U.S. signaling Iranian 
weakness.  
Iraqi-USSR relations were strained in the period immediately preceding invasion. 
The shah’s removal theoretically could offer the Soviets gains in the region and Brezhnev 
held hope that inroads could be made with the young revolutionary Iranian state. 
Although Khomeini was hostile to leftist movements in Iran and was critical of the 
USSR, Brezhnev made entreaties to Iran. Such entreaties were made during a tense time 
in Iran-Iraq relations, and thus likely raised concerns in Baghdad. More importantly, the 
USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan strained relations with Baghdad. Following the invasion 
Saddam denounced the invasion and called for a quick end of the occupation. Moscow 
responded to Saddam’s criticism by increasing aid to both the Iraqi Communist Party and 
various Kurdish groups—groups hostile to the Baathist regime (Smolansky and 
Smolansky, 1991). It was in this context that Saddam dispatched Tariz Aziz to Moscow 
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just a day before the Iraqi invasion of Iran. Kremlin leaders were surprised to learn of the 
attack “and furious not to have been consulted” (Razoux, 2015a, p. 82–85).  The Iraqi 
attack on Iran with Soviet supplied arms at a time when Moscow was aiming to improve 
relations with Iran displeased Moscow. Moscow signaled its displeasure with the attack 
by suspending arms shipments to Iraq.  
While various Gulf States provided robust support to Iraq during the war, Saudi 
Arabia was concerned about how an Iraqi invasion would destabilize the region. Saddam, 
traveling to Saudi Arabia and meeting King Khalid in the run up to the Iraqi invasion of 
Iran, was not encouraged to invade by the Saudi King. Rather the King expressed 
concerns about how the invasion would influence oil markets. Ultimately, “unable to 
change Saddam’s mind” the Saudi King offered tacit support with conditions (Razoux, 
2015a, p. 70). In sum, while Iran was isolated, the international system hardly provided 
clear incentives for Saddam to invade.  
Saddam did receive intelligence discussing the deterioration of the Iranian 
military. The Iranian Air Force was weakened due to purges ranging from high ranking  
officers to pilots (Murray & Woods, 2014a, p. 75). The expulsion of western technical 
consultants resulted in the Iranian air force being unable to maintain their equipment 
(Razoux, 2015a). An Iraqi intelligence report indicated the Iranian air force as only 
having  2 of 5 squadrons flyable (Murray & Woods, 2014a, p. 76). The Iranian army was 
subject to purges as well. Estimates indicate over 12,000 officers were purged from the 
Iranian Army. The purges hurt Iran’s ability to orchestrate large scale complex military 
operations (Murray & Woods, 2014a, p. 82). Iraqi intelligence reports relayed Iranian 
weakness to Saddam.  
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 Iranian weakness was a factor in Saddam’s decision to invade. However, the 
temporary advantage should not be considered sufficient to explain the attack. While 
Razoux finds a temporary force ratio favoring Iraq (Razoux, 2015a, p. 20), this advantage 
should not be overblown. A number of objective factors should have tempered Saddam's 
optimism. Iran’s population is three times Iraq’s; while both states have heterogeneous 
populations, Iraq lacks a particular socio-political cohesion; finally, the geography of Iraq 
offers numerous challenges: Iraqi is almost landlocked with major population centers 
closest to the Iranian border and is forced to export oil—its major source of revenue— 
overland via a pipeline through Syria or via the Shat-al-Arab into the Gulf which has the 
potential to be “easily controlled by Iran” (Murray & Woods, 2014a, p. 72). As in most 
military operations, this is an operation riddled with contingences and uncertainties. The 
more important question was essentially how Khomeini would react to an attack, about 
which Saddam could only speculate. Captured audio recordings, discussed later in the 
paper, indicate Saddam understood that he could not predict how Khomeini would react 
or who would be in the position ( or ‘in charge’) to make the decision after an Iraqi 
attack. Saddam seemed to understand that there was a possibility that Iran would not 
immediately capitulate, as envisioned in his limited war aims.   
Gause (2002, 2009) and Walt (1996) offer what I label defensive realist positions. 
Gause sees Saddam as reacting to legitimate threats to his domestic political stability 
while Walt argues that Saddam’s actions were ultimately a result of misperception. 
According to Gause, the Iranian Revolution and its subsequent radical turn involved 
sharp attacks on Saddam’s political legitimacy. Iranian agitation fomented general Shia 
uprisings coupled with attacks on the Iraqi state. Saddam, ever concerned about ‘the 
hidden power of the Shia’ (Tripp, 2002a), could not countenance these types of attacks on 
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his legitimacy and thus was forced to halt Iranian subversion via military means. Gause 
notes that the timing supports his interpretation: it was only after the subsequent 
deterioration of relations that Iraq entertained military strikes; mere Iranian weakness did 
not wet the appetite of Iraqi aggression. Other pieces of evidence suggest Saddam was 
reacting more to Iran provocations. Iraqi’s initial gestures to the revolutionary regime 
were accommodating, and Saddam clearly distinguished between the modern Badr 
regime and its more radical predecessor.  While difficult to pinpoint, Gause (2002, 2009) 
sees Saddam making the decision to invade in April 1980, following a series of attacks—
which Saddam attributed to the Iranians—on Tariq Aziz and a funeral procession.  
Saddam was clearly threatened by these attacks and Shia agitation to the point of 
executing cleric Al-Sadr and his sister, also a Shia activist. While the killing of an 
opposition leader may seem commonplace in Saddam’s Iraq, this was the first time the 
Ba’athist regime killed such a high ranking cleric. As Tripp (2002) notes, this killing was 
“an ominous indicator of the regimes determination to force Shia leaders into a posture of 
obedience (221).” Saddam made membership in the al-Dawa party retroactively illegal 
and a capital offence and expelled more than 40, 000 Iraqis of Iranian origin (Tripp 
2002). He was clearly concerned about the challenges the Iranian revolution posed to the 
stability of the Ba’athist regime. Based on this logic, the only way to halt these 
subversive activities was an attack which would force the Iranians to halt their support for 
the destabilizing elements in southern Iraq.  
Walt (1996) discusses the initiation of the Iran-Iraq War in the larger context of 
the relationship between revolution and war, featuring a case study of revolutionary Iran. 
Revolutions change the preferences of states and the balance of power. Those changes are 
insufficient to explain the initiation of conflict. What is also necessary is uncertainty and 
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misperception surrounding revolution, which leads to spirals of hostility. Uncertainty 
surrounds the new revolutionary state’s capabilities and intentions. Revolutions also 
result, to use the language of defensive realists, in an environment of offensive 
dominance. The offensive dominance stems from the revolutionary states’ messianic 
belief in the inevitability of their revolution spreading, combined with the incorrigible 
need for the status quo state to subvert the revolutionary process. In his discussion of the 
Iranian Revolution, Walt provides an explanation for the Iran-Iraq War which hinges on 
the spiral model. Saddam unjustifiably feared Khomeini’s call for the Shia to revolt 
would be heeded and result in domestic instability. Walt argues that not only are the 
threats to Saddam’s stability exaggerated, but states can take prophylactic measures to 
prevent domestic subversion. While the revolution posed challenges to Saddam’s 
domestic political stability, Saddam overreacted. 
 I agree with Gause that Saddam was threatened by the Iranian Revolution and 
subsequent provocations.27 However, while Saddam was threatened, attacking Iran is 
hardly the uncontested, best means of dealing with this threat.  As Walt notes, states can 
take a number of prophylactic measures to buttress their political stability. As Bengio 
(1985) and Tripp (2002) note, Saddam employed a number of strategies to deal with 
domestic political subversion that did not necessarily involve external aggression. 
Furthermore, the theory outlined above argues actors not only need to be threatened, but 
to have a certain belief in their own efficacy – Hymans (2006) calls this a level of pride—
to deal with the threat.  There is still an explanation needed that bridges threat to action. I 
agree with Walt, as well, that misperception figured prominently in the decision to 
                                                          
27
 Assessing Gause's and Walt’s works hinge on the difficulty in measuring Iraq’s susceptibility to internal 
subversion. Recent work by Gause (2015) addresses this issue.   
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invade. If this conflict was ultimately a product of misperception it should be housed in a 
more comprehensive psychological explanation which is offered in this paper. 
Explanations for the Gulf War  
Offensive realists highlight the incentives for Saddam to invade Kuwait. Iraq 
could gain valuable resources and much needed coastline by swallowing up its much 
weaker neighbor and it is uncontested that Kuwait could not defend itself militarily 
without aid from other states’. Uncertainty surrounded the potential for other states to 
come to Kuwait’s defense, making the rationale for the invasion hinge on the likelihood 
of outside involvement. Realists argue that Saddam made a reasonable gamble based on 
inferences about likely U.S. involvement. A general trend of U.S.-Iraqi policy was based 
on a balancing logic against revolutionary Iran, which culminated in the normalization of 
relations (J. Hiltermann, 2007, pp. 37–51; Jentleson, 1994a; Karabell, 1995a). Offensive 
realist claim this encouraged Saddam to believe that the U.S. would not become involved 
if Saddam invaded Kuwait; the U.S. would overlook this transgression just as it failed to 
punish  Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and his support for various terrorist 
organizations. Outside the broader trend, the U.S. did not implement a successful strategy 
of deterrence. In the face of Saddam’s bellicose language, mixed messages emanated 
from Washington, culminating in the famous Glaspie meeting, in which Glaspie, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, was summoned abruptly to meet Saddam. Glaspie stopped short of 
making a clear statement about the U.S.’s commitment to Kuwait’s sovereignty. 
According to this view, while Saddam clearly miscalculated—this was a reasonable 
gamble due to the U.S. government’s inability to signal its intention to protect Kuwait, 
which led Saddam to believe the U.S. would not become involved (Freedman & Karsh, 
1995a; F. G. Gause III, 2009).  
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This approach has a number of major problems. Firstly, as Stein (1992) notes, the 
U.S. did not employ a coherent strategy to deter Saddam from invading Kuwait. Meaning 
that it is possible that a rational actor could have interpreted U.S. policy preceding the 
invasion as signaling that the U.S. was unwilling to become involved. However, the 
strategy of compellence was successfully implemented by the United States, according to 
Stein (1992). Compellence, as used in international relations, involves an actor coercing 
an opponent into giving up something the opponent already possesses, usually by 
threating punishment (Shelling, 1966). H.W. Bush made two very costly signals 
indicating that the U.S. would likely become involved in the conflict: The infamous Rose 
Garden statement (“this aggression will not stand”) and deploying tens of thousands of 
troops to the region. A rational actor should have interpreted U.S. actions as clearly 
signaling its willingness to eject the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. It is perplexing from a 
rational choice standpoint, if the invasion was an act of opportunism, as to why, when it 
became apparent that the U.S. would become involved—first in pledging to defend Saudi 
Arabia and evolving to a U.S. commitment to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait—that 
Saddam did not take or attempt a face saving off-ramp offered by French and Russian 
envoys, before the start of the air campaign (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a). Or Saddam 
could have agreed to unconditional withdrawal before either the beginning of the ground 
or air campaign, theoretically saving the destruction of parts of his military. Other pieces 
of evidence hurt this narrative. Captured recordings detail Saddam’s deep distrust of the 
U.S. Seeing that Saddam saw the U.S. as incurably deceitful, Saddam “almost certainly 
could not have taken this statement (Glaspies’ alleged pledge of U.S. non-involvement) at 
face value given his abiding fear of American hostility” (Brands & Palkki, 2012a, p. 
656). Other minor issues are inconsistent with the offensive realist position or theory of 
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opportunistic expansion. As the Iraqi Perspective Project notes, it did not appear that the 
Iraqi Army was prepared to invade Kuwait, as they lacked basic maps of the small 
emirate (Woods et al, 2006).  
It is more likely that a different motive than opportunism was driving Saddam to 
invade. Saddam believed in an elaborate conspiracy to weaken the Iraqi regime via the 
manipulation of oil prices. Kuwait was a party to this conspiracy as it was overproducing, 
driving down the price of oil (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a; F. G. Gause III, 2002, 2009).  
Captured recordings confirm Saddam’s belief in this conspiracy (K. M. Woods, Palkki, & 
Stout, 2011b). Tariq Aziz, after the U.S. invasion and the overthrow of the Ba’athist 
regime, still maintains this position (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b). But, as Jentleson (1994) 
argues, U.S. policy during this period could not be said to be a conspiracy aimed at 
weakening the regime. As noted, the U.S. was aiming to improve relations with the 
regime prior to Saddam’s invasion (J. Hiltermann, 2007, pp. 37–51; Jentleson, 1994a; 
Karabell, 1995a). Attention shifts to the origins of this elaborate conspiracy, especially 
during a period of attempted warming of relations with the U.S. The theory used in this 
paper can explain both the construction of the conspiracy and the apparent urgency to 
invade Kuwait.  
Works in the field of comparative authoritarianism explain Saddam’s behavior 
with reference to unit-level variables. Jessica Week's (2014) path-breaking work 
highlights how the preferences of leaders interact with domestic political institutions. 
This model features a case study of Saddam: the combination of his ambition and 
permissive domestic political institutions explain the initiation of the Gulf War. Jeff 
Colgan's (2013; Colgan and Weeks 2015) work, addressing revolutionary states and 
conflict initiation, stresses the importance of domestic political institutions as well, 
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crafting a theory that combines domestic political institutions, the revisionist preferences 
and high risk tolerances of revolutionary leaders, and petro-wealth. The combination of 
these three variables creates a potent cocktail which explains the higher likelihood for the 
initiation of military disputes.  Colgan sees Hussein as exemplifying this dynamic 
(Colgan, 2013c).  
Both of these theories have little or no appreciation for the threats Saddam 
faced—real or imagined—and, thus, are forced to frame Saddam’s actions as being acts 
of opportunism. It is the contention of this paper that in both cases Saddam perceived his 
regime to be under serious threat. While missing the systemic dimension, theories 
featuring domestic political institutions are valuable in outlining the context in which 
Saddam made decisions and should be viewed as a permissive condition. Accounts have 
Hussein making these decisions essentially unconstrained. Woods and Murry note that 
Saddam made the decision to invade Iran essentially in isolation (Murray & Woods, 
2014a);  Tariq Aziz claims that Hussein made the decision to  invade all of Kuwait ‘at the 
last minute,’ giving little warning to the Iraqi military (Cockburn & Cockburn, 2000). A 
different domestic political institutions may have inhibited Saddam’s ability to launch 
these attacks. These theories are able to explain why these regime types frequently 
engage in wars, but cannot provide a specific explanation for a specific war.   
Saddam’s NIC: Solidarity and Status  
The Solidarity Dimension: “The Three Circles of Hostility”28  
The solidarity dimension’s key question “is whether ‘we’ and ‘they’ naturally 
stand for similar or different interests and values” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 22). Saddam 
clearly held an oppositional identity conception with Israel, the U.S., and Iran. I use 
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 This phrase is Bengio's (2002) 
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secondary sources augmented with captured recordings to establish the key comparison 
other. I find Saddam’s key comparison other(s) to be: Iraq against the world. 
Interestingly, Saddam sees a diverse groups a states—Iran, the U.S., and Israel—forming 
circles of hostility and acting in concert to thwart the Ba’athist project. Iran paired with 
the U.S. and Israel may appear incongruous without an understanding of Saddam’s 
conception of pan-Arab unity and its relationship with imperialism. Saddam believed 
imperialists were constantly plotting to inhibit the formation of the Arab nation and 
aiming to retard the Arab nations’ modernization and development. Ba’ath party idiom 
distinguished between the imperialism done by great powers driven by their ambition, 
which included the U.S. and the U.K, and ‘Imperialism on the behalf of ‘another party—
this includes Israel, Iran, Kuwait, and other Gulf States  (Bengio, 2002a, p. 129). This can 
explain why Saddam attributed many actions by Iran and Kuwait as evidence of a larger 
conspiracy to weaken the Arab nation.  Nonetheless, he clearly saw the U.S., Israel, and 
Iran as having interests and values inimical to Iraq.  
Americans: “Conspiring Bastards”29 
 Fundamentally, Saddam saw the conflict with the U.S. stemming from the U.S.’s 
close relationship with Israel. U.S. policy strengthening Israel could only come at the 
Arab’s expense. Saddam elaborated, “There are some proven facts of American 
policy…keeping the Zionist entity strong at the expense of Arabs. And with such a basis, 
we’ll find ourselves clashing with it (the U.S.) and in one way or another, and so will 
every genuine Arab who’s ardent for his nation” (SH-SHTP-000-838, Woods et al pg. 
41).  Saddam continued: “whenever the American policy meets Zionist policy, it becomes 
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 Saddam claimed that the Americans were still ‘conspiring bastards’ even during the alleged warming of 
U.S.-Iraqi relations (Brands and Palkki 2012, 626; SH-SHTP-D-000-567).  
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hostile; and wherever the American policy supposes it must obtain its interests at the 
expense of Arabs, it is imperialistic (SH-SHTP-000-838, Woods et al p. 42).    
 Saddam’s opposition to the U.S. is all the more interesting as the U.S. and Iraq 
held a number of the same strategic objectives, notably trying to contain revolutionary 
Iran’s expansion and, post-9/11, both were threatened by religiously based extremism. 
Even when the two states found themselves with similar strategic objectives, Saddam was 
still hostile to the U.S. During the tilt (1982-1988) with the U.S. supporting Iraq during 
the Iran-Iraq War, “Saddam’s view of the United States as treacherous and conspiratorial 
persisted” (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 18). For instance, while the U.S. was supplying 
Iraq with weapons, Saddam suspected that the U.S. was helping Iran in a similar fashion, 
feeding Iran weapons and intelligence. Recordings document Saddam’s belief that the 
Iranians capture of the Al-Faud peninsula was only possible with U.S. intelligence given 
to them. Saddam thought, as well, that the U.S. was spying on Iraq and feeding Iraq ‘bad’ 
intelligence.  These beliefs were validated when he learnt of Iran-U.S. collusion during 
the Iran contra scandal (Brands, 2011b). Tarqi Aziz told interrogators the scandal 
reinforced Saddam's view of the U.S. as ‘untrustworthy’ and “out to get him personally.”  
The Zionist Entity  
This section will provide three pieces of evidence—Ba’ath party language, private 
recordings, and Saddam’s public speeches— to establish an oppositional identity 
conception with Israel. Saddam clearly held an oppositional identity conception vis-à-vis 
Israel or the ‘Zionist entity.’30 A discussion of Saddam’s views of Israel should be 
preceded by a discussion of Saddam’s anti-Semitism. While the source of Saddam’s anti-
                                                          
30
 Brands and Palacki note: “there was no clean dividing line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in 
Saddam’s thinking” (Brands & Palkki, 2011a, p. 141).  
73 
 
Semitism cannot be known, his maternal uncle who raised him may have influenced his 
views. Khair Allah Talah—Saddam’s maternal uncle—wrote a pamphlet titled: The 
Three Things God should not have Created: Jews, Persians, and Flies.  According to 
Woods, Palkki, and Stout (2011), the secondary literature tended to downplay Saddam’s 
anti-Semitism, suggesting his anti-Semitism was unfairly attributed, based on his public 
utterances—which were made instrumentally— and in a guilt by association fashion due 
to his close relationship with his maternal uncle.  Recordings made in private belie the 
idea that Saddam was an instrumental anti-Semite.  Brands and Palaki reviewing 
transcripts of private conversations find “his vituperative public utterances toward Israel 
was not merely a matter of political theater or rhetorical excess, but rather indicated a 
perception of incorrigible strategic and ideological conflict and a desire to wage war 
against the Jewish state” (Brands & Palkki, 2011a, p. 135).  
 Although Ba’ath party idiom may be used instrumentally, the language is 
consistent with Saddam’s views expressed in private. Ba’ath party ideology portrayed 
Israel as deserving of both fear and contempt.  In terms of contempt, as Bengio (2002) 
notes, Ba’ath party organs placed quotation marks around Israel, reflecting the contested 
nature of Israel. Another telling term used to describe Israel in Ba’athist idiom is al-
dahkila which means stranger or one deserving of protection. In Bedouin custom, this 
type of person is worthy of protection and hospitality for a period of time, but that this 
persona must leave after a short interval. The important point, according to Bengio 
(2002), is not the hospitality but the idea that “dahkial cannot be accepted into the tribe, 
so Israel can never be accepted in the Arab nation” (Bengio, 2002a, p. 135).  The words 
kiyan mazru was used as well to describe Israel, meaning something foreign and had a 
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medical parallel meaning “strangeness, artificiality… and the possibility of rejection” 
(Bengio, 2002a, p. 135).  
 Being contemptuous of Israel without fear would hardly motivate action. Yet, 
Saddam appears to have held a healthy appreciation for Israel’s abilities to harm Iraq. 
Woods, Palkki, and Stout, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts concludes that 
Saddam had a “respect for his adversary” (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 62). Saddam 
was fond of conceding that “Jews are smart” (SH-SHTP-000-561).  This explains why 
Ba’athist idiom portrayed Israel as something to be feared.  Bengio notes that Ba’athist 
idiom saw Israel as part of an imperialist scheme to ‘balkanize’ the Arab nation. Israel 
aimed to dominate the area, acting as a beachhead to keep Arab nations “divided, 
dependent, and backward” (Bengio 2002, p. 134).  In recorded conversations, according 
to Brands and Palkki, Saddam implicated Israel in a number of schemes to weaken his 
regime. Saddam saw Israel behind the Kurdish rebellions; thought Israel aimed to destroy 
Iraq’s nuclear facilities and kill senior leadership; envisioned Israel encouraging Iraq’s 
neighbors to attack Iraq; and aimed to weaken Iraqi morale via propaganda and 
misinformation. Some of these claims are correct: Israel did destroy the Osirak reactor in 
1981. Yet others are ridiculous, such as when Saddam apparently thought that the 
“television series Pokémon was, in fact, an Israeli plot to contaminate the minds of Iraqi 
youths” (Brands & Palkki, 2011a, p. 140).  
 Another telling and fascinating piece of evidence is Saddam’s own fiction writing. 
Saddam thought of himself as an artist and a poet (Sassoon, 2011a). Shortly before the 
U.S invasion in 2003, Saddam was finishing a novel entitled Be Gone Demons. The 
protagonist, tellingly, is an Arab warrior fighting a Christian-Zionist conspiracy. He has 
three sons representing Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The son representing Judaism is 
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characterized as only caring for money and is expelled from the household. Thereafter, he 
becomes a usurer and sells weapons, using his influence to foment discontent among the 
tribes. The son then falls in love, which is unreciprocated. Unable to deal with the 
unreciprocated love, the son rapes the woman. The two other sons are portrayed in a 
favorable light. One does not need a degree in comparative literature to see the meaning 
of the allegory (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 62).31  
 The captured recordings document deep and consistent hostility towards Israel. 
Woods et al., reading numerous transcripts find that Saddam believed that the The 
Protocols the Elders of Zion to be an accurate “guide to understanding Zionist actions” 
(K. M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 62). In a captured recording taped in the mid-1990s, 
Saddam explained: “Zionism has partnered with imperialism and participated in its 
conspiracy and political plans… for the purpose of destroying the Arab nation… 
destroying here may not be sufficiently understood. This means maintaining the weak 
start of the Arab nation and gradually reinforcing and transforming the feelings that it is 
incapable of forming an Arab nation…” (SH-SHTP-A-001-211 pg. 67). In 1985, shortly 
after an Israeli air strike on the Palestine Liberation Organization, Saddam argued that 
there would be no room for accommodation with Israel and the Arabs. “Even if it 
achieved security in the manner that we now see—meaning geographic security—the 
social and political security will absolutely never be achieved between Israel and the 
Arabs,” Saddam concluded. He continued “either the Arabs are slaves to Israel and Israel 
controls their destinies, or the Arabs can be their own master and Israel is like Formosa’s 
location to China at best. Without that rule, it is not possible to ease the issue between the 
Arabs and Israel” (SH-SHTP-V-000-567 pg. 70).   
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 Daniel Pipes discussed the novel at: http://www.danielpipes.org/1947/saddam-the-novelist 
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Iran: “The Yellow Storm” 
Saddam held an oppositional identity conception with Iran as well. Geography 
made the animosity between Iran and Iraq and take on a different and more intimate 
dimension. As Saddam’s uncle wrote: “Iran is a dagger in the heart of the Arabs, 
therefore it must be removed so that the Arabs can regain their health and recover their 
strength, and only then can they face up to foreign enemies. As the old proverb has it: 
‘He who lies with us is the worst thief” (Bengio, 2002a, p. 145). Territorial disputes 
provided ample opportunities for conflict. Shortly after the Ba’ath party taking power in 
1969, Tehran revoked the Shat-al-Arab agreement of 1937 and in 1971 the shah made 
territorial claims on three islands in the Gulf, which held the potential to disrupt traffic in 
the channel.  Feeding the fears of encirclement was the shah, with U.S. backing, 
assuming the role of the ‘police man’ of the Gulf in the early 1970s. More troubling for 
Ba’ath party leadership, was the shah’s support for Kurdish separatist movements in 
Northern Iraq. While the Shah and Saddam clashed, relations deteriorated further with the 
subsequent Iranian revolution.  
As Gause notes, while the relationship between the shah and Ba’athist regime was 
hardly positive, both refrained from making attacks on each other’s domestic political 
legitimacy, as “the major regional powers had come to accept the domestic legitimacy of 
each other’s regimes” (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 86).32 Post Iranian revolution, attacks 
from Khomeini were especially neuralgic as Khomeini made attacks on Saddam’s 
domestic political legitimacy and openly advocated overthrowing the Iraqi dictator. In all, 
                                                          
32 According to Little, while the shah aimed to destabilize Iraq he did not aim to overthrow the Iraqi 
regime. Iranian and American support for the Kurdish was “little more than a spoiling operation” aimed to 
gain negotiating leverage not aimed to overthrow the Iraqi regime (Little, 2004, p. 698; Sluglett & Farouk-
Sluglett, 2001).  
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geography and the clashes immediately preceding the Iran-Iraq War must have “menaced 
Iraq with the danger of partition or of a stifling encirclement” (Bengio, 2002a, p. 139).  
 Ba’ath party language reflected this hostility. Iran called itself Iran since the 
beginning of the 16
th
 century, yet Saddam referred to Iran as Persia. Bengio argues that 
the regime did this for a few reasons. It reinforced the basic Arab-Persian distinction, 
which helped to remind the Shia of southern Iraq of their shared Arab identity and also 
remind other ethnic minorities in Iran of their non-Persian identity. The use of Persia also 
aimed to give the Iran-Iraq war “historical depth” (Bengio, 2002a, p. 140), framing the 
origins of the conflict as primordial. Bengio asserts as well that the use of Persia was 
used to stress its alleged “expansionary nature” (p. 140).  
  Captured recordings indicate Saddam viewed Iran as constantly involved in 
conspiracies in order to weaken the Arab nation.  “No, they are not Turbans,” Saddam 
explains, “the Iranians are satanic Turbans, and they know how to conspire and know 
how to plan sedition…” ( SH-SHTP-000-561). Saddam saw Iran as a useful proxy for the 
U.S. and Israel to harm Iraq. Saddam thought that the U.S. provided Iran with weapons in 
order to urge Iran to prolong the Iran-Iraq War (SH-SHTP-A-000-555).  Saddam’s belief 
in the collusion between Iran and Israel can explain some of his views that are, absent an 
understanding of Saddam’s beliefs, perplexing. For instance, Saddam thought the U.S. 
was involved with the Iranian Revolution. Without going into a detailed discussion of 
U.S.-Iranian relations, it is clear that the revolution was a disaster for the U.S and the 
U.S. was unable to predict the revolution or orchestrate it. Yet, Saddam held that “they 
(the Americans) are involved in the events of Iran, including the removal of the shah, 
which is completely an American decision” (SH-SHTP-D-000-559). As mentioned, the 
Iran-Contra Affair served as validation for Saddam’s belief in close Iranian-U.S. 
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collusion. Saddam sees Iranians colluding with Israel in the captured recordings as well.  
In one recording he asserts that “Iran cannot do anything without the help of the Zionist 
entity” (SH-SHTP-A-000-626). In another recording made in 1981, Saddam envisions a 
chemical attack upon Iraq by Iran, planned by the Israelis. “One day, Israel will provide 
the Iranians with the know-how to wage a germ and chemical attack,” Saddam explained. 
The recordings details how Saddam thought the Iranians  would be emboldened and 
encouraged attack Iraq with chemical weapons, with the Israelis providing the materials 
and knowhow (SH-SHTP-A-001-039). He also believed that the attack on the Osirak 
Reactor by Israel in 1981 was done with the help of the Iranians and “another 
international party” (SH-SHTP-000-571).  
 Saddam’s belief in Iranian, Israeli, and U.S. collusion is not crazy or insane. As 
Takeyh (2011) notes, Israel pursued a periphery doctrine which aimed to cultivate 
relations with non-Arab states in the Middle East in order to vitiate its isolation (Takeyh, 
2011, p. 66–67). As Razoux (2015, p.116) notes, at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Israel engaged the revolutionary regime supplying it “not only with spare parts but with 
growing quantities of weapons and ammunition,” as a prolonged war, weakening both 
states, was in Israel’s interests. Furthermore, at the time at the start of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Israel was concerned about its more pressing and proximate threat, Iraq.33  Yet, Iran was 
hardly a pliable tool of Israel. Similarly, as Iran-Contra displayed, while U.S.-Iranian 
collusion was possible, Saddam erred in seeing Iran-Contra not as an aberrant, rather ill-
executed scheme, but rather as indicative of the U.S.’s perfidious nature, thus cementing 
his views about the U.S (Brands, 2011b).  
                                                          
33
Takeyh  notes that Israel was also concerned about the large Jewish population in Iran; Israel also held out 
the hope that the Iranian revolution would be a passing phenomenon (Takeyh, 2011, p. 67).  
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The Status Dimension: “The Central Post of the Arab Nation”  
The key feature for the status dimension “is how high ‘we’ stand relative to 
‘them’ in the international pecking order: are we naturally their equal (if not their 
superior), or will we simply never measure up” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 23). Saddam 
envisioned Iraq to be a great power. In Saddam’s words:  “we draw a large picture of 
Iraq. We want to possess a weight like that of China, a weight like that Soviet Union, a 
weight like the United Sates, and that indeed is the factual basis of our actions” (Bengio, 
2002a, p. 146). Aside from comparisons between great powers and Iraq, Saddam clearly 
saw Iraq as the state best able to lead the pan-Arab movement. “While often conflating 
the concept of self and state, Saddam believed Iraq was the only Middle Eastern state 
capable of achieving the proper place for the Arab nation in history,” writes Murray and 
Woods (2014a, p. 26). Addressing a gathering of the Iraqi Military in 1978, Saddam 
pledged to make Iraq the firm base of the Arab nation  (Bengio, 2002a, p. 36). 34 Even 
after the U.S. invasion and capture of Saddam, he held firm in his belief about the 
greatness of Iraq. Saddam told his interviewer: “God had destined Iraq for greatness. Few 
countries has ever led the world, yet God has given Iraq a unique gift that enabled in to 
‘go to the top’ many times”  (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 87).  
In a captured recording, Saddam discussed how and why he envisioned Iraq to be 
the central post in the Arab nation. In the recording, consistent with SIT, he makes 
arbitrary– and sometimes inaccurate— distinctions as to why Iraq was the state best able 
                                                          
34
 Bengio notes an apparent contradiction in Saddam’s use of identity if used in an instrumental fashion. If 
Arab identity is emphasized, this leaves out the Kurds who are linguistically and ethnically not Arab; if you 
emphasize a Iraqi identity, it “raises Iraq above the others in the overall Arab revival” (Bengio, 2002a, p. 
36).   
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to lead the pan-Arab nation. While Saudi Arabia was very rich, “the human being is 
missing. There is no destiny of population and no quality.” Algeria is unable to lead 
because of its “distant location” and “the limit in the depth of its national thinking, cannot 
assume the leadership.”  Saddam elaborated that “Iraq has everything going for it… it has 
the depth in its civilization, it has the depth in the population density, and has various 
types of advanced sciences in comparison to the others and has the material 
capabilities…No one else can carry out this role. Iraq can make this nation rise and can 
be its center post of its big abode” (all quotes from SH-SHTP-000-626). Saddam went on 
to say that if Iraq was to fail, the whole pan Arab movement would fail as well.   
 
Case Study: The Iran- Iraq War  
 
Fear: “The Hidden power of the Shia”   
In July 1980 high ranking military officers met in Baghdad. The Iraqi army chief 
of staff told the group that war with Iran was possibility and asked them to prepare—but 
did not provide a date or specific military objective. According to Woods and Murry the 
generals had an idea about the possibility of war with Iran in July of 1980, but “most 
officers got the impression that such a war would not take place for at least two years” 
(2014, p. 47). At a different meeting with Saddam present “he (Saddam) gave his 
generals a single month to prepare the army and provide him with a coherent battle plan, 
ignoring the fact that such an enterprise generally requires considerably more time,” 
writes Razoux (2015, p. 7).  Consistent with the theory in section 3, the evidence suggests 
there was an urgency to act.  
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 There are two reasons as to why Saddam felt the urgency to act. One was the 
weakness of the Iranian Army; the second was the diplomatic isolation of Iran post- 
hostage crisis. Both appear to have been factors in Saddam’s decisions. In a recorded 
conversation on September 16
th
 – the ground and air invasion commenced on the 22nd of 
September—Saddam and his advisors discuss Iran’s diplomatic isolation. Shibli al-
Aisamy tells Saddam the benefits of attacking soon, “there is no doubt that the 
international circumstances, currently, are in our favor to get the land back and to conduct 
operations. But in the future perhaps, the international circumstances will not stay the 
same if things take a long time.” (ST-SHTP-A-000-035). In addition to Iran’s diplomatic 
isolation, Saddam received a report from his intelligence services on June 30 1980, 
outlining that Iran “has no power to launch wide scale offensive operations against Iraq, 
or defend itself on a large scale,” that the Western embargo was making the economic 
situation in Iran dangerous, and that more deterioration in Iran’s fighting capability is to 
be expected (SH-GMID-D-000-842). While these may have been factors, the timing 
suggests that the deterioration in relations between Iran and Iraq was a factor as well. The 
Iranians stormed the American embassy on November 4, 1979. According to Gause, the 
Iranian regime started weakening under the Shah in 1977. Although it is unclear if 
Saddam knew this, as he only received the intelligence report in the June 1980. Saddam 
apparently started planning for the attack in the summer of 1980 following a sharp 
deterioration in relations with the Iranian regime, not immediately following the hostage 
crisis or revolutionary purges. Fast forward to September 1980, in a September 16
th
 
meeting Saddam told his generals that he decided to go to war with Iran in the following 
days. General Ali Hassan al-Majid, told Saddam about a number of risks attacking Iran. 
Saddam dismissed al-Majid’s arguments and “asked him, ‘Ali, why do you always bring 
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me the bad news, never the good news” (Razoux, 2015a, p. 13)?   After this exchange he 
“summoned his generals and ordered them to immediately go on the offensive.” While 
the generals had some flexibility about the proper time and date, Saddam “would not 
tolerate the slightest delay” (Razoux, 2015a, p. 13). In sum, while there may have been a 
window of opportunity, Saddam clearly felt an urgency to act.  
 Revolutionary oppositionists should make higher threat assessments. Following 
Bengio, the Iranian revolution posed a general and specific threat to the Iraqi regime. In 
general, it posed a threat—similar to the threat revolutionary states pose to status quo 
states— in the form of “a somewhat ill-defined religious challenge to the secular, 
modernist Ba’athist ideology” (Bengio, 1985a, p. 1)  The second threat, according to 
Bengio, was in the form of a direct overthrow—via a rebellion—orchestrated by Shia 
clergy in Iran.  Regarding the latter, Saddam was clearly threatened by Shia agitation and 
attributed internal instability to Iranian meddling. As noted, he executed notable cleric 
Al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980; expelled over 40,000 Shi’a Iraqis; made the Shi’a 
ineligible to join the military; and made membership in the al-Dawa party a capital 
offense (F. G. Gause III, 2009; Tripp, 2002a). While it is clear that the Iranian revolution 
posed a challenge to both the Iraqi and Saudi regimes, Walt (1996) and Bengio (1985), 
argue that Saddam likely overreacted to the threat. Regarding the first general threat, 
Walt (1996) argues that the revolutionary regime’s “ideological message has proven less 
compelling than many observers originally feared” (1996, p. 261). While this assessment 
is made ex post, Walt is correct to note the difficulties in exporting revolution. Regarding 
the second threat, Walt and Bengio note that states have the ability to take prophylactic 
measures to bolster their domestic political stability. Bengio argues that these strategies 
had been “quite successful” (1985, p. 6). Bengio concludes that a combination of Shi’a 
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passivity, a lack of organization, the regime’s ‘tight grip’, and the Shi’a loyalty to the 
Iraqi state, made it unlikely that a revolution would have been successful in Iraq. Bengio 
concludes by stating that “the Shia threat has been magnified beyond all proportion by 
the regime itself” (Bengio, 1985a, p. 12). While Saddam had valid reasons to be 
threatened by the Islamic revolution, he blew up the threat to unreasonable proportions, 
which is consistent with the theory outlined in section 2.  
 Fear also encourages an actor to have a lower degree of cognitive complexity. 
Actors with a high degree of cognitive complexity are able to make subtle distinctions 
when confronted with new information (Stein, 1994b). The air attacks’ effectiveness— 
Saddam was aiming to ape the Israelis air attacks during the Six Days War —was 
predicated on an intelligence report indicating that the Iranian Air Force was effectively 
grounded or their capability was severely diminished. Before the air attacks and ground 
invasion on September 22
nd
, Iraqi and Iranian forces exchanged artillery fire. The artillery 
fire was followed by air skirmishes. On September 7
th
, five Iraqi helicopters entered 
Iranian airspace, one was shot down and the other forced to return. As Razoux notes, 
“this was a bitter surprise for the Iraqi pilots, who thought that Iran’s F-12 air-superiority 
fighters were grounded” (Razoux, 2015a, p. 12). Two more air skirmished followed. An 
Iraqi Mig-21s shot down an Iranian Phantom; on September 10
th
, an Iranian Tomcat 
destroyed an Iraqi Su-22. Razoux notes the Iranian Tomcat is a formidable aircraft with 
long range capabilities.  These events, preceding the air attack, should have urged caution 
on the Iraqi side: not only was the Iranian air force certainly not grounded, but the 
Iranians just displayed the Tomcat’s air capacities. This should have reminded Saddam—
who was a notorious mico-manager and assiduously monitored military actions— that 
while the revolution may have diminished the capabilities of the Iranian Air force, the 
84 
 
Iranian military was a modern, well-trained military, with equipment—provided by 
American during the Shah’s era—that was superior in many ways to the Soviet provided 
Iraqi equipment. The air skirmished should have raised doubts about the Iranian air force 
being a non-entity or about air superiority on the Iraqi side being a given (Razoux, 2015a, 
pp. 8–10).  A rational actor should have updated plans based on this new information.  
Pride: “We have to stick their face in the Mud” 
Saddam aimed for an air attack similar to the Israelis’ attack on Egypt during the 
Six Days War, in which the Israelis were able to destroy the Arab air forces on the 
ground in the first few hours of the attack. Not only did Saddam error in seeing the 
spectacular—Israel’s successful surprise attack on the Arab air force—as likely, but his 
air force commanders should have been aware of significant limitations in their own 
training and capabilities, which should gave raised doubts about the Iraqi Air Force’s 
ability to accomplish such as task. When Saddam told air force command General 
Mohamed Jessam al-Joury of the attack, the General—who Razoux describes as a ‘good 
apparatchik’—“followed the dictator’s wishes” (Razoux, 2015a, p. 22). It is unclear if 
Saddam knew the extent of the limitations of his air force.  Saddam was told directly by 
Shibli al-Aisamy: “they (the Iranians) also have remarkable modern military bases that 
are spread over the coast, which is about 860 kilometers” (SH-SHTP-A-000-835). Al-
Aisamy also noted that the Iranians have an excellent navy. Saddam should have been 
aware of the limitations on his military capabilities. Saddam who at times discussed the 
most specific details—such as if the Soviets will continue to provide ammunition during 
the war— was untroubled with the details of the air attack and did not worry about the 
logistical challenges. If his military did voice concern such as when Ali Hassan al-Majid 
voiced concerns directly to Saddam about the risks of an attack on Iran—it is likely they 
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would have been brushed aside. Consistent with the theory in offered in this dissertation, 
Saddam displayed an illusion of control. What we should see in cases of such illusion is 
an actor overlooking important details in the implementation of policy. There is 
significant evidence that important details were overlooked in the implementation of the 
opening air attack.  Evidence suggests that this attack did not even have a chance of 
achieving the goals articulated by Saddam.  
 Consider first the basic logistical challenges of the opening air attack. Hundreds 
of aircraft were housed in seven military bases across Iran, some of them hundreds of 
miles from Iraqi air bases and across mountainous terrain. The Iraqi Air Force “was 
hardly capable of mounting more than 90 sorties per day… and had only limited combat 
experience” according to Cooper and Bishop (2002, p. 72). For comparison, the Israelis 
launched 700 sorties a day in the Six Days War. Razoux (2015) estimates that the Iraqi 
Air Force would have needed to fly over 500 more sorties to have possibly achieved the 
destruction of the Iranian air force. In addition, as Woods and Murry note, the command 
system did not have any prior experience with such a complicated attack (2014, p. 101).  
Compounding a general difficult logistical feat, the Iraqi Air Force was not 
adequately trained for such an air attack and did not have the proper equipment to 
achieve the objectives set. Saddam should have known this because as part of his strategy 
of ‘coup-proofing’ he limited the Iraqi’s air forces ability to adequately train (Murray & 
Woods, 2014a). As Razoux notes, the Iraqi pilots flew too fast to destroy certain targets 
and lacked the proper training to line up the Iranian Tiger planes properly on the ground. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi sighting system was not “designed for low altitude bombing” 
(Razoux, 2015a, p. 25). In addition to the training deficiencies, the planes were not 
properly equipped. The Iranian Air Bases, built by the Shah on the American Model, 
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featured large runways and housed their planes in concrete reinforced bunkers. It is likely 
the Iraqis were unaware of this because “ the distances to Iranian Airfields limited the 
Iraqis to human sources of intelligence to determine the status and strength of the 
squadrons deployed” (Murray & Woods, 2014a, p. 100). The Iraqi Air Forced lacked 
effective weapons to destroy concrete hangars (Razoux 2015, p. 22). Iraqi generals also 
planned on prioritizing destroying the Iranians radar and anti-aircraft systems, 
overlooking the fact that they lack effective weapons systems to destroy such systems 
(Razoux, 2015a, p. 22). Iraqi planes could only hold two parachute drag bombs because 
the weapons load had to be reduced to allow for the maximum amount of fuel in the 
external fuel tanks to reach some of the Iranian Air bases (Razoux, 2015a, p. 23). In order 
to reach the Iranian Airfields at daybreak, the Iraqi pilots had to take off at night and fly 
nap-of-the-earth to escape notice. Iraqi pilots were not trained to fly at night and were not 
equipped with the proper navigation equipment to fly nap-of-the-earth (Razoux, 2015a, p. 
22). With the Iraqi Air Force not properly trained and equipped, it is not surprising that, 
as Razoux notes, “the Iranian Airforce came out of the attack, which was designed to 
permanently ground it, unharmed” (2015, p. 26).  Murry and Woods make a similar 
conclusion: “Sloppily planned and executed, the attempt to destroy the Iranian Air Force 
on the ground failed” (2014, p. 101). While many military operations are difficult and 
limitations become obvious with the benefit of hindsight, it does appear that neither the 
Iraqi Air Force nor Saddam gave pause to determine if their forces were even capable of 
such a mission. The air attack appears to have been planned with little attention to the 
details of policy implementation, which matches the predictions made in the theory 
section.  
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The ground invasion was more successful and consisted of six uncoordinated 
drives into Iranian territory. Murry and Woods argue that success was aided by surprise 
and an unprepared Iranian military (2014, p. 108). Saddam proved to have gambled 
correctly in this instance, as the Iranian military was weakened due to the tumult of the 
revolution. Yet, while Saddam may have gambled correctly, the ground invasion was 
poorly planned and uncoordinated, mirroring the air campaign, in which the details of 
policy implementation were ignored. “The invasion appears to have rested on no overall 
military plan or conception, nor is there evidence of clear objectives” writes (Murray & 
Woods, 2014a, p. 108). The Iraqi military overlooked three important facets that would 
prove costly. The Iraqi Army failed to seal the mountain passes that would preclude the 
Iranians from reinforcing the front from Tehran. Secondly, the main highway—which 
was of strategic importance as it linked four towns in Iran—was not secured by the Iraqis. 
This would haunt the Iraqis as the Iranians would use this road to conduct counter-attacks 
over the next two years. Thirdly, they failed to plan how they would occupy key areas. 
This same lack of planning will be seen in the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Iraqi 
Army seemed to have wandered into Iran without any clear goals or plans, overlooking 
many key objectives, which is consistent with the theory outlined in section 3. As we will 
see in the case of the Gulf War, Saddam displays a Pollyannaish faith that his military 
will accomplish their objectives with little attention to the actual details of the likely 
engagement.  
The illusion of control also makes actors insensitive to the potential unintended 
consequences of a particular decision. Perhaps Saddam’s most consequential gamble 
involved how the Iranian regime would react to the Iraqi invasion. The attack made sense 
strategically if it either toppled the radical regime or forced the Iranian leadership to sue 
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for peace. Both would halt Iranian subversion and allow Saddam to take territory. In a 
recorded conversation on September 16
th
 Saddam discusses just this topic with his senior 
advisors. The debate hinges on two intertwined questions: is Khomeini in charge, 
specifically does he have the military under his control? And two, is Khomeini likely to 
reach an agreement with Iraq after the attack? Ali Abu Hassam argued that “there is 
currently no authority in Iran to make a decision except for Khomeini. There is no one 
else.” Hassan continues “he is a stubborn man, who claims he is coming to liberate Iraq, 
so how can he tolerate the land snatched away from him?  He has to be arrogant about it.” 
Hassam notes—correctly with the benefit of hindsight—that Khomeini is unlikely to 
compromise if attacked. Saddam responds by asking about rumors of Khomeini’s death; 
they both have a laugh and Saddam quips that there are similar rumors about his own 
death—meaning they are rumors.  Saddam agrees with Hassan regarding the likelihood 
of Khomeini compromising “this is correct, Khomeini cannot (compromise).”  But, 
Saddam then goes on to explain that he thinks that Khomeini’s authority is diminishing, 
his orders are sometimes not carried out, “he says something and nobody obeys.” Saddam 
sees both the political and military leadership fractured, the Iranian army is “non-
Khomeini”  (SH-SHTP-A-000-835). Yet, as usual, Saddam's logic is convoluted. He also 
asserts that something could unite them and that something would be war. Saddam 
acknowledges that an attack from Iraq may not in fact unleash the centrifugal forces and 
fracture the regime, but could serve to consolidate Khomeini’s power. Based on this 
conversation it appears that not only does Saddam recognize that Khomeini may be 
unlikely to compromise, but also that an attack may serve to consolidate his regime. He 
appears to be aware of the potential unintended consequences, but this does not cause 
him to question the underlying strategy or to seek more information. In sum, Saddam 
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clearly is aware of the dangers but decides to take a roll of the dice anyway and seems 
aware—but ultimately unmoved—by the dangers of this unintended consequence.  
 Pride also influences an actor’s ultimate goals. This may be especially prevalent 
with revolutionary nationalists who see their place in the sun and not the gutter. Saddam 
clearly saw himself as the leader of the pan-Arab movement. The attack had the ability 
not merely to gain territory but also to reverse the 1975 Algiers Agreement. For Saddam, 
the signing of the Algiers Agreement was a ‘bitter pill’, and the lack of sovereignty over 
the Shatt al-Arab symbolized “subjugation and humiliation by a regional rival” (Murray 
& Woods, 2014a, p. 22). In an interview with journalist Faud Matar, Saddam framed 
Iraq’s involvement in the war as essentially an act of regional leadership and as a duty to 
thwart ‘Persian’ advances: “We will never allow anyone to touch the Arabness of the 
Gulf, its land or its people” (Matar, 1982a, p. 146). Saddam’s speeches constantly refer to 
his role as unifier of Arabs and his duty to thwart imperialist designs. Framing the 
conflict this way had an instrumental component: it encouraged financial support from 
the Gulf States, but Saddam also portrayed himself in private conversations as a regional 
leader with responsibilities. In a meeting with senior officials shortly before the invasion, 
Saddam’s language suggests this conflict is much more than a border squabble. Saddam 
goes on to explain “we have to force their head into the mud and enforce our political 
will on them (striking the table with his hand) which can only happen militarily…We 
want to twist their hands until they accept the legal fact” (SH-SHTP-A-000-835). The 
language used in private meetings and public speeches suggest that this conflict for 
Saddam was about much more than merely halting subversion: Saddam wanted to force 
the Iranians into a subordinate position with himself as rightful leader. In this sense, 
Saddam appeared to derive utility not just from potentially taking territory and halting 
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subversion, but from asserting his dominance and displaying his leadership on a level 
equal with Iraqi’s natural ‘place in the sun.’ 
 Pride “enhances the nation’s sense of the national capability if it exerts itself, to 
affect others behavior” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 33). Revolutionary nationalists should display 
higher potential power perceptions.  As noted, while the Iranian military was weakened, 
a number of objective factors should have curbed Saddam’s optimism about achieving his 
goals.  Recorded conversations provide evidence of Saddam’s higher power perceptions. 
In a recorded conversation dated October 1980, after the air and ground attack, Saddam 
appears to still be optimistic about ‘victory.’ Note that while this cannot shed light on his 
decision to attack, it displays his higher power perceptions after more information was 
revealed. In October 1980, Saddam was aware of the unsuccessful air attack and the 
ground invasion that—while relatively more successful – did not achieve the Iraqi 
military’s stated objectives.  In this recording, Saddam notes “the military results are 
tilting for the benefit of Iraq… our victory will be a historic one.” Saddam then continues 
with his generic paeans regarding the greatness of the Arab nation: “Our victory will be a 
historic one… a victory generations will be talking about… and your role will contribute 
to the development of the Arab nation and its civilization and human developments” (SH-
SHTP-A-001-229). Perhaps Saddam is trying to bolster the morale of his senior officers, 
but it is indicative of his unsupported faith in Iraqi victory. Saddam asserts that the 
‘greatness’ of the Arab nation will ensure ‘victory’ with an insouciance towards his 
actual military ability vis-a-vis Iran’s.  
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Case Study: The Gulf War 
Fear: There is a conspiracy to weaken the Arab Nation   
 
Saddam was hardly the first leader to desire to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq. Iraqi 
leaders, such as Qasim, questioned the legitimacy of the small kingdom and held a 
longstanding claim on Kuwait’s independence dating to 1899. Relations soured between 
Saddam and Kuwait following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Evidence suggests that 
Saddam decided to attack Kuwait in the summer of 1990 and with an apparent urgency to 
act. This matches predictions made in the theory section, which posits that “’a heightened 
level of fear and threat motivates people to take some kind of action—any action” 
(Hymans, 2006b, p. 31). Saddam believed Kuwait was part of a conspiracy to weaken the 
Ba’athist regime via the manipulation of oil prices. Preceding the invasion, Saddam was 
able to coerce the Kuwaitis to reduce production for a two month period, yet Saddam 
claimed that he did not trust the Kuwaitis to keep the agreement (Freedman & Karsh, 
1995a; F. G. Gause III, 2009).  Based on this logic, destroying the Kuwaiti regime may 
have been the only way to halt the actual or the potential manipulation of oil prices. In 
this light, the invasion of Kuwait makes sense and can explain Saddam’s desire to 
incorporate Kuwait into Iraq, but has a difficult time explaining the apparent urgency to 
act. According to Gause, “there is every indication that the decision to invade Kuwait was 
made shortly before the invasion, with the regime feeling intense pressure to act” (F. G. 
Gause III, 2009, p. 92).  
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This urgency can explain why the Iraqi military was unprepared for the invasion. 
Woods (2008) notes that the Iraqi Army lacked accurate and up to date maps of Kuwait.  
General Hamdani in his memoirs notes that they had to rely on tourist maps in order to 
navigate the city (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 67). The Navy was told thirty-six hours before 
the invasion, leaving “the Iraqi Navy very little planning time and almost no preparation 
time in the run-up to the invasion of Kuwait” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 73).  The Navy 
lacked the proper intelligence about the Islands they were attacking (K. M. Woods, 
2008a, p. 77). Iraqi Army aviators were told of their pending mission that midnight that 
they would attack at 0350 that morning. “A senior officer remarked … that the operations 
were not planned very well and were… spur of the moment, ” writes Woods (2008, 80).  
Even more troubling, the Iraqi army appeared to have not given much thought to how 
Kuwait was going to be occupied and administered (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 101).   
In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, there was pressure to act due to the perceived 
obsolescing advantages stemming from Iran’s diplomatic isolation and military 
weakness. In the case of Kuwait, Saddam may have felt the urgency due to his acute 
financial distress. However, from a rationalist standpoint attacking is hardly the 
unequivocalyl best means of addressing this problem. Coercive diplomacy could address 
his financial perils. As noted, Saddam was relatively successful in forcing concessions in 
the forms of aid and decreased oil output from the Kuwaitis. As Gause argues, it made a 
great deal of sense for Saddam to “accept the Kuwaiti offer of 500 million U.S. dollars 
and the Kuwaiti agreement to return to its OPEC oil production quota, pocketed the gains 
and then come back to the table later with other demands” (F. G. Gause III, 2002, p. 53) 
A theory of diversionary war could explain why he attacked, but again, has difficultly 
with the timing and urgency. A diversionary war would still need to be planned for it to 
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be adequately prosecuted. What is more likely and supported by the evidence, is that 
Saddam thought he was subject to an international conspiracy to weaken his regime.  The 
fear induced may have provided the needed motivation to launch this gamble. As we 
know, no such conspiracy existed, shifting attention to why Saddam made such an 
inflated and exaggerated assessment of the threat.  
 As outlined in the theory section, “fear tends to create, on the cognitive level, a 
predisposition toward high threat perceptions” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 33). Saddam believed 
that Iraq was subject to an international conspiracy that did not exist, validating the 
hypothesis that revolutionary oppositionalists will make threat assessments that are 
‘exaggeratedly high.’ Remember as Jettelson notes, US policy at this time was aimed at 
trying to moderate and improve relations with the Iraqi regime (J. Hiltermann, 2007, pp. 
37–51; Jentleson, 1994a; Karabell, 1995a). Thus, from a rational choice perspective, it is 
hard to explain why Saddam believed himself to be subject to an international conspiracy. 
Saddam ascribed significance to essentially unrelated and relatively innocuous events or 
changes in policy.  
 Saddam connected a number of independent external and internal events as being 
pregnant with malicious intent. In terms of external factors, following the Iran-Iraq War, 
Saddam’s regime was in a precarious financial position.  The regime owed a staggering 
amount of money to foreign creditors: $35 billion to western lenders, $11 billion to the 
USSR, and more than $40 billion to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Freedman & Karsh, 
1995a). With the price of oil around 17 dollars a barrel at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Hussein was facing an acute fiscal problem: more liabilities than income. He either had to 
decrease expenditures or increase income (Aburish, 2000b, p. 192; Freedman & Karsh, 
1995a). It was in this context that Saddam interpreted Kuwaiti ‘overproduction’ as part of 
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a larger foreign scheme to weaken his regime (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 99) . Saddam 
essentially viewed the violation of oil quotas by the UAE and Kuwait as a declaration of 
war. He elaborated: “war is fought with soldiers and much harm is done by explosions, 
killing and coup attempts—but it is also done by economic means” (Freedman & Karsh, 
1995a, p. 46). For a regime that relied on a degree of patronage to ensure its domestic 
political stability, a conspiracy to harm Iraq financially was hardly an innocuous act 
(Aburish, 2000b; Tripp, 2002a).  
 A number of trends on the systemic level likely filled Hussein with foreboding as 
well. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Saddam was deprived of a powerful ally. 
According to Freedman and Karsh, the fall of the Soviet Union removed a check on U.S.-
Israeli power in the region. “In his view, the decline of Soviet power and the 
disintegration of the eastern Bloc had deprived the Arab World of its traditional allies and 
left the arena open for a US-Israel diktat,” write Freedman and Karsh (1995, p. 30).  
 Saddam interpreted a small shift in U.S. policy as being aimed at weakening his 
regime.  Congress placed limits on credits for Iraqi purchases of American rice; 
American and British officials moved to block the export of dual use technology; and 
Congressional resolutions criticized Saddam for human rights abuses. Voice of America 
(VOC) broadcasters deeply troubled Saddam as they compared him to recently fallen 
dictators in Eastern Europe. Saddam was unnerved regarding negative reports in the 
media about Iraqi’s use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, negative attention 
about Iraqi nuclear weapons programs, and a money laundering scandal involving an 
Atlanta Bank (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 92–93). 
Compounding Saddam’s views of American hostility, was his poor understanding 
of U.S. politics writ large. According to the Iraqi Perspective Project, Saddam was 
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confused about how Congress might not reflect the views or policies of the executive 
branch (Woods et al, 2006).  Similarly,  it is likely, according the Karabell, that Saddam 
“interpreted criticism from the US media as criticism from the Bush Administration” 
(1995, p. 39).  
 According to Gause (2009), Saddam thought an air  strike was likely from Israel 
during this time, similar to the strike on the Osirak reactor in 1981. Saddam saw other 
actors aimed to thwart his quest for weapons of mass destruction. A Canadian scientist, 
Gerald Bell, was assassinated in Belgium on March 22, 1990. Bell was involved in a 
project to develop a ‘super-gun’ for the Iraqi military. Saddam attributed Bell’s 
assassination to the Israelis (K. M. Woods, 2008a). A few weeks later, European 
countries impounded high-tech devices thought to be of dual use for an Iraqi weapons 
program (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 95).  
 Internal aspects were a cause of great concern as well. During the Iran-Iraq War, 
Saddam was forced to concede a degree of autonomy to the military. Upon completion of 
the conflict and ever concerned about the militaries ability to orchestrate a coup, Saddam 
aimed to purge and break the corporate coherence of the Iraqi Army (Cockburn & 
Cockburn, 2000). In 1988 and 1989 “scores of officers were arrested and executed” (F. 
G. Gause III, 2009, p. 93). Hundreds of officers were forced to retire as well. Saddam 
apparently saw the internal conspirators being helped by outside powers. According to 
Al-Bazzaz, Ba’athist offices believed “during 1989 that a number of foreign powers, 
including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. were attempting to infiltrate Iraqi society to 
collect intelligence and pressure the government” (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 93). In May 
1989 Adnan Khayrallah, a prominent Iraqi general, died in a helicopter crash. Razoux 
(2015) argues that this crash was no accident as was likely ordered by Saddam’s son 
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Uday because of his belief in Khayrallah’s independent sources of power and popularity 
within the military. In addition, three attempts were made on Hussein’s life in the period 
of 1988 to 1990. The last two were especially troubling as one originated with the 
Republican Guard—Saddam’s elite force—and one in which Hussein “narrowly escaped 
an assassination attempt by Army officers while he was riding in his car through 
Baghdad” (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a, p. 30).  
 How do we know Saddam was troubled by this conspiracy? Saddam personally 
brought up the Voice of American broadcasts with April Glaspie. Tariq Aziz raised the 
conspiracy issue with James Baker in a meeting with Washington. Via channels in the 
Saudi embassy, Saddam voiced concern to President Bush regarding U.S. intentions. The 
President aimed to reassure Saddam that there was no such conspiracy, yet, according to 
Tariq Aziz—especially after Iran-Contra—Saddam was unmoved by U.S. pledges. Wafic 
al-Sammuri, a senior Iraqi general that defected, claims that Saddam told him in March 
1990: “America is coordinating with Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Kuwait are in a 
conspiracy against us. They are trying to reduce the price of oil to affect our military 
industries and our scientific research, to force us to reduce the size of our armed forces … 
You must expect from another direction an Israeli military strike, or more than one, to 
destroy some of our important targets as part of this conspiracy” (F. G. Gause III, 2009, 
p. 93).  Wafic al-Samurri also notes that in early 1990, the Iraqi intelligence services 
began receiving reports “from Saddam's offices” about plans to strike Iraqi weapons 
facilities (F. G. Gause III, 2009, p. 93). Saddam appeared to be deeply troubled by this 
conspiracy. In this period of time, Saddam made his famous ‘burn half of Israel 
speech’—“by God, we will make fire eat up half of Israel if it tries against Iraq” 
(Karabell, 1995a, p. 40)— and executed Iranian born British citizen, Farzad Bazoft, 
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resulting in the withdraw of the British ambassador to Iraq.  Saddam publicly justified the 
execution of Bazolft and claimed that western powers were trying to frame him for 
developing nuclear weapons (Karabell, 1995a, p. 39).  
 This is clearly a case of exaggerated threat perception. There were small changes 
in US policy, specifically the suspension of credits for agricultural goods. Additionally 
there was also Congressional criticism regarding human rights abuses. But, the U.S. 
government was not part of an elaborate plot to weaken the Iraqi regime. In fact, just the 
opposite:  until the invasion of Kuwait, the US was following a policy of ‘constructive 
engagement’ with Iraq (Karabell, 1995a, p. 45). As NSD-26 outlined, the Bush 
administration aimed to make Iraq a “pillar of US policy in the Gulf, a bulwark against 
Iran, and a possible ally of US interests in the Arab-Israeli dialogue, Lebanon, and the 
Taif accords” (Karabell, 1995a, p. 37). The US made numerous attempts to assure 
Saddam of its benign intent. President Bush publically reiterated his desire for continued 
constructive engagement; Bob Dole and Alan Simpson, two Republican senators, 
traveled to Mosul on April 11 1990 to personally reassure Saddam of Bush’s desire for 
better relations; April Glaspie wrote to the Iraqis, regarding the VOC broadcasts, that “it 
was not the intention of the US to question the legitimacy of the regime or to interfere in 
its internal affairs” (Karabell, 1995a, p. 39).  Yet these gestures did not move Saddam. 
Consistent with the theory, he essentially connected a myriad of independent events into 
a tapestry that involved the US and Israel orchestrating a massive campaign to destabilize 
his regime. Without the belief in this conspiracy, it is difficult to explain why he rushed 
and took the leap to invade Kuwait at the time he did.  
 Revolutionary oppositionalist should also display a lower level of cognitive 
complexity when interacting with key comparison others. Saddam relied on crude beliefs 
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in his assessments of U.S. coalition military capabilities. Saddam constantly reiterated 
that the U.S. was a ‘paper tiger’ and did not have the resolve to fight when faced with the 
possibility of significant casualties (Woods et al, 2006). He also relied on amorphous and 
difficult-to-measure metrics like morale, and placed faith in his military’s ability to ‘take 
the initiative.’ His reliance on such factors allowed Saddam to be optimistic even after 
the sustained air campaign and in the face of an objective, superior military force. He was 
able to dismiss important details such as the size and technical superiority of the coalition 
by relying on crude beliefs about the Iraqi’s fighting spirit and ability to absorb 
casualties. Before the invasion in a taped meeting with Yasir Arafat, Saddam explained 
his decision-making style, “this battle will develop... some might do calculations in 
regards to the nation. I do not calculate the abilities of the nation.” Saddam continued: “I 
do not calculate in the classical way. How many artilleries, how many planes… this is 
important but what is more important—is that the son of the nation is able to touch the 
future with his fingers” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 52). He, also, relied on a number of 
analogies to the Iran-Iraq War to guide his decision making.  
This was exemplified with Saddam’s decision to invade the town of al-Khafji on 
January 29
th
 1991. After the initial Iraqi ground invasion of Kuwait and after the 
beginning of the coalition’s air campaign, Saddam personally oversaw a military 
maneuver to attack and occupy the town of al-Khafji,  a town lying just on the Saudi side 
of the Saudi-Kuwait border. By January 17
th
 1991, the town was evacuated due to its 
proximity to Kuwait.  According to Woods (2008), the rationale for the operation 
involved ‘taking the initiative’;  they hoped, as well, to force ground engagements with 
the coalition forces while the Iraqi forces still had the capabilities (K. M. Woods, 2008a, 
p. 16). Putting aside any judgments about the benefits of such an engagement for the Iraqi 
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side in the larger context of the conflict, Saddam was personally involved with this 
mission, traveling to Basra to speak to commanders. According to senior military 
officials present at the meeting, Saddam's rationale for the attack hinged on a number of 
analogies to the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam argued that they were successful in the early 
stages of the Iran-Iraq War because “we took the initiative of challenging the enemy and 
attacked it in the first two weeks of the war.” He continues to explain that after we lost 
the initiative, the war slowed and “dragged on for eight years.” Secondly, Saddam found 
that “this enemy’—the U.S. led coalition—lacked a level of determination and “would 
collapse when confronted” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 18).  
There are numerous problems with this reasoning which resulted in Saddam 
making erroneous conclusions, which is consistent with the theory outlined in the theory 
section. For instance, the basic comparison between the Iranian military and the vastly 
superior 33 nation coalition is extremely facile. One could argue before the air campaign 
that Saddam was unaware of the coalition’s technical superiority. Yet, the air campaign 
which commenced on January 17
th
 should have left little ambiguity as to the coalition’s 
dominance. The Iraqi military certainly understood this, as the Iraqi military was unable 
to move or even resupply and repair its damaged equipment, which was something which 
the Iranian military during the Iran-Iraq war was never able to achieve. Furthermore, 
Saddam understood and made the basic decision to invade Iran with the belief that the 
Iranian military was weakened due to the revolutionary purges. The U.S. left little 
ambiguity as to their capabilities as they amassed on 370,000 troops on the Saudi border 
in preparation for the ground campaign.  This was not an unorganized mess as Saddam 
thought of the state of the Iranian military.  Saddam’s belief in the coalition’s lack of 
morale and dedication may be slightly more valid, yet again the reasoning is 
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questionable. For instance, the benefit of this attack is predicated on the U.S. engaging 
with the Iraqi army on the ground. This is unlikely as the U.S. would probably not be 
easily drawn into a ground engagement as they have just achieved unrivaled air 
superiority.  Saddam seemed little concerned about these details and rationalized the 
benefits of the attack with platitudes about ‘keeping the initiative’ and destroying the 
enemies’ morale, which is consistent with a lower level of cognitive complexity. If an 
actor was displaying a higher degree of cognitive complexity, the actor would desire 
more information and not be as reliant on crude heuristics.  
 Military historians find the battle of al-Khafji  a ‘draw.’ The official Iraqi 
Ba’athist history labeled it a major victory because it displayed the Iraqi armies’ 
‘sophistication’ against a superior force and the battle served to increase Iraqi morale (K. 
M. Woods, 2008a). Saddam told his senior staff in early February of the success of this 
operation. It seems merely confronting a superior military was providing positive utility 
for Saddam (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 27). As Saddam was fond of saying: “the real 
chance is the one you use not the one you think about” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 197). 
One could not find a better quote that encapsulates Saddam’s desire to take ‘leaps in the 
dark.’   
Pride before the fall 
  Like many wars, the overall project to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq was a risky 
gamble based on a number of contingencies. Saddam’s project had a chance of success 
and some of his gambles proved correct—Saddam was not crazy or insane. This section 
argues that Saddam’s NIC—which was revolutionary oppositionalist—can be linked to a 
number of behavioral, observable implications linked to the emotion of pride. 
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Specifically, the emotion of pride encouraged Saddam to overestimate the likelihood of 
success and to encourage Saddam to see events as more manageable than they were.  
The theory sections discusses pride and linked it to a number of behavioral 
implications. The Illusion of Control encourages actors to feel a sense of control over 
events that an actor is in fact, unable to influence (Thompson, 1999).  Furthermore, “such 
illusions short-circuit searches for information about potential unintended consequences 
of a given decision, and they also produce inattention to the details of policy 
implementation,” writes Hymans (2006, p. 33). A different actor may have looked at the 
invasion of Kuwait as unleashing a series of uncontrollable events. He seemed to be 
aware of many dangers but ultimately pushed ahead with his plans. Saddam likely 
decided to invade knowing outside involvement was a possibility. As a number of 
uncertainties were resolved about the United States willingness and ability to eject the 
Iraqi Army from Kuwait, he was still not only optimistic about the likelihood of success, 
but optimistic about his ability to negotiate a ceasefire right up until the beginning of the 
ground campaign. At a number of junctures, Saddam pushed ahead with his plan with the 
facile belief that events would break his way.  
For Saddam to swallow up Kuwait, a number of contingencies had to break in his 
favor. The gamble hinged on the likelihood of outside involvement. Offensive realists 
claim that Saddam thought U.S. involvement was unlikely. I argue, echoing Freedman 
and Karsh’s conclusion, that “Saddam was sensitive to the possibility of U.S. 
interference” but choose to invade anyway (1995, 62). A few pieces of evidence support 
this claim. Saddam was a student of Middle Eastern history and certainly understood that 
Qasim’s challenge to Kuwait’s independence in 1961 invited British intervention (Alani, 
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1990).35 Saddam claimed that Qasim erred in revealing his desire to incorporate Kuwait 
into Iraq, thereby inviting western intervention. The operational secrecy preceding the 
invasion of Kuwait was justified, according to Woods (2008), in order to preempt actions 
by the U.S, suggesting he was sensitive to the possibility of outside involvement.  Iraqi 
intelligence reports also hinted that outside intervention was a possibility. On July 25
th
 
1990, the director of Iraqi intelligence produced a study regarding the likelihood of 
outside involvement. The study “hinted that Kuwait would try to ‘internationalize’ any 
crisis and noted that the U.S. had declared that it would intervene to help Kuwait” (K. M. 
Woods, 2008a, p. 62). More broadly, Saddam saw Western powers as constantly aiming 
to thwart the Ba’athist project, which suggests he would find it unlikely that Western 
powers would stand by while Kuwait—a U.S. ally—was attacked.  Furthermore, as 
noted, the pledges of U.S. indifference were unlikely to be believed as the captured tapes 
indicate that Saddam’s was convinced of American perfidy. Based on this evidence it is 
likely that Saddam understood that outside involvement was a possibility, but decided to 
take a roll of the dice anyway.  Immediately following the invasion on August 4
th
 1990, 
Saddam, according to Woods et al, was unconcerned about the likelihood of outside 
involvement, “telling his ministers ‘do not worry about the small things: only pay 
attention to what is going on in Kuwait” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 93). Again, Saddam 
made decisions with the naive hope that things would essentially ‘work out.’   
                                                          
35
 Iraq had longstanding claims on the territory of Kuwait. Upon Qasim taking power in a military coup in 
1958, Qasim refused to acknowledge Kuwait’s’ independence and employed provocative language hinting 
at incorporating Kuwait into Iraq. The British, based on faulty intelligence, preemptively moved into the 
region to dissuade Qasim from action. See Alani (1990) for details. If the U.S. made a similar move—
preemptively moved troops into the region before Saddam had the chance to invade—this may have 
precluded Saddam’s 1990 invasion. Note, I concede that systemic level variables are important. The theory 
I employ argues that revolutionary oppositionalists are not crazy or impervious to systemic pressures, just 
that they are more likely to take leaps in the dark in the face of uncertainty.  
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His behavior between the initial Iraqi ground invasion and the beginning of the 
coalition air campaign (August 2 1990 to January 17
th
 1991) displays a similar dynamic: 
a Pollyannaish belief that somehow Iraq would nevertheless ‘win.’ Saddam gambled as 
well that even if the U.S. did become involved, the U.S. would be unwilling to eject the 
Iraqi army from Kuwait. This was based on Saddam’s belief that U.S. action would be 
limited to air strikes or sanctions, because Saddam believed that the U.S. was a ‘paper 
tiger.’ He thought the U.S. was unable to absorb casualties and would not have the 
stomach for a prolonged ground campaign. As Saddam told April Glaspie, “yours is a 
society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle” (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a, p. 
276). In a recorded conversation dated August 7
th
 1990, Saddam explains that if the U.S. 
does engage “all they can do is boom, boom, and boom … so what? Nothing will happen, 
we will give them hell. Give me once instance when an airplane has settled a situation.” 
Saddam continues, “We are not like Panama, people to be scared by airplanes” (SH-
SHTP-A-001-233).  Again this view is not unreasonable: many in the administration, 
notably Colin Powell, argued that economic sanctions would be the correct response or at 
least should be ‘given the time to work’ (See Woodward 2002). It should be remembered, 
as well, that at the time U.S. policy makers did not see ejecting the Iraqi Army from 
Kuwait as being a ‘walk in the park.’ Iraq still possessed, according to some estimates, 
the fourth largest army in the world (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a).  
Saddam also thought that Arab states would not dare ask for U.S. support. This 
would preclude the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia and would divide the Arab 
coalition. Saddam attempted to divide the coalition by linking Palestinian issues to 
leaving Kuwait and by attacking Israel, hoping for an Israeli response and forcing Arab 
states to ally with the U.S. and Israel against their fellow Arabs. While some Arab states 
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were put in very difficult positions—King Hussein of Jordan supported Iraq for domestic 
political reasons—Saddam overestimated his support among Arab states and the Saudi’s 
ultimately agreed to allow U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia.36  
  It is important to reiterate that Saddam is not a hands-off leader: he was directly 
involved with the planning for the defense of Kuwait.37 Furthermore, captured documents 
note that the intelligence reports circulating “did not minimize the challenges ahead” (K. 
M. Woods, 2008a, p. 127) . An intelligence report dated August 27 indicated that the 
number of troops amassed ( the coalition troops) on the Saudi border exceeded the 
number needed to defend the Saudi Kingdom—showing that the coalition was preparing 
not just to defend Saudi Arabia. Another report dated August 29
th, indicated that “they 
(the US coalition) believe that the embargo policy is insufficient as a political measure, 
also they will not wait long before they attack” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 128). Another 
report dated November 4 argued “that the American administration is serious about 
attacking Iraq, but we have not received any intelligence evidence that enables us to 
identify the right timing of the attack” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 129).  The movement of 
troops was accompanied by statements from H.W. Bush. Besides the Rose Garden 
statement—‘this aggression will not stand’— which may have been dismissed as an 
undisciplined comment, Bush said before a joint session of Congress on September 
11,1990, that “our quarrel is with Iraq’s dictator and with his aggression. Iraq will not be 
permitted to annex Kuwait. That's not a threat, that’s not a boast, that’s just the way it’s 
                                                          
36
 Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were directly threatened by Iraq. Syria did not support the invasion as 
Saddam and Al-Assad had a longstanding contentious relationship. Mubarak was personally livid with 
Saddam because Saddam broke a personal pledged not to invade (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a).  Jordan, 
Yemen, the PLO, Sudan, and Mauritania, refused to condemn Iraq. Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, “tried to 
remain on the fence” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 104) 
 
37
 A recent book by John Nixon, a CIA analyst, claims that before the 2003 invasion Saddam had 
essentially disengaged from the daily affairs of running the Iraqi state to work on his novels. But, it 
appears, at this time Saddam is still providing “hands-on” leadership (Nixon, 2016).  
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going to be” (quoted in Woods 2008, 108). One could not ask for a more explicit threat 
with the accompanying ‘audience costs.’ This should have given Saddam concern: the 
U.S. – to use the language of rationalist choice—was sending ‘costly signals’ to Saddam 
about its willingness to use force to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty.  
By January of 1991 a number of uncertainties had been resolved. Congress voted 
to support the ground invasion; Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. troops on its soil; the coalition 
appeared to be relatively robust and stable; and the U.S. had amassed a large force on the 
Kuwaiti border.  According to the Iraqi Perspectives Project, Iraqi intelligence officers 
were fond of reading the Washington Post, making it extremely likely they were unaware 
of these developments (Woods et al, 2006).  Yet, by January 16
th,
 Saddam still held out 
hope. He thought that the Iraqi’s great numerical superiority and their dedication to the 
Arab cause would be able to inflict enough casualties on the U.S. that they would sue for 
peace, leaving Saddam with some of his war booty. Rationalists models have a difficult 
time explaining why—as the strategic landscape became clearer—why Saddam was still 
holding out hope for an Iraqi victory. 
Captured documents and recordings indicate that Saddam held out hope for a 
diplomatic solution until February 22
nd. Even after the air campaign, “Saddam resolved to 
remain in Kuwait as long as there remained even a chance of success while 
simultaneously readying the Iraqi government to counter the invasion of Iraq proper” (K. 
M. Woods et al., 2011b, p. 188) At this point, Saddam had already passed the deadline set 
by the UN. In this period, not only did Saddam see a powerful display of air superiority, 
but he received intelligence reports about the coalition’s superior capabilities. There was 
also deterioration in his soldiers’ morale—although Saddam may have been unaware of 
this or may have attributed reports of poor morale to coalition propaganda. In a report 
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dated February 18
th, Saddam’s director of intelligence provided what Woods (2008) calls 
“a pessimistic and ultimately accurate assessment.” The director wrote, “we see that the 
dimensions of the conflict are such that we could not possibly overcome, as far as the 
Kuwait issue is concerned” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 207). It is not known if Saddam 
personally read this report. The bombing was taking a toll on morale as well. A member 
of the Republican Guard, retrospectively recounting his experience in 1991, found that 
the bombing “had a very big psychological influence on the fighters, which led a large 
number to flee their corps and their defensive positions” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 208).  
What may have avoided the ground campaign would have been an unconditional 
withdrawal  (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 211). On February 22,
 
Saddam told Aziz to 
announce that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait over a three week period if the 
international community removed the sanctions against the regime. Due to the qualifier if, 
Bush took this as a conditional withdrawal and rejected the proposal. Recordings indicate 
Saddam was genuinely surprised that the last minute negotiations by Aziz were 
unsuccessful (K. M. Woods et al., 2011b). Saddam, just like in the Iran-Iraq War, held 
out hope that Tariq Aziz would be able to lead Saddam out of the corner he had 
maneuvered himself into.   
 The ground campaign began on February 24
th
 1991. Recordings capture how 
Saddam dealt with dispiriting information of Iraqi battlefield losses.  In a recording on 
February 24
th
 1991, an unidentified male tells Saddam of reports indicating that over 500 
Iraqi soldiers have surrendered and some units have been hit with over 500 artillery 
shells. Saddam flippantly dismisses these reports as fabrications, propaganda to diminish 
Iraqi morale. An unidentified male quips “the media is dirty,” and Saddam responds 
“what they would give—they would announce things they hope to occur or what they 
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expect to occur” (SH-SHTP-A-000-666, 11). Later in the recording Tariq Aziz and others 
speculate that if the American did in fact capture thousands of prisoners, they should 
show them on TV, asserting that the Americans are lying. It is unclear at some points in 
the recording whether ‘they’ refers to Americans or the media, nonetheless it is clear that 
Saddam discounts various pieces of information, diminishing Iraqi battlefield losses.  On 
or around February 24
th
, Saddam was not only discounted troubling information; he was 
still hoping that the coalition will crumble. Saddam elaborated, “I don’t think this 
international coalition will continue to the end” (SH-SHTP-A-000-931). In another 
recording, an advisor identified as Comrade Muhammad, tells Saddam that an entire Iraqi 
corps was overrun, Saddam shot back, “this is lying” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 225). 
 Pride encourages the need to act autonomously as well. Pride encourages “people 
(to) want to do on their own what they think they can do on their own” (Hymans, 2006b, 
p. 34). It is unclear what concessions Kuwait could have made to appease Saddam—they 
did agree to reduce oil production for a period of time. Yet, as Freedman and Karsh 
(1995) note, there was a status dimension motivating Saddam’s actions and demands. 
Saddam saw Kuwait as a parasitic neighbor who did not acknowledge Iraq’s sacrifice 
during the Iran-Iraq War. “In Saddam’s opinion, the Kuwaitis did not treat him with due 
respect,  or take his word seriously” (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a, p. 62).  Saddam 
appeared to be receiving positive utility—aside from the material benefits of invasion and 
foregoing the possible benefits of cooperation—in putting these ‘arrogant’ Kuwaitis in 
their place. “Who do they think they are? They think they’re better than any other Arab 
country and they look down on everyone else?” Saddam charged in a captured recording. 
In interpreting this statement, it appears that Saddam takes their non-acquiescence as an 
affront to his leadership (quote in SH –SHTP-A-001-232).  
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 Saddam appeared to gain utility from merely standing up to the U.S. Note that 
Saddam thought the U.S. had an undue amount of influence over the U.N and often 
conflated actions from the U.N. as merely reflecting American influence. “The more they 
(the U.N) increase its resolutions, the more unbending we become,” Saddam explained to 
Tariq Aziz in a private recording made in late September 1990. “I hope they will not 
become too adamant, because this kind of world in fact does not deserve respect. This 
low level of being subservient to America does not meet with any kind of respect from us 
at all.” Saddam continued, “it is disgusting the way the American is leading them (the 
U.N) under its whip and brings them  to any decision it wants from them” (K. M. Woods, 
2008a, p. 108). Instead of recognizing its diplomatic isolation—only a handful of states 
either abstained or declared support for Saddam’s invasion—he appear to relish his 
confrontation and derive utility by not submitting to the U.S.’s and the U.N.’s authority. 
After the Mother of all Battles, Saddam was fond of framing the battle as a success, 
simply because the Ba’athist regime survived. There are undoubtedly propagandistic 
reasons for this retrospective judgement. Nonetheless, Saddam constantly reiterates how 
Iraq ‘stood up’ to the Americans and survived in the face of overwhelming force. He told 
a group of senior officers in 1992 in a private conversation, “no one dared to stand 
against America, but Iraq, this small country with all its circumstances as a third world 
country, resisted America” (K. M. Woods, 2008a, p. 299). Saddam appeared to “derive 
utility from the act of standing alone” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 34), exactly as the theory 
predicts. 
 Consistent with theory, Saddam also displayed higher relative power perceptions. 
The higher power perceptions cannot be divorced from Saddam’s flawed strategic 
assumptions: such as his views that the US coalition was highly sensitive to casualties 
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and the belief in the superior morale of the Iraqi army which enabled them to withstand 
the coalitions attacks.38 Saddam also believed that dislodging an enemy from their 
position—attacking a fortified position—required a higher force ratio as well (Freedman 
& Karsh, 1995a). Saddam envisioned a direct clash between coalition forces and Iraqi 
forces as inflicting heavy casualties—a reasonable assumption. The U.S. coalition would 
likely not play to Saddam’s strengths and attack the Iraqi army where they were heavily 
fortified. Saddam—who liked to claim to be a great military strategist—failed to predict, 
as the saying goes, that the enemy gets a vote. This may be understandable and it would 
hardly be the first time a leader failed to account for an enemy’s actions. Yet, I offer a 
few pieces of evidence which suggest that Saddam should have been aware of these 
vulnerabilities.  
 Firstly, Saddam claimed to be a student of the Six-Day War (Murray & Woods, 
2014a). He should have been aware that “numerically inferior forces can be victorious if 
able to exploit qualitative or tactical advantages” (Freedman & Karsh, 1995a, p. 280). 
One such advantage is air superiority. The air campaign forced the Iraqis to displace 
some of their forces to limit the destruction from the coalition’s air campaign (K. M. 
Woods, 2008a). The defensive ratio does not guarantee success and could be overcome 
with technical superiority, something the air campaign should have displayed. Secondly, 
as Freedman and Karsh (1995) discuss, “Saddam could not ensure a heavy concentration 
of defense forces all along the line, for he could have no confidence that the coalition 
                                                          
38 It should be noted as well that Saddam’s goals changed over the course of the campaign and he redefined 
success at different stages. The initial goal of occupying Kuwait morphed into success being defined as the 
regime surviving. In the case of the latter, Saddam was correct, ignoring that overthrowing the Ba’athist 
regime by coalition forces was never the goal of the US led coalition. This seems to suggest that utility was 
gained not from any objective territorial gains—such as incorporating Kuwait into Iraq—but by merely 
standing up to the international coalition. He also redefines success for domestic political purposes, but he 
seems to believe in the idea of success by surviving in the private recording as well. 
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would confine its attention solely to Kuwait” (1995, p. 280). While Saddam could not 
predict the coalitions ‘left hook,’39 he should have been aware that he did not have the 
resources to maintain the force ratio across such a relatively long expanse of territory. 
Third, Saddam should have been aware of his vulnerabilities as revealed during the Iran-
Iraq War, when the Iranians were able to breach his defenses. The Iranians breached his 
lines with untrained Iranian teenagers and at no point did the Iranians achieve the level of 
air superiority that the allied campaign achieved. To boot, Saddam was forced to repulse 
these breaches with the heavy use of chemical weapons, which he was aware of because 
few people were authorized to employ their use.40 In sum, consistent with many of 
Saddam’s decisions, he overlooks his vulnerabilities while inflating the advantages.  
Conclusion  
 Saddam’s two cases—combined—provides the best case for the identity driven 
model of decision making. Saddam displayed exaggerated threat perceptions in both 
cases, interpreting the threat of Shia agitation out of proportion in the run-up to the Iran 
Iraq War and, in the case of the Gulf War, envisioning a conspiracy where one did not 
exist. In both cases, there was a clear urgency to act, leaving the military to scramble to 
prepare. Lower cognitive complexity was on display as well: Saddam relied on crude 
beliefs in terms of understanding how the U.S. would likely respond to an invasion of 
Kuwait—seeing the U.S. as being casualty adverse, and holding such views even as the 
U.S. signaled its willingness to intervene and employ military means to eject the Iraqi 
Army out of Kuwait. In the case of the invasion of Iran, Saddam did not update his 
                                                          
39
 The coalition deceived the Iraqi forces by staging a decoy of an amphibious landing in Kuwait while 
divisions went around the front lines and encircled the Iraqi forces.  
 
40
 Saddam was reluctant to use chemical weapons because he the thought their benefits were primarily 
psychological, and thus, subject to diminishing returns.  
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information after the initial air skirmishes before the invasion, which may have provided 
information undermining the belief that the Iranian Air Force was essentially grounded.  
The pride dimension was essential to explain both “leaps in the dark.” Saddam 
appeared to derive utility by defying the U.S. in the case of the Gulf War—“I was the 
only one to stand-up to America”—and in acting as the leader of the pan-Arab movement 
in containing the “Persian Menace” in the Iran-Iraq War. The illusion of control was 
evident. As Murray and Woods (2016) document, the initial air campaign in the Iran-Iraq 
War was nothing short of ambitious and it did not appear that the Iraqi Air Force had the 
capabilities to accomplish such a feat, which was of little worry to Saddam. Invading 
Kuwait also hinged on a number of contingencies: the U.S. would not become involved; 
that the Saudis would not allow the stationing of troops on Saudi soil; and that if the U.S. 
did become involved, they would be unwilling to force the Iraqi military out of Kuwait, 
suggesting that Saddam underappreciated the unintended consequences of his actions. 
Saddam also overestimated his own capabilities. In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam 
had to overlook a number of Iranian objective advantages, but thought Iran’s military was 
sufficiently weakened. The case of Kuwait is telling: even after more information is 
revealed about U.S.’s will and capabilities, the tapes show Saddam was still confident of 
victory.   
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CHAPTER IV  
FIDEL CASTRO  
 
Many accounts of The Cuban Missile Crisis portray the crisis as a confrontation 
between two superpowers. Portrayed in this manner, Cuba is more a place where the 
drama unfolds, than a place where independent actors make important decisions.  While 
the crisis was indeed a confrontation between two superpowers and the USSR held 
control over the nuclear weapons, portraying the conflict in this manner diminishes the 
importance of the Cuban decision. As Weldes (1999) notes, because the USSR needed 
Cuban approval, the Cubans were key players in this drama  and Castro was not coerced 
into accepting the weapons (1999, p. 82). While Castro may have not been consulted 
regarding the final agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Castro, according to 
Soviet General Gribkov, was a key player in this drama, as the decision to deploy nuclear 
weapons “was adopted jointly” (Blight, Allyn, & Welch, 2002a, p. 66). This analysis 
focuses on Castro’s decisions, decisions that arguably threatened the existence of both the 
Cuban state and the survival of Castro’s regime—a decision that was both risky and not 
to be taken lightly.   
 This case has both strengths and weaknesses. In terms of weaknesses, the 
triangular nature of the crisis poses complications for any analysis. The difficulty lies in 
trying to pick apart aspects of the crisis attributed to Soviet or Cuban decision-making. 
For instance, Castro disagreed with the Soviets regarding how to deploy the missiles. 
Because Castro did not have complete control over the deployment, it is difficult to 
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cleanly link the deployment to Castro. Nonetheless, Castro could have insisted on 
deploying the missiles in the fashion he preferred, as U.S. retaliation would likely be 
aimed at the Cubans. Furthermore, the USSR and the Cubans negotiated the deployment. 
Thus, Castro acquiescing to the nature of the deployment should be considered a 
decision. Another leader may have been unwilling to attach the security of her regime to 
such an enterprise, being able to speculate as to the risks involved.   
 A more serious complication involves the general opacity of the Cuban regime. 
While historians have gained access to the archives of the USSR, Cuban records remain 
difficult to access. Castro took part in the ‘critical oral history project’ as part of a series 
of conferences organized by Bright, Ally, and Welch, but Castro’s statements at various 
conferences should be taken with a healthy amount of skepticism. Until the archives are 
made public or a drastic change in leadership in Cuba takes place, researchers will have 
to use the available evidence to make inferences about Castro’s decision-making. This 
type of problem is hardly unique to Cuba and the opacity is surmountable.  
 With that said, this case offers a number of strengths. It can be considered a 
critical case study. If emotion figured prominently in one of the most important decisions 
in the Cold War, it is likely that emotion was at play in other decisions as well. Due to the 
seriousness of the deployment and the gravity of deploying nuclear weapons, actors 
should have been sufficiently incentivized to make the decisions in an atmosphere of 
‘cool rationality.’  
Emotion being involved in decision-making does not mean that material features 
were unimportant: in the messy and overdetermined world of political science, one single 
variable does not usually explain most cases. Yet, I will argue that with the amount of 
uncertainty and risk involved in this decision, emotion provided the key why Castro took 
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such a ‘leap in the dark.’ Indeed, as Hymans argues, the potential cocktail of fear and 
pride may give an actor just such a drive to make such leaps.  
 This analysis is organized with reference to Hymans’ theory, linking Hymans’ 
variables to outcomes. Revolutionary oppositionalists should display the behavioral 
characteristics discussed in the theory section. Before proceeding to the analysis, it is 
important to note the limitations with the existing explanations, focused around the 
decision by Castro to place nuclear weapons on the island.  
Why Did Castro Accept the Weapons?  
 Castro’s primary motivation was to deter an U.S. invasion. While a major 
motivation, a few questions remain. Firstly, this justification cannot explain the size and 
scope of the deployment. Castro agreed to a deployment that went “considerably beyond 
Cuba’s needs” to solely deter an attack on the island (Halperin, 1973, p. 166). Halperine 
speculates that a measured deployment designed to only deter an attack could have been 
accomplished with enough resources deployed and concealed in “mobile tactical units,” 
with nuclear weapons but with limited range. The actual deployment included missiles 
with the potential to target major cities on the U.S. Eastern Seaboard. A smaller 
deployment promised additional benefits: It was less likely to be discovered (assuming 
the need to deploy the weapons secretly) and could give more credence to Cuba’s claim 
that the weapons were purely for defensive purposes. In addition, as Horlick (1964) 
notes, if the purpose was to deter an attack on Cuba, it would have made more sense to 
have some ambiguity regarding who actually controlled the nuclear weapons. With the 
Soviets still in control, doubt remained regarding the Soviets’ willingness to risk nuclear 
escalation in the face of an U.S. invasion.  
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 Secondly, this also assumes the deployment of nuclear weapons was the most 
obvious means to deter an invasion. With the benefit of hindsight, the act had the 
potential to precipitate an invasion that the missiles were designed to deter. If the United 
States was looking for a pretext to invade, the placing of ‘offensive’ weapons in Cuba 
would have been just such a pretext.41 What other options were available? One means 
would be for the USSR to offer the Cubans a formal alliance with the promise to come to 
Cuba’s defense in the event of an invasion. Due to various dynamics in the Soviet Bloc, 
the USSR was not able or willing to offer Cuba membership in the Warsaw Pact 
(Garthoff, 1989a). Similarly, a separate, formal alliance may have complicated the 
USSR’s relations with other communist states and may have been unavailable. 
Khrushchev did make a pledge in June 1960 to come to Cuba’s defense in the case of 
attack.  Khrushchev explained:  “figuratively speaking, Soviet artilleryman, in the case of 
need, can with their missile fire support the Cuban people if the aggressive forces of the 
Pentagon dare begin intervention against Cuba…” (quoted in Dinerstein 1978, p. 82). 
According to Dinerstein, the statement represented an official position and was treated as 
such by the Cubans. Che Guevara “was quoted as saying that Khrushchev’s statement 
‘showed that the imperialists could not invade Cuba with impunity’” (1978, p. 91). While 
the pledge was vague—possibly deliberately vague for strategic reasons—it provided 
some expectation that the USSR would come to the aid of Cuba in the case of invasion. 
The placing of nuclear weapons on the island may be a ‘costly signal’ to add credence to 
Khrushchev’s pledge or to enhance the USSR’s capabilities in general. But, even during 
the crisis, after nuclear weapons were being emplaced, because the USSR always held 
operational control over the nuclear weapons and due to the United States’ conventional 
                                                          
41
 The historian Arthur Schlesinger makes this point in Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002). 
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and nuclear superiority, doubts remained about the USSR’s commitment to protect Cuba 
in the case of invasion.42 While the placement of nuclear weapons on the island would 
bolster the credibility of a claim to protect the island in the case of invasion, the value 
added in terms of credibility should be weighed against the likelihood of provoking an 
attack with which the weapons were designed to deter. For this reason, it is likely that the 
deployment served other objectives in addition to deterring an attack on the island.  
In sum, if the defense of Cuba was the primary and only objective from Castro’s 
standpoint, the deployment could have been much smaller. In addition, as of June of 1960 
the USSR already pledged to come to the defense of Cuba in the case of an US invasion 
that theoretically serve the purposes of deterrence.   
The second rationale offered by Castro was that he was fulfilling his 
“international proletarian duty.” Castro told French journalist Claude Julien in 1963 
“…since we are getting a large amount of help from the socialist camp, we felt we could 
not refuse. That is why we accepted them. It was not in order for our own defense but to 
strengthen socialism on the international scale” (quoted in Halperine 1973, p.168). This 
explanation can explain why the deployment included nuclear weapons and was larger 
than was necessary for the defense of the island. Strengthening the USSR’s capabilities as 
a whole also could have indirectly enhanced Cuban security because, as Horelick notes, 
strengthening the USSR’s ability writ large, in a world-wide confrontation, adds 
credibility to “Soviet strategic threats, including the threat to defend Cuba against U.S. 
attack” (Horelick, 1964a, p. 372)  
                                                          
42
 For example, the ‘hawks’ in the Kennedy administration argued that, during the actual crisis, due to the 
United States’ conventional and nuclear superiority, the USSR would not risk nuclear escalation in the case 
of conventional U.S. invasion (see Blight and Welch 1990). 
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Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002) argue that the proletarian duty explanation was 
essentially an ex post facto justification, allowing Castro to appear not dependent on the 
USSR for security and enables him to claim he was making sacrifices for the 
international forces of revolution. Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002) point out a number of 
inconsistencies with the proletarian duty explanation. Two Cubans close to Castro, Sergio 
del Valle and Emilio Aragones, explained at the Cambridge Conference that they 
considered the deployment to benefit the Cubans primarily for its deterrent value, which 
“undercuts Castro’s claim that the Cuban leadership in 1962 was unanimous in its 
understanding of the situation” (p. 345).43 In addition, it does not appear that Castro had a 
correct understanding of the composition of nuclear forces between the United States and 
the USSR, which would be strange if one of the primary motivations was to aid the 
Soviet camp in the balance of nuclear forces. From comments Castro made at the Havana 
Conference, Castro apparently overestimated the amount of nuclear weapons the Soviets 
possessed. In that case, it would be perplexing as to why more nuclear weapons were 
needed in Cuba if the Soviets already possessed sufficient nuclear weapons. If his aim 
was to bolster the Soviet camp, “by his own admission, he did not know that socialism 
needed bolstering on the world scale” (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 347). Castro’s statement 
that he understood Soviet nuclear capabilities to be greater than in reality is strange, 
seeing that the missile gap was publically revealed to be in favor of the United States by 
mid-1961. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric’s public statement and subsequent 
                                                          
43 Researchers Bright and Welch held a series of conferences with key actors from the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The Havana conference took place January 1992 and the transcripts are annotated in Cuba On the 
Brink, (Blight et al., 2002a). Blight and Welch also have provided transcripts for the Hawks Cay 
Conference, the Moscow Conference, and Cambridge Conference, provided in On the Brink, (Blight & 
Welch, 1990).  
 
118 
 
press coverage makes it likely that Castro knew the balance was heavily in the United 
States’ favor. In the case he knew, the proletariat duty explanation makes more sense, as 
placing nuclear weapons in Cuban could serve as a ‘quick fix’ to vitiate the USSR’s 
inferior nuclear capabilities. But, then, Castro would have agreed to a deployment in light 
of what he knew to be overwhelming U.S. nuclear and conventional superiority in the 
region, which could hardly augur well in the case of escalation.  
At the Havana Conference, Castro claimed that he was unconcerned about the 
details of the deployment because he was deferring to Soviet expertise (see Blight, Allyn, 
and Welch 2002; Szulc 2000, p. 583). The Soviets’ possessed more experience doing this 
sort of thing, Castro claimed.44 Again Castro may be trying to deflect blame onto 
Khrushchev for what was arguably an ill-thought-out and poorly executed plan.45 
Nonetheless, it remains puzzling why Castro would have been so insouciant regarding 
such important details or not insisted on certain details, seeing that Cuba could face the 
brunt of U.S. retaliation.  As will be discussed, on a number of issues it does appear that 
Castro did defer to the Soviets in terms of important details of the deployment. This 
simply brings up more questions: why did he trust the Soviets? Why did he assume that 
the Soviets would risk their security and relations with the U.S. for Cuba, especially in 
light of the relatively new alliance between the USSR and Cuba? 
What explains the size of the deployment in the absence of the proletarian duty 
explanation? Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002) offer a non-material explanation which is 
                                                          
44
 To be discussed shortly, while the Soviets had more experience than the Cubans, the Soviets did not have 
any experienced with a deployment of this size and on such a scale.  
 
45
 If Castro’s goal was protection from invasion, you could have expected Castro to have claimed victory 
post-crisis, as Castro theoretically gained a non-invasion pledge from the United States. However, a deeply 
entrenched enemy image and the contingent nature of the pledge may have caused Castro to doubt the 
pledges’ veracity (see Garthoff 1989).  
119 
 
consistent with the findings of this dissertation. In conjunction with the deterrent value of 
the weapons, weapons of this type “would be supremely gratifying. At one stroke the 
deployment would raise Cuba, for the first time, onto a geopolitical plane with 
imperialism” (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 345). “They would put Cuba, in Edmund Desoes’s 
phrase, ‘on the summit’” (p. 349). Notice the status dimension: the weapons allowed 
Cuba a degree of equality with the United States, which must have been highly 
gratifying.   
Did Castro have a Choice?  
Before proceeding, a caveat should be discussed: did Castro have a choice in 
accepting the weapons? In early 1962, according to Acosta (2002), both the Soviets and 
Cubans were increasingly concerned about the likelihood of an U.S. invasion, which 
prompted the USSR to assist the Cubans in strengthening their defense capabilities. 
According to Khrushchev’s memoir, Khruschev had the idea to place nuclear weapons in 
Cuba while on vacation in Bulgaria in May 1962 (Khrushchev & Crankshaw, 1970).46 
Later that May, Khrushchev met with senior officials to discuss if the Cubans would be 
willing to accept the weapons. To highlight the contingent nature of the deployment, 
senior advisor Anastas Mikoyan and the Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev, both 
doubted that Fidel would agree to such a proposal due to the risks involved (see Lebow 
and Stein 1995, 73–74). In late May, a Soviet delegation secretly traveled to Cuba. In 
Cuba, Fidel met with Soviet General Biryuzov and discussed the nuclear deployment 
idea.  According to Acosta, they discussed the type of weapons and how the deployment 
would be carried out; Biryuzov “explained the deployment would be done quickly, in 
secret, and under cover” (Acosta, 2002a, p. 101). Fidel asked for time to discuss the 
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 Garthoff (1989) argues that Khrushchev had the idea before his vacation to Bulgaria.  
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deployment with the ORI. In the meeting the following day with the ORI, Fidel agreed to 
the deployment.47 On June 10
th
 Biryuzov reports about the meeting to the Presidium, 
prompting the Soviet Ministry of Defense to prepare deployment plans. On July 2-17 
Raul Castro travels to Moscow to discuss the shipments. Another delegation on August 
27 to September 2, composed of Che Guevera and Emilio Aragones, traveled to Moscow 
with revisions dictated by Fidel to the draft treaty. 
A few points should be highlighted. The Soviets thought Castro did indeed have a 
choice. If the situation was one of acute dependence, Khrushchev’s advisors would have 
suggested that Castro had no choice but to take the weapons. In addition, both parties 
stress this was an agreement negotiated between the Cubans and the Soviets. I am not 
aware of any accounts arguing that Castro was coerced into taking the weapons.  
 
Castro’s NIC   
The Solidarity Dimension  
The United States was not only Castro’s key comparison other, but it is clear that 
Castro held a dichotomizing identity conception with the United States. To reiterate, the 
solidarity dimension’s key question “is whether ‘we’ and ‘they’ naturally stand for 
similar or different interests and values” (Hymans, 2006 p. 22). Castro understood Cuba 
and the U.S. as standing for different interests and values. According to Domínguez 
(1989), a central idea animating Cuban foreign policy under Castro was “a deep hostility 
towards the U.S. government and towards many U.S. values” and that “the imperialist 
enemy is a world system that must be met with global struggle” (p. 3).  
                                                          
47
 The Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) at the time was composed of: The Secretariat Fidel 
Castro, Deputy Secretary Raul Castro, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, Osvaldo Doritcos Torrado, Emilio Aragones 
Navarro, and Blas Roca Calderio (Acosta 2002, 101-2).  
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 Starting broadly, according to Liss (1994a), Castro viewed U.S./Cuban relations 
as part of a larger North/South conflict. According to this view, the North possesses great 
financial and industrial resources that translate into economic power and the control of 
advanced technologies. The South possesses natural resources and inexpensive labor, but 
is “inordinately indebted to the North’s financial institutions” (Liss, 1994a, p. 103). 
Omitting various details, the North’s dominance of economic resources results in an 
“inequality in trade relations” and spurs economic crisis, specifically high inflation in the 
South. Castro explained to Federico Mayor Zaragoara, a former UNESCO Director, in 
early 2000, “Latin America, like the rest of the Third World, is the victim of a world 
economic order imposed on it from outside…Divided and balkanized, seduced by 
illusory visions for progress and development… Latin American countries run the risks 
of losing their independence for ever and being annexed by the United States” (quoted in 
Skierka, 2006, p. 310). According to Castro, the U.S. and the North, could, but is likely 
unwilling, to change various policies which would result in more beneficial trade and 
“greater internal democracy in the underdeveloped states” (Liss, 1994a, p. 103).  
Castro’s version of the history of U.S./Cuban relations is one of neocolonial 
dependent development. According to Castro, in the early nineteenth century, the U.S. 
government allied with Cuba’s white landowners and annexationists to preserve slavery 
on the island. The Platt Amendment was a legal means “to infringing on Cuban 
Sovereignty” (Liss, 1994a, p. 99) and even after the removal of the Platt Amendment, 
reciprocal trade agreements and U.S. multinational corporations’ foreign direct 
investment in Cuba, linked the two countries and economies, ensuring U.S. dominance of 
Cuba’s mining industry, electricity production, telephone and transportation services, 
sugar production, and banking. Castro was well aware of the United States’ economic 
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role, as he grew up in an area with a high concentration of U.S. multinationals (Szulc, 
2000). And while Castro was wealthy by Cuban standards, “the sight of foreigners 
flaunting their affluence and protected by their own armed guards from the hungry eyes 
of the local population … left a lasting impression on Fidel” (P. G. Bourne, 1986, p. 20).  
 More importantly, Castro claims to be a student of Jose Marti. “Marti was always 
Castro’s role model” writes Szulc (2000, p. 92). “Fidel… developed a powerful 
identification with Marti,” the biographer Bourne (1986) writes, “and in a way he 
worshiped him” (p. 27). Castro believed that Cuba possessed no greater “poet, essayist, 
and journalist who believed in the power of ideas accompanied by action” than Marti 
(Liss, 1994a, p. 33). Statues of Marti stand as symbols of revolutionary culture 
throughout Cuba, not statues of Marx or Lenin. Fidel, in tribute to Marti, even wrote a 
series of essays about his role model (Liss 1994, p. 33). In March 1949, a group of U.S. 
Marines, in an act of drunkenness, urinated on a statue of Marti. For Cubans and Castro 
this was a “unspeakable insult to their country,” and Fidel organized a guard to protect 
the statue all night (P. G. Bourne, 1986, p. 57).  
Marti held distinct views of the United States’ role in Latin America. According 
to Weldes (2000), Marti “considered an aggressive and imperialist United States to be 
chief among ‘our common Latin American dangers’” (p. 176). Marti, after living for 
fifteen years in the U.S., came to view the greatest threat to Cuban independence as 
annexation from the United States (Perez, 1990, p. 78).48 It should be noted this anti-
imperialist strain of thought is hardly unique to Fidel or Marti, “The tradition of the entire 
Cuban left, from Chibias to the communist was doctrinally ‘anti-imperialist,” writes 
(Draper 1969, p. 110)  
                                                          
48
 Marti was also highly critical of American culture, see Perez (1990, 78-81) 
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The influence of the U.S. was felt in the domestic politics in Cuba preceding and 
during the revolutionary period. Fidel attributed U.S. pressure as key in canceling a 
mission to attempt to oust the Dominican dictator Raphael Trujillo in July 1947 (P. G. 
Bourne, 1986, p. 41); Bourne (1986) argues that Chibias, a political leader and mentor of 
Fidel, lost his election bid “partly because he lacked the United States backing” (p. 54).  
What was extremely salient for Fidel was the U.S. role in backing Batista during the 
revolutionary period, specifically the U.S. provision of weapons to Batista. This is the 
subject of some contention, as Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002) argue that the U.S. 
provided arms to Batista with the “condition that they not be used to maintain internal 
order.” By March 1958, Secretary of State Dulles announced a total embargo of arms to 
the Cubans, aside from weapons that the Cubans have already purchased in full (p. 416). 
While U.S. support may have been more limited than imagined by Fidel, he saw first-
hand the decimation of the peasant population and the death of a child of a close 
acquaintance, which he attributed to arms supplied by the United States. The idea of the 
U.S. protecting the “venal and corrupt Batista” against a defenseless population “had a 
deep effect on Fidel” (P. G. Bourne, 1986, p. 155). Shortly thereafter, he penned this 
letter to Celia Sanchez:  
 
When I saw the rockets firing…at Mario’s house, I swore to myself that the 
Americans were going to pay dearly for what they are doing. When this war is 
over, a much wider and bigger war will commence for me: the war that I am 
going to wage against them. I am aware this is my true destiny (quoted in Bourne 
1986, p. 155).  
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Bourne argues that Che Guevara was influential in terms of Castro’s 
understanding of the United States. Che had first-hand experience with U.S. imperialism: 
he was present in Guatemala during a U.S. orchestrated coup. In Che’s eyes, the U.S. was 
willing to overthrow a democratically elected president to thwart social change, in order 
to protect U.S. financial interests. Partly due to this experience, Che’s “strongest political 
emotion was a deep-seated hostility towards the United States” (P. G. Bourne, 1986, p. 
117). Bourne argues that Che “infused him (Fidel) with his own emotion and bitterness 
toward the United States, adding an element of passion to Fidel’s intellectual views on 
the subject” (P. G. Bourne, 1986, p. 117). After the revolution, Che constantly warned 
Fidel that the greatest threat to the revolution was U.S. intervention (P. G. Bourne, 1986, 
p. 157).   
The Status Dimension  
 The key feature for the status dimension “is how high ‘we’ stand relative to 
‘them’ in the international pecking order: are we naturally their equal (if not their 
superior), or will we simply never measure up?” (Hymans, 2006 p. 23)  Fidel made it 
clear that Cuba would no longer tolerate being seen as the United States’ subaltern. 
Speaking extemporaneously over the radio in April 1959, Fidel expounded that he would 
not follow U.S. dictates in the region, even if it meant confrontation with the United 
States. “Some fainthearts warn that Cubans must respect the cold war policies of the 
United States, that ‘we exist only because the United States allows us to” Halperine 
writes, paraphrasing Castro’s message, “Well our attitude is we defend our right to live 
by our own principles… this is a real revolution… This revolution will take its place as 
one of the greatest political events in history” (Halperin, 1973, p. 2). The strong anti-
imperialist messages of the revolution spoke to a desire to resists U.S. influence which 
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was based on an assertion of equality with the United States. Conversely, if Castro did 
not see Cuba as an equal player, it would be fitting for Cuba to follow the dictates of a 
much larger more developed power.  
 After the revolution, according to Draper (1969), Castro thought of himself not 
only as the leader of Cuba, but as the leader of “the communist movement in Latin 
America” (p. 53) and demanded to be treated equally with other communist leaders, even 
leaders of much larger countries, such as Mao Zedong. Draper opines that this may seem 
delusional, but Castro just displayed, in the successful Cuban Revolution, that the 
importance of objective conditions are grossly exaggerated. In Cuba, Castro led a 
revolutionary movement with few men and resources, why could Cuba not lead the 
revolution in Latin America? Fidel understood Cuba as the ‘example’ of revolution in 
Latin America, superseding the Chinese and Russian example. And it would be Castro in 
the position to pass judgment on “who is not correctly following the ‘Cuban example’” 
(Draper, 1969, p. 53). Furthermore, while in a position of dependence with the Soviet 
Union, Castro made clear that Cuba does not see itself as a subordinate with the USSR. 
Discussing Castro’s and Cuban foreign policy over decades, Dominquez concludes that 
“there is little evidence that Cuba acts in international affairs simply at the bidding of the 
USSR. Fidel Castro’s Cuba is no one’s puppet” (Domínguez 1989, 4). This evidence 
suggests that Castro thought of Cuba as either an equal if not superior to other countries 
in the region.  
Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis   
The Pride Dimension  
According to Hymans, oppositional nationalists should display the behavioral 
characteristics stemming from the pride dimension, including an illusion of control. 
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“Such illusions short-circuit searches for information about potential unintended 
consequences of a given decision, and they also produce inattention to the details of 
policy implementation,” writes Hymans (2006, 33). Langer argues that the illusion entails 
an “expectancy of personal success higher than an objective probability would warrant” 
(Langer, 1975, p. 311). 
 This section will focus on two major issues: First, what was Castro’s role in the 
implementation of the missile deployment? Second, did Castro anticipate a reaction by 
the United States? If so, what type of reaction did he anticipate?  
 Both Castro and Khrushchev appeared to be aware of the likelihood of the 
deployment being discovered before the weapons were emplaced, which would 
complicate the deployment. The size and logistical challenges of the deployment should 
be discussed before proceeding. It involved a medium range missile division, two air 
defense missile divisions, four motorized rifle regiments, two regiments of tactical cruise 
missiles, a helicopter regiment, navy assets, a missile regime for coastal defense, and a 
brigade of patrol boats (Acosta, 2002a). The deployment involved 42,000 troops (Blight 
et al., 2002a, p. 58). More important than the technical details of the deployment, was the 
Russian’s inexperience with deploying weapons in another hemisphere. According to 
Soviet General Gribkov, “never before in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces and in 
the history of Russia had we transported so many troops to the other side of the ocean” 
(Blight et al., 2002a, p. 59). Not just a logistical feat, the plan hinged on, by 
Khrushchev’s design, the United States not discovering the missiles before the weapons 
were emplaced. The missiles would have to travel over 7,000 miles secretly and be 
emplaced on an island only 90 miles from the U.S. coastline (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997, 
p. 191). If the U.S. did discover the missiles before emplacement, the Cubans would be 
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exposed to a reaction by the United States. The clandestine nature of the deployment was 
not the only issue: all this had to be done in a relatively short period of time, around 70 
days, as the Cubans and the Soviets were emplacing the weapons to deter what they 
thought to be an imminent invasion. Famously, Allison and Zelikow (1999) argue that the 
launch sites were built in an identical fashion to other sites in the USSR and not 
camouflaged due to the standard operating procedure. In addition to organizational 
procedure, time constraints likely contributed to the lack of proper camouflage. As 
Acosta notes, the engineering crews were under tremendous pressure, which may explain 
the lack of camouflage as well (2002, p. 122–3) .  
Castro was concerned about the United States’ reaction if the deployment was 
discovered before the missiles were operational. Che Guevera and Emilio Aragones, at 
the behest of Fidel, traveled to the USSR in August 1962 to discuss this issue. They asked 
Khrushchev what would happen if the missiles were discovered before they were 
properly emplaced. Khrushchev replied: “You don’t have to worry; there will be no big 
reaction from the U.S.  And if there is a problem, we will send the Baltic Fleet” (Blight et 
al., 2002a, p. 351). Aragones recalls that they “looked at each other with raised 
eyebrows” (p. 351). At the Havana conference, Castro explained to the conference 
members, “we (Castro is speaking) did not think that the Baltic Fleet would solve the 
problem” (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 84). While Guevera, Aragones, and Fidel Castro, might 
be falsely claiming they knew of this vulnerability in light of the subsequent discovery of 
the missiles, Khrushchev’s explanation should have raised a number of concerns for 
Castro. Khrushchev’s explanation makes little sense. If there would be “no big reaction 
from the U.S.,” when why not just make the deployment public? In addition, the Baltic 
fleet reference is almost comical. As Welch notes, the last time the Baltic fleet “left 
128 
 
Russian waters on a distant mission” it was “annihilated by the Japanese in 1904” (p. 
351). “In 1962, the mismatch in the Caribbean would have been even greater” and the 
fleet “would be incapable of offering timely or effective assistance” in the case of the 
missiles being discovered (Blight, Allyn, and Welch 2002, p. 351; see also Fursenko and 
Naftali 1997, p. 195)  
In defense of Fidel, he may have not cared about the deployment being discovered 
to the point of canceling the agreement, as his preference was for a public defense pact. 
However, there were costs associated with a discovery of a clandestine deployment, as 
compared to a publically announced defense pact. Castro recognized the discovery was a 
propaganda victory for the ‘imperialists.’ The secretive nature of the deployment implied 
that the deployment was illegal. Castro maintains to this day that this was a lawful act 
and thus there was no need for the type of subterfuge employed by the Russians. 
McGeorge Bundy and Theorodre Sorenson, both member of the ExComm, agreed that 
the secretive nature of the deployment influenced U.S. options and they argued, at the 
Cambridge Conference in 1987, that “a public deployment of the missiles would have 
greatly constrained American options” (Blight & Welch, 1990, p. 205). In addition, the 
secret deployment of offensive weapons could possibly better serve as a rationale for a 
preemptive invasion from the United States. Castro could have insisted that the only way 
the weapons could be placed on Cuban soil was in the form of a public defense pact.  
Khrushchev and Castro should have been and were aware of a number of 
vulnerabilities in the plan. “U.S. intelligence regularly flew high-altitude U-2 
reconnaissance planes over Cuba, almost guaranteeing that Kennedy would discover the 
truth before completion of the operation,” writes Fursenko and Naftali (1997, p. 191).  
Khrushchev was an avid consumer of intelligence reports and was likely aware of this 
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vulnerability. According to Acosta, the Soviet high command was well aware that the 
Cubans did not have the assets to deter or shoot down the high altitude planes (2002a, p. 
122). Khrushchev tried to find a solution to this problem by prioritizing the deployment 
and emplacement of SA-2 surface to air missiles before the nuclear missiles. The SA-2s 
would theoretically be able to deter the overflights by shooting down the U-2s. Blight, 
Allyn, and Welch are skeptical about the ability of the USSR to shoot down the U-2s 
prior to the discovery of the missiles, even if Khrushchev permitted them to do so. They 
argue that as of October 18
th
, the USSR had only “9 of 22 SA sites operational” (Blight et 
al., 2002a, p. 415). Note that this may not appear to be as easy a solution as it seems: the 
USSR shooting down U-2’s would hardly have gone unnoticed and may have drawn 
more attention to the military build-up on the island, although this may have diminished 
the likelihood of the nuclear weapons being discovered.49 At the Havana conference, 
Castro blamed the Soviets for overlooking the U-2 issue, arguing that the Soviets should 
have made sure that the U-2s were unable to fly over, “It’s incredible to me that those 
planes were allowed to fly over,” Castro remembered (quoted in Acosta 2002, p. 122).  
According to Acosta (2002), Raul Castro directly conveyed concerns to Fidel 
after Raul and Soviet General Biryuzov inspected possible sites on the island for the 
weapons to be emplaced. On the inspection tour Raul got familiar with the size of the 
weapons and the number of personnel involved. Raul Castro “doubted, and has since 
stated, that the Soviets could transport the twenty-meter-long missiles to Cuba, without 
being discovered by the enemies’ intelligence services,” writes Acosta (2002, p. 103). He 
                                                          
49
 CIA director at the time John McCone’s initial hunch regarding Soviet weapons on the island was due to 
the emplacement of SAM sites. He speculated that those sites essentially had to be placed there to protect 
something, not just as general anti-aircraft weapons for the purposes of repelling an U.S. invasion, this 
suggest that shooting down the U-2s would have brought more attention to the buildup on the island 
(Dobbs, 2009).  
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reported his concerns to Fidel, “but there was confidence in Soviet expertise in such 
matters” (Acosta, 2002a, p. 103).  Fidel had to be aware of the difficulty in concealing the 
weapons because he was involved in the details of the deployment, Fidel had to relocate 
“hundreds” of families to make room for the missile sites (Lebow & Stein, 1995, p. 85) 
 Remember this is an island that by Castro’s own admission was subject to U.S. 
clandestine actions since the revolution. As Dobbs (2009) notes, the U.S. held a number 
of intelligence assets on the island. As the missiles were transported around the island, it 
is likely that these assets would see such a large deployment of missiles being 
transported.  In late August 1962, Cuban security services intercepted radio reports from 
Cuban agents regarding a large number of Soviet troops and material moving through the 
Island. Fursenko and Naftali (1997) argue that if Cuban intelligence services were 
picking up this type of information via radio chatter, it is likely that the U.S.—with better 
intelligence sources—were picking up this information or more as well. Indeed, as Dobbs 
(2009) discusses, reports of nuclear weapons on the island trickled in to U.S. intelligence 
agencies, but, ironically, were dismissed because it was believed to be extremely unlikely 
that the Soviets would place nuclear weapons in Cuba.  
The ties between Cubans still on the island and the Cuban exile community in 
Miami posed another problem. Reports circulated in the U.S. press in early August about 
Soviet activity on the island.  Acosta argues this information came from the Cuban 
émigré community in the U.S., when they received information regarding Soviet military 
activity from Cubans on the island (Acosta, 2002a, p. 126).   
In sum, Castro did not stop a plan advanced by Khrushchev that seemed to have 
had a number of serious vulnerabilities, the most conspicuous being the overhead flights. 
Moreover, when Cuban officials asked Khrushchev about what would happen if the 
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missiles were discovered, Khrushchev offered a solution: sending the Baltic fleet. 
Castro’s said years later that he found this explanation wanting and likely did at the time.  
Castro’s decision to initially agree and/or not to halt the deployment can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. The first is that Castro engaged in a calculated gamble 
in a similar fashion as Khrushchev. The gamble makes much more sense in the context of 
the fear dimension. It is possible, if Castro thought an invasion likely, that he was willing 
to take any action—even if only partially likely to succeed—to alleviate his fear. 
Furthermore, in Castro’s mind, “the impending invasion would be viewed as the 
equivalent of a nuclear holocaust” (Blight & Brenner, 2002, p. 21). Thus, risking nuclear 
holocaust is acceptable if a conventional invasion is viewed to be just as devastating and 
likely to happen. Going along with the Soviet deployment may have had the advantage of 
at least taking action, any action that offered a solution to what Castro saw as a likely 
U.S. invasion with full knowledge that the plan would only be partially likely to succeed. 
This should be taken as support for Hymans’s theory: Castro supported a plan with a 
likelihood of success that was unjustified based on objective conditions.  
Another explanation is that Castro—as he claimed at the Havana conference 
regarding a number of important details—essentially decided to defer to the Soviets’ 
expertise, putting his faith in their ability to successfully deploy the missiles. This would 
suggest support of Hymans’s theory as well, as Castro is essentially outsourcing the 
details of policy implementation.  
Castro’s faith in the USSR’s ability to successfully deploy the weapons and his 
general belief that the USSR would come to Cuba’s aid in the case of invasion, is all the 
more striking in light of the recent history of Cuban-Soviet relations in the period 
between the Cuban Revolution and missile deployment. As Robbins notes, “Moscow 
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approached the Cuban revolution with a great deal of caution—even more caution than it 
was simultaneously exercising in Asia or Africa” (C. A. Robbins, 1985, p. 139). All 
through 1959 the Soviet press was careful to describe the revolution in positive terms, but 
“was careful not to imply any offer of possible Soviet support” (p. 139). In early 1960, 
after Castro implemented a number of progressive policies, the Soviets warmed to the 
regime and pledged its support but carefully avoided any concrete pledges—Robins 
describes it as “disinterested support.” This all changed in July of 1960 when, according 
to Robbins, Khrushchev offered the Cuba military support. Khrushchev stated, 
“figuratively speaking, should the need arise, Soviet artilleryman can support the Cuban 
people by missile fire if the aggressive forces from the Pentagon dare intervene” (quoted 
in Robbins 1985, p. 141). Robbins argues this was an abrupt change in policy: after “a 
year and a half of qualified endorsements and only the most nebulous commitments,” 
Khrushchev “threw caution to the wind” and pledged his support to a relatively new 
socialist state that was in the United States’ principal sphere of influence. Such abrupt 
changes in policy and level of support may have been a cause for concern to another 
leader.  Furthermore, regarding the reliability of Cuba’s Soviet ally, outstanding non-
trivial issues were still unresolved regarding the need to ‘export revolution’ and 
disagreements over Marxist doctrine.50 As Brenner (1990, p. 12) notes, relations between 
Cuba and the USSR were “strained in the early part of 1962 and…Soviet aid was 
provided at a reduced level in June.” Notwithstanding the panegyrics regarding 
                                                          
50
 Robbins notes that while the Cuban revolution was anti-imperialist and, more importantly, anti-U.S., it 
was hardly the ideal state to receive the support of the USSR. It had “no industry, no proletariat, and, most 
importantly, no communist party leading their struggle” (C. A. Robbins, 1985, p. 137).  
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international solidarity, this was an ‘uneasy alliance,’ which makes it all the more 
perplexing as to why Castro was so trusting of his Soviet ally.51 
The need for concealment hints that the Soviets were concerned about a possible 
U.S. reaction, which brings up another question: What did Castro expect the U.S. reaction 
to be, either if the missiles were discovered prematurely or if they were revealed after the 
election? Fidel told journalist Tad Szulc (2000) after the crisis, “I was convinced that a 
very tense situation would be created, and that there would be a crisis” (p. 582).  This, 
again, may be a comment informed by the benefit of hindsight, because as Brenner 
(1990) notes, “The prevailing view is that neither the Cubans nor Soviets gave much 
thought to the U.S. reaction, and had no contingency plan for it” (p. 123). In the event 
that the weapons were properly emplaced and discovered, he may have assumed, as did 
Khrushchev, that the U.S. would have no choice but to ‘swallow’ the fact of the 
deployment—in a fashion similar to how the USSR had dealt with the stationing of U.S. 
weapons on their border. However, on September 4, Kennedy warned “against the 
introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba” (Brenner, 1990b, p. 123), and on September 
13
th
, he warned again about the consequences of Cuba becoming “an offensive military 
base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union” (Hilsman, 1967, p. 121).52 These 
comments were made after the initial decision to deploy was made, yet they should have 
challenged the idea that that the U.S. would simply accept wallow the weapons in Cuba. 
It is likely that Castro was aware of these statements. Castro must have been aware of the 
general political climate in the United States. As Lebow and Stein (1995) note, the 
                                                          
51
 See also Dinerstein (1978) for a discussion of USSR’s relationship with the new Cuban state. 
 
52
 Pressman (2001) argues Kennedy made these comments largely for domestic political reasons. Indeed, he 
may have, and Khrushchev’s insistence that the missiles be revealed after the election suggests that 
Khrushchev was aware of the political pressures acting upon Kennedy.   
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summer and fall of 1962 was a period of public concern in the United States regarding 
the ‘Cuban problem,’ due largely to the alleged build-up of Soviet troops on the Island 
and due to Republican charges that the Kennedy administration was lackadaisical 
regarding the buildup. Although these developments happened after the initial decision 
was made, “Since the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Cuba had constantly been in the headlines” 
and it would be reasonable to assume that the discovery of nuclear missiles on the island 
would put tremendous political pressure on Kennedy to ‘do something’ (Lebow & Stein, 
1995, p. 81).  
Deferring to Soviet expertise on this point is perplexing as well. Perhaps the 
Soviets had more experience deploying nuclear weapons, but Castro, by his own 
admission, thought that he had a better understanding of ‘Americans,’ so it is strange to 
see Castro defer to the expertise of the Soviets in regards to understanding a possible 
reaction from the United States (see Blight, Allyn, and Welch 2002).  
In sum, either Castro did not give much thought to a possible U.S. reaction or he 
was aware of the possibility that the deployment would precipitate a crisis but decided to 
proceed anyway. The former should be taken as support for the theory because it suggests 
that he was insensitive to the likely consequences of a given decision: a strongly negative 
reaction from the United States. The latter suggests that Castro engaged in a calculated 
gamble, because it had the potential to reduce the uncomfortable experience of fear.   
Pride should influence preferences over strategies as well, in the need to act 
autonomously. Hymans argues that pride should “produce positive utility from the act of 
standing alone, even if the ultimate material objective of the act could be more easily or 
fully achieved by cooperation” (p. 34). A major motivation for the deployment was what 
Castro perceived to be the deterrent value of the weapons. Yet, as Blight, Allyn, and 
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Welch (2002) argue, possessing the weapons offered the Cubans a degree of equality 
with the U.S., which had the potential to be “supremely gratifying. At one stroke the 
deployment would raise Cuba, for the first time, onto a geopolitical plane with 
imperialism” (p. 345). The weapons offered the ability to the Cuban of asserting their 
equality, by virtue of denying the U.S. the ability to invade the island by force. Moreover, 
the act itself was also an assertion of equality. Castro always stressed the right of Cuba to 
deploy any weapons on its territory, and that the U.S. did not have the right to determine 
what type of weapons the Cuban’s possessed. This is why Castro claims he always 
rejected the U.S.’s distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons. As Castro told 
the Havana conference in 1992, “…we always said that Cuba considered it had a 
sovereign right to have whatever type of weapons it thought appropriate, and no one had 
any right to establish what kind of weapons our country could or could not have” (quoted 
in Weldes 1999, p. 35). Castro stressed the legality of his action by reference to U.S. 
prior actions, as he explained to Suzlc “…in the same way that the U.S. had missiles in 
Italy and Turkey, in the same way as the United States has bases in all parts of the world 
around the Soviet Union, we, a sovereign nation, considered we had the absolute legal 
right to make use of measures in our own country” (2000, p. 582). Castro could have 
followed the U.S.’s ‘rules’ and only accepted defensive weapons, but this would have 
entailed a recognition of the U.S.’s authority and status in the region. Castro was hoping 
the weapons would force the U.S. to treat Cuba not as a subordinate satellite in a U.S. 
dominated sphere of influence, but as a sovereign state capable of negotiating and 
accepting whatever agreements it deemed necessary for its security.53 The comparison to 
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 The status aspect was apparent on the U.S. side, “During the ExComm deliberations it quickly became 
clear that the United States could not afford to allow Cuba to be seen as its equal. Allowing the Soviet 
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the U.S. is telling: by Castro’s logic, the Cubans are merely doing what the U.S. is doing, 
which would not be an issue if the U.S. treated Cuba as not only a sovereign state, but as 
a state with equal standing to the U.S.  “We were defending these rockets with amazing 
fervor and love,” Fidel said in secret speech in 1968, “for the first time we were 
participating in a certain state of equality with an enemy that had been attacking and 
provoking us incessantly, and we were really enjoying such a different and new 
situation…” (quoted in Blight and Brenner 2002, p. 32).  
The pride dimension has the ability to explain a number of otherwise perplexing 
aspects of the crisis. Rather than being relieved when an agreement was reached and 
hostilities avoided, Castro was extremely angered at not having been consulted or 
included in the negotiations. The Soviets were perplexed by Castro’s anger; from the 
Soviet perspective, Castro, having just escaped nuclear holocaust, was pettifogging and 
angered about a “diplomatic slight” (Blight & Brenner, 2002, p. 75). For Castro this was 
much more than a diplomatic slight, however. Had he been included in the negotiations, 
that undoubtedly would have made an agreement harder to reach and could have meant 
an agreement more beneficial to Cuba, but there was a non-material aspect as well.  
Castro resented not being included in the participation and in the consultations as an 
equal partner; he later told the Havana conference, “We were really very irritated over 
the fact that an agreement was reached without our participation, or without consultation 
with us… it provoked great indignation because we realized that we had been some type 
of game token” (quoted in Weldes 1999, p. 36). As Bright and Brenner (2002) argue, the 
Soviets could have included one of Castro’s demands—a token demand— in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
weapons to remain in Cuba, Kennedy said on October 16
th, ‘makes them (the Cubans) look like they’re 
coequal with us…” writes (Weldes, 1999a, p. 213) 
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negotiations, such as the need to negotiate directly with Cuba over the removal of the 
missiles. Kennedy may have not accepted this—though Bright and Brenner (1990) argue 
it would have been difficult to reject a proposed Cuban participation if it offered a 
‘solution’ to the crisis. Negotiations may have dragged on as a result, but Cuba would 
have been involved. Castro explained in a NBC interview in 1993, that it would have 
been satisfactory for Cuba to merely take part in the discussions (Lechuga, 1995, p. 255).  
What likely angered Castro was that Cuba was denied the “the sovereign right to 
negotiate its own fate” (Blight & Brenner, 2002, p. 13).54  
Another perplexing aspect of Castro’s behavior was his refusal to allow UN 
inspections on the island after the initial agreement was reached. Resisting the 
inspections certainly had a symbolic component, but it also had real costs. Technically 
the agreement—which included a non-invasion pledge by the U.S.—never went into 
force because it was predicated on inspections verifying the removal of the missiles. If 
U.N. inspections were completed it could offer “a binding juridical commitment lacking 
in Kennedy’s statement to Khrushchev” (Halperin, 1973, p. 196). Allowing the 
inspections and thereby accepting the pledge, could have appeared “to anyone accept 
Fidel, as a real turning point in revolutionary Cuba’s uncertain and extremely costly 
struggle for survival,” possibly providing an initial modus vivendi between the two 
adversaries (Halperin, 1973, p. 196). Castro did not give much weight to the pledge, 
seeing it as worthless. By not allowing inspectors, however, the Cubans would appear to 
be in breach of the agreement, which may have made it easier for a future administration 
to attack the island.  
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 As social psychologists Susan Fiske notes, non-inclusion can be a particularity acute form of scorn and 
non-recognition, see Fiske (2012).   
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The pride dimension may be able to shed light on this dynamic. Castro may have 
been gaining utility by the act of “standing alone,” denying the UN, and by extension the 
United States, the ability to inspect the island. As Castro told the Havana conference 
years later, “it is pretentious for another country to determine what we have the right to 
do in our country. Cuba is a sovereign state” (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 217). Castro makes 
reference to how Cuba and the U.S. are treated differently in his justification for resisting 
inspectors: “If the Soviets and the United Nations both trusted Washington’s public 
promise not to invade Cuba, why then did the U.S. government doubt that the USSR 
would remove the missiles?”( quoted in Acosta 2002, 184). Castro was fond of arguing 
that they should perform inspections on U.S. training sites, sites used for the training of 
Cuban exiles. This may seem like minor debating points, but again Castro highlights the 
issues of Cuban equality and the need to not be subject to U.S. mandates. “We have not 
given, and have no intention of giving, the U. S. Congress any of our sovereign 
prerogatives,” Castro told the Havana conference regarding his motives for resisting 
inspections. The language used to describe the inspection is telling as well: The 
inspections were “humiliating” (Lechuga, 1995, p. 134); “another attempt to humiliate 
our country”  (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 217). 
 
The Fear Dimension   
 As Hymans discusses, the experience of fear should encourage an urgency to act. 
In this case, it is difficult to directly attribute an urgency to act to Castro, as he reacted to 
a Soviet proposal, yet the evidence suggest there was such an urgency. Hymans’ predicts 
“this demand for action leads to haste in the decision making process” (p. 31). A 
reconstruction of the initial decision suggests it took place over a short period of time. To 
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reiterate, Khrushchev had the idea mid-May 1962. Commander Biryuzov’s secret Soviet 
delegation met with Castro and made the proposal on May 29
th
. According to Acosta 
(2002), Fidel convened the ORI and the following day made the decision in principle to 
deploy the nuclear weapons. In the meeting with the ORI, according to Acosta, Fidel 
argued for acceptance of the weapons for two reasons. The missiles would “strengthen 
the socialist camp”55 and, according to Acosta, those present at the meeting agreed it 
would be a powerful deterrent for U.S. action. Acosta’s reconstruction suggests there was 
not a discussion of the balance of nuclear forces; no discussion of the possible U.S. 
reaction; and no discussion regarding the motivation of the Soviets. Again, even taking 
the rationale to strengthen to socialist camp at face value, there was no discussion of what 
exactly “strengthen the socialist camp” entailed. The only concern voiced involved how 
other Latin American would react to the deployment. Acosta portrays it as essentially a 
snap decision: “All members of the ORI secretariat…without hesitation, and thinking 
honestly with a truly internationalist sentiment agreed to say yes to the Soviet proposal” 
(Acosta, 2002a, p. 102–103). While Acosta’s recollection may be subject to political 
manipulation, the timing suggests that the initial decision was made over a period of 
days. Due to the logistical challenges and the possible repercussions, it seems a decision 
of this sort would have required more planning and deliberation.  
 Another aspect of the fear dimension involves actors taking action to try to reduce 
the uncomfortable experience of fear, “as the experience of fear is physically 
uncomfortable and mentally oppressive, the urge to decrease the fear… can become as 
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 Unfortunately, Acosta is relying on Castro’s explanation from the Havana conference to reconstruct 
some of Castro’s decision-making. As noted, Blight, Allyn, and Welch (2002) suggest this is essentially an 
ex post facto justification. Acosta also uses “Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
Cuba” as well to reconstruct this meeting, which unfortunately may be subject to the same ex post facto 
tinkering.  
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important to the individual as the urge to decrease the danger,” writes Hymans (p. 32). 
This prompts actors to take action—any action—which may or may not decrease the 
actual danger an actor faces. This may explain why Castro rather unreflectively accepted 
the weapons: While it may not have decreased the danger—though it would have, if done 
correctly, offered a deterrent to a U.S. invasion—it offered Castro the ability to do 
something, rather than merely wait for what he perceived to be an imminent invasion. It 
may also explain why he overlooked a number of challenges and problems with the 
overall plan as articulated by Khrushchev. Castro told journalist Tad Suzlc after the 
crisis,  
we preferred the risk, whatever they were of great tension, a great crisis… to the 
risks of the impotence of having to wait, impotently, for the United States 
invasion of Cuba… At least they gave us a nuclear umbrella, as we felt much 
more satisfied with the response we were giving to the policy of hostility and 
aggression toward our country (p. 582).  
This quote suggests that while the deployment may not have been ideal for the purely 
defensive purpose of defending the island, it offered the ability to reduce the experience 
of fear by the actor taking action and gave Castro the ability to exercise some control 
over the situation.  
 Fear should result in inflated threat perceptions. In this case, it is difficult to 
conclude that threat perceptions were inflated because it is plausible that any actor would 
have interpreted U.S. actions as hostile and correctly perceived the United States’ desire 
to see Castro overthrown. Indeed, a number of Soviet decision-makers, including General 
Gribov, thought an U.S. invasion likely. The reasons for this are well documented. 
According to Brenner, Cuban officials in 1962, believed the United States would follow 
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the Bay of Pigs debacle with a large-scale invasion and subsequent U.S. polices were 
understood in such a context. According to the Cubans, the economic embargo was part 
of a plan to “destabilize and destroy their government” (Brenner, 1990b, p. 118). The 
U.S. was instrumental in suspending Cuban membership in the OAS, which the Cubans 
understood as setting the diplomatic table for an invasion. The U.S. was entertaining a 
plan to overthrow the Cuban government as part of Operation Mongoose, tentatively 
scheduled for October 1962. This was a multistage plan, whose final stage involved a 
military invasion of the island. The initial stages of Mongoose involved destabilizing the 
Cuban government and economy with acts of economic sabotage, terrorist acts by ex-
patriot groups, and the dissemination of propaganda via radio broadcasts. A series of 
naval exercises involving the mock overthrow of a dictator name Ortsac—Castro 
backwards—in Puerto Rican waters was likely interpreted as the preparation and 
planning for an invasion. While this exercise was scheduled to take place after Castro’s 
decision to deploy, it is possible the Cubans knew of the plans. Finally, Castro could not 
have been ignorant of various members of the U.S. media and members of Congress’ 
explosive rhetoric regarding the need to eliminate the ‘Cuban threat’ (see Brenner 1990, 
p. 17–122 for this paragraph).  The inferences Castro was making were quite reasonable 
and it is likely that another actor would have come to a similar conclusion regarding 
hostility from the United States.  
 With that said, this does not mean that the United States was in face planning to 
invade the island. It appears that official policy was to destabilize the regime up to the 
point of military invasion. Both Robert McNamara and Arthur Schlesinger, two advisors 
close to Kennedy during this period, insisted at the Havana conference years later, that 
Kennedy never—other than during the actual Missile Crisis—entertained plans of 
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invading the island. “I can say unequivocally that President Kennedy never expressed to 
me this belief that the U.S. should invade Cuba,” McNamara recalls (Blight, Allyn, and 
Welch 2002, p. 160). Schlesinger echoes McNamara, discussing an invasion before the 
actual crisis, “at no point was a military invasion contemplated” (Blight et al., 2002a, p. 
159). Other considerations likely discouraged a U.S. invasion. A full scale invasion 
would pose a problem for U.S. diplomacy in Latin America (Halperin, 1973, p. 103). In 
addition, invading the island could result in a protracted civil war, not to mention 
American casualties, which, according to  Raymond Garthnoff were estimated to be 
around 18,500 ( Blight, Allyn, and Welch 2002, p. 163).  
 While Castro may have perceived United States’ hostility accurately after the Bay 
of Pigs and before the Missile Crisis, Castro’s entrenched enemy image of the United 
States should not be overlooked. Castro frequently assumed the worst from the United 
States.  As Halperine notes, “Fidel was predicting an invasion of Cuba and organizing a 
student and workers’ militia to meet it” even before the Bay of Pigs invasion (Halperin, 
1973, p. 75). Innocuous acts were interpreted as threating gestures from the United 
States, such as the United States embassy in Cuba possessing stickers that were used to 
label U.S. property. According to the Cubans, the existence of “the stickers could only be 
explained as preparation for invasion” (Halperin, 1973, p. 78). On March 4 1960, the La 
Coubre, a French ship with weapons being delivered to Cuba, exploded in a Havana 
harbor. While “No proof of sabotage was actually produced by the Cubans, and the cause 
of the explosion was never officially established” Fidel immediately blamed the United 
States (Szulc, 2000, p. 515). Castro insisted that this was a “logical deduction” since the 
United States had an interest in denying the Cubans arms (Halperin 1973, p. 76; see also 
Quirk 1995, p. 302). The following day Castro gave “an immensely emotional oration” at 
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the funeral services bemoaning the United States’ interference in Cuban affairs (Szulc, 
2000, p. 515). While there may have been an instrumental component to this reaction, 
because blaming the United States may have bolstered Fidel’s domestic political 
legitimacy, this does not mean that Fidel did not genuinely believe the United States to be 
involved. As Fettewies (2015) notes, scholars err in assuming that if a belief advances a 
material goal then the belief in insincere, as if “political elites are unable to hold multiple, 
reinforcing ideas simultaneously” (2015, no page). Thus, even if Castro succeeded in 
using the explosion of the La Coubre for political advantage, this does not mean that 
Castro did not believe that the United States was involved.  In sum, while it is difficult to 
conclude that his is a case of exaggerated threat perceptions, due to the clearly hostile 
actions of the United States, Fidel did hold an entrenched enemy image of the United 
States that ensured that U.S. behavior would be interpreted hostile.  
Conclusion  
 Hymans’s theory resolves some of the otherwise perplexing aspects of this case. 
The anger Castro displayed following the denouement of the crisis suggests that the 
nuclear weapons were much more than mere instruments of deterrence. As the pride 
section outlines, it is likely that Castro was deriving utility from the act of standing alone, 
specifically possessing weapons that offered the Cuban state a degree of equality with a 
much stronger neighbor, which in turn promised a higher degree of autonomy from the 
United States. Moreover, the pride dynamic can shed light on the general overconfidence 
displayed by Castro, particularly his overlooking key vulnerabilities of the deployment.  
 The evidence suggests that there was a general urgency to act and that Castro was 
taking action to alleviate the uncomfortable experience of fear, which is consistent with 
Hymans’s theory. Due to the particulars of the case, it is difficult to conclude that this is a 
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case of exaggerated threat perceptions, yet it does appear that Castro held an entrenched 
enemy image of the United States.  In sum, the weapons clearly offered material benefits, 
but the bundle of behavioral characteristics that stem from the emotion of fear and pride, 
can explain why Castro was likely to make suck risky decisions.  
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CHAPTER V 
KIM ll-SUNG  
 
Explanations for the Korean War  
 Orthodox accounts of the Korean War see the invasion of South Korea as a 
preconceived communist conspiracy, with Stalin pulling Kim’s strings, with support from 
Communist China (Armstrong, 2013, p. 12). As Jervis (1980) and Mercer (2013) 
document, U.S. policy makers did, at the time, see the invasion of the South as the 
actions of a monolithic communist bloc, primarily instigated by Stalin, explaining why 
U.S. policy makers reevaluated the ‘threat’ from a now united and embolden Sino-Soviet 
Bloc to be much higher than in the period before the invasion (See also Foot, 1985 for 
U.S. policy makers' reactions).56 This account proved half correct—there was indeed 
planning between Stalin, Kim, and Mao – but it incorrectly conceptualizes Kim as being 
manipulated by Stalin, when in fact, the prime mover pushing for invasion was Kim. 
There is more evidence that it was Kim that manipulated Stalin in terms of invading the 
South than the other way around (Armstrong, 2013, p. 11).57 More important, this account 
fundamentally mischaracterizes Kim’s motivations, seeing Kim as an agent of an 
international communist movement, while his major goal was to unify the Korean 
Peninsula under Northern rule and thereby consolidate his power and eliminate the 
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 This reevaluation of the threat, according to Jervis (1980), resulted in an explosion of U.S. defense 
spending and the proliferation of agreements between the U.S. and its allies to ‘contain’ communist 
expansion, highlighting the importance of the Korean War in international history. 
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 This is not an entirely new revelation. Khrushchev in his memoirs, argued that it was Kim’s idea to start 
he war not Stalin’s (See Khrushchev pg. 145-47).  
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reactionary, pro-Rhee elements in South Korea. Spreading communism was, at best, a 
secondary concern (Armstrong, 2004, p. 2).  
 Revisionist accounts place emphasis on the essentially civil nature of the war. 
Bruce Cumings (1990), the most prominent advocate of the revisionist view, sees the 
conflict in Korea as essentially a civil war internationalized by U.S. intervention. 
Cumings sees U.S. intervention based on a political economic logic, captured by ‘world 
systems theory.’ Not only did the U.S. misperceive the nature of the war, but used the 
opportunity to advance Acheson’s goal of a U.S. led global economic hegemony. “The 
foundation of Achesonian containment in East Asia was a world economy logic, captured 
by his metaphor of a ‘great crescent,’” writes Cumings. “Here was the crucial 
background to Acheson’s extension of containment to southern Korea [in 1947], his later 
elaboration of a ‘defensive perimeter’ in Asia, and his decision to intervene in the Korean 
War” (Cumings, 1992, p. 49). As with the orthodox accounts, revisionists proved to be 
half correct explaining Kim’s actions. Revisionists erred in diminishing the role of the 
USSR or Chinese— Kim did act with the approval and coordination of the Soviets and 
Chinese. They proved correct in emphasizing the civil nature of the conflict. Of particular 
importance is the essentially contested nature of the 38
th
 parallel. As Cumming stresses, 
the 38
th
 parallel was not an internationally recognized boundary (Armstrong, 2013, p. 
15). This fact may reduce the risk associated with Kim’s invasion of the South and it 
should be distinguished from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, which was an 
internationally recognized boundary. Also important to note is the de facto conflict going 
on before the invasion, as Cumings see the North’s invasions as an escalation of an 
already well developed civil war—Kim’s invasion was the denouement of a civil war, not 
the start of a conventional war. While Kim’s actions were a drastic and clear escalation of 
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hostilities, it was not unreasonable for Kim to fear a possible South Korean attack, 
supplying some rationale for Kim’s subsequent explanation that he was reacting to 
Southern provocations.  
 Recently available works featuring declassified Russian and Chinese sources have 
been able to shed considerable light on this controversy. It is now clear that Kim pressed 
for invasion as early as mid-1949, with a reluctant Stalin withholding support (to be 
discussed in more detail below). Stalin eventually agreed to support the invasion, but 
only after maneuvering the Chinese to pledge support as well and by fundamentally 
limiting the USSR’s involvement in the campaign. Kim, in gaining Stalin’s support, 
argued that the invasion would be swift and easy; would be greeted with a concomitant 
uprising of support from guerrillas, supporters of the North Korean regime in the south; 
and the U.S. was not likely to intervene and if the U.S. did, it would be too late to make 
any effective difference. Indeed, as orthodox school suggests, there was a conspiracy of 
sorts, but it was Kim that was the major actor pressing for invasion.  
 This chapter argues that the identity-driven model of decision making can shed 
considerable light on Kim’s decision to invade and resolve some otherwise perplexing 
aspects of the case. For instance, why was Kim so optimistic about a likely concomitant 
guerrilla uprising in light of the fact that the guerrilla movement in South Korea was 
essentially exhausted?  Why did Kim brush aside warnings about the possibility of U.S. 
intervention? Why was the invasion rushed and why did the North Koreans not have the 
resources to complete the objectives of the initial ground invasion? Kim likely 
overlooked such complications because, finally, unification was within his grasp. This 
had to have been of great emotional significance to Kim, as much of his life had been the 
life of a guerilla fighter. The emotion associated with prospective unification likely 
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helped determine how Kim interpreted the likelihood of success of an invasion and 
pushed Kim in the direction of taking such a ‘leap in the dark’ and invade South Korea.  
 
Kim Il Sung’s NIC  
 
The Solidarity Dimension: North Korea against the World  
 
The solidarity dimension’s key question “is whether ‘we’ and ‘they’ naturally 
stand for similar or different interests and values” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 22). Kim’s NIC is 
one of “North Korea against the world.”58 A useful visual for understanding Kim’s NIC 
is of ceaseless waves crashing against rocky shores; the waves are symbolic of the never-
ending attempt of enemies of the North Korean regime to harass and attack it. Usually a 
member of the Kim family “stands guard” on the shore “as waves of a hostile world crash 
ineffectually against the rocks” (Meyers, 2012, p. n.p.). Murals of this sort are commonly 
featured in North Korean propaganda. This section will argue for such an interpretation 
of Kim Il Sung’s NIC: Kim viewed Korea as standing for different interests and values 
than most of the world.  
The historical record of Kim’s early life, suggests he was a dedicated nationalist, 
fighting foreign occupation and resisting foreign influence. While official North Korean 
biographies are undoubtedly hagiographic, exaggerating Kim’s exploits as a guerrilla 
fighter, there is substantial evidence that Kim was a dedicated nationalist.
 59 Even if the 
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 This assessment is borrowed from Hymans (2008). 
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 Of the more risible stories in the official biographies of Kim, features Kim explaining the details of 
“dialectical materialism” to a group, at the tender age of five. 
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North Korea regimes’ official biographies of Kim are untrue, they can be indicative of 
Kim’s NIC, the national “myths” an accurate reflection of how the Kim sees himself. The 
secondary literature is in agreement with the interpretation that Kim was a dedicated 
nationalist before the Korean War. Kim was “genuinely consumed by patriotic anti-
colonialism who, while still in his teens, embraced communism as the key to 
independence and justice for Koreans” writes Martin (2004, p. 12).60 Kim grew up in a 
region known for its “strong currents of nationalism and Communism” (Lee, 1967, p. 
375). Some ambiguity surrounds Kim’s official residence in his early years, but most 
sources, including colonial Japanese records, find that, around 1924-25, Kim’s family left 
Korea for Manchuria’s Kirin Providence. Ironically, Kim, the dedicated Korean 
nationalist did not grow up in Korea. However, it was an area known to have “been 
heavily populated by Koreans and had become a haven for Korean nationalists” (Lee, 
1967, p. 375). It was a “highly politicized environment,” with a number of nationalist and 
communists groups organized military academies collecting taxes and recruiting fighters 
(Lee 1967, p. 375). It is not surprising, according to Lee, that Kim joined a local League 
of Young Communists “as early as 1926 when he was a middle school student in Kirin” 
(Lee 1967, p. 375). He was imprisoned for eight months by the Chang Tso-lin regime for 
his association with said organizations.  
Official regime propaganda, published after Kim seized power, portrayed him as 
descending from a lineage of Korean nationalists. Communist sources claim that Kim’s 
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 Some may see a conflict between being a dedicated nationalist and a communist, as the latter suggests 
the importance of being part of an international, class-based movement. However, as Lankov notes, Kim’s 
understanding of communism had both national and social dimensions. East Asian communists were not 
just attracted to the communist ideology because of its promise of social equality, but because of its strong 
anti-colonial messages and was seen as a means of national revival, offering a path to “leapfrog” stages of 
development and escape colonial dependence (Lankov, 2013).  “Korea, like Vietnam, was a country 
recently released from colonial rule, and in both of these countries the communist movement has been 
closely associated with anticolonial nationalism” writes Armstrong (2003, p. 2). See Vu (2016) for a 
similar interpretation of the Vietnamese communist movement.  
150 
 
father had participated in the March First Movement of 1919, which landed him in 
prison. Kim’s official biography, With the Century, tells of his great-grandfather’s role in 
the attack on the U.S.S. General Sherman, which ran aground in Korea in 1866.61  
According to Kim’s autobiography, his grandfather, upon hearing “imperialist 
aggressors” were sailing up the Yanggak Islet and killing Koreans with its cannons and 
guns, raping women, and stealing property, sprang into action, joining a campaign that 
ultimately resulted in the destruction of the American ship.62 Both claims may be 
apocryphal, parts of one of the stories created by the regime to bolster Kim’s claim to 
dynastic leadership. Kim’s fathers experience may be highly plausible: the March First 
Movement, a nation-wide movement in Korea, involved one to two million people “and it 
is conceivable that Song-ju’s father (i.e., Kim’s father) had also joined the 
demonstration” (Lee, 1967, p. 375). Nonetheless, even if both stories are false, it does 
shed light on Kim’s NIC. Kim desires to be seen as descending from generations of 
freedom fighters, willing to die to punish imperialist aggressors and safe-guard the 
independence of the Korean people.  
North Korean Communists never tire of stressing Kim’s credentials as a guerrilla 
leader. Again, while much of his experience may be embellished for propaganda 
purposes, the historical records suggest Kim was a dedicated guerilla fighter. Both the 
South Korean Government and the Japanese occupational authorities acknowledged 
Kim’s role as a guerrilla leader. The majority of Kim’s guerilla activities were with the 
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 The Sherman’s anchor – the ship’s guns were taken and hull burned—hung on the main gate to 
Pyongyang as a warning to outsiders who may attempt to enter Korea uninvited. In 2000, the Pueblo—
another U.S. Naval vesicle and subject of controversy in U.S. –North Korean relations— was placed on 
display alongside the monument to the U.S.S. General Sherman, reminding Korean’s “they must maintain 
their vigilance against American imperialism” (Armstrong 2013, p. 154).  
 
62
 This story is told in With the Century, (vol 1, pg. 10). Also, see Martin (2004, p. 375).  
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Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army around 1934 to 1940. The group was directed by 
the Chinese Communist Party, a fact usually omitted by the North Korean regime when 
discussing Kim’s partisan activities (Armstrong, 1995, p. 7). Two significant events 
helped build Kim’s reputation with both the Japanese authorities and the Korean people. 
Starting in November of 1933, Kim and his forces engaged in a three-month battle with 
Japanese forces. The Japanese aimed to starve the group out with a siege, but were 
unsuccessful. Kim and his partisans snuck through enemy lines to attack the Japanese 
from the rear. This raid was a notable event in his guerilla experience. Kim, then twenty-
five years old, led two- hundred men into Korea at night, killing Japanese police officers 
and stealing supplies and money from local property owners. The Japanese followed the 
partisans back into Manchuria, only to be ambushed by Kim’s forces. The forces, behind 
rocks on a mountain-side, pushed large boulders down the mountain on the attacking 
Japanese (Martin, 2004). Such tactics were typical, according to Martin. Kim’s bands 
were known to use subterfuge:  “The guerrillas used surprise attacks, sniping, ambush 
night warfare and feints, luring the enemy into defensive zone of their own choosing,” 
writes Martin (2004, p. 39). 
Armstrong notes that the guerilla fighters had some success between 1936 and 
1939, but “the years between 1939 and 1941 ‘could be called the period when our forces 
suffered loss,’ as Kim euphemistically puts it” (Armstrong, 1995, p. 9), resulting in Kim 
fleeing Manchuria for safe haven in the USSR. While official state mythology paints an 
inaccurate picture, Kim was unquestionably highly dedicated, fighting against great odds. 
Armstrong describes Kim’s group of partisan fighters as having “tremendous 
determination to win against overwhelming odds, willing to take enormous and at times 
foolhardy risks” (1995, p. 9). Furthermore, Kim appeared to be genuinely dedicated to 
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the cause. The partisans “felt themselves the only legitimate representative of a people 
oppressed by imperialism and ‘feudal vestiges,” writes Armstrong, “ who attempted to 
link themselves with the poor peasantry of the remote Manchurian countryside in order to 
win back for them the land stolen by ruthless invaders” (1995, p. 9). Dae-Sook Suh 
argues that Kim became “then the most wanted guerrilla leader in Manchuria. He 
persisted in the hopeless fight without much support, but he endured and did not 
surrender or submit to the Japanese” (Suh, 1995, p. 46).  
While official regime propaganda regarding Kim’s guerilla experience may be 
inaccurate, it does shed light on how the regime sees itself. Kim’s guerilla experience 
provides “the central founding myth of the North Korean state” (Armstrong, 1995, p. 9), 
and it is at “the heart of Korean propaganda, storytelling, and arts” (D. Byman & Lind, 
2010, p. 53). North Korean propaganda stresses Kim’s role in the heroic anti-imperial 
struggle, offering an origin story for the North Korean regime. Kim’s guerilla experience 
justifies the Supreme Leader or suryong system, an ideology that sees Kim II Sung as the 
“sun of the nation” and “eternal president of the republic” (D. Byman & Lind, 2010, p. 
52); Armstrong argues that Kim “became a kind of substitute and symbol for the family 
of the Korean nation” (Armstrong, 2002, p. 222). Kim played the led role in this founding 
myth, as he leads his nation to salvation from foreign oppression. His nomadic 
experience—wandering in the Manchurian wilderness—is symbolic of the exile off all 
Korean people who were strangers in their own occupied homeland. In the guerilla myth, 
Kim’s role is of the “filial son of an anti-Japanese fighter, descended from a pantheon of 
revolutionary ancestors; Kim’s filial son, Kim Jong-Il, carries on this tradition” writes 
Byman and Lind (2010, p. 52). To be sure, the propaganda surrounding the guerilla myth 
has an instrumental component. It justifies the privileged position of the North Korean 
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guerilla elite, stressing that without the sacrifices and loyalty of this group, liberation 
would have been impossible. The myth also serves a legitimating function for the Kim 
dynasty, the legitimacy stems from Kim’s role as resisting—against great odds—foreign 
domination and influence. However, just because the myth serves an instrumental 
function, does not mean that Kim does not hold such an identity conception.  
 The role of the Manchurian experience in justifying Kim’s leadership suggests a 
high degree of nationalism and xenophobia prevalent in general in the regime, which may 
be the product of the North Koreans regime’s propaganda. This xenophobia may be 
justified as Korea found itself at the mercy of great powers in modern history. While the 
NIC stresses North Korea against the world, certain groups are singled out for special 
vituperation. Bruce Cumings argues that North Korea “is first of all, and above all, an 
anti-Japanese entity,” and “that anti-Japanese sentiment is drummed into the brains of 
everyone in the country” (quoted in Byman and Lind 2010, p. 53).63 North Korean 
propaganda for domestic consumption portrays the Japanese as an “inherently evil race 
that can never change, a race with which Koreans much forever be on hostile terms” 
(Meyers 2012, p. 135).  
The U.S. is subject of a great deal of demonization as well, because, according to 
the Kim regime, the U.S. is responsible for dividing the peninsula, engaging in various 
atrocities, and allying with the Japanese to subjugate Korea.64 North Korean propaganda, 
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 The Japanese occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945.  
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 Cumings (1990) argues that the North’s anti-U.S. propaganda is more a product of U.S. war crimes 
committed during the Korean War. Indeed, the U.S. engaged in a great deal of bombing of civilian 
populated areas. However, as Meyers notes, “no other country has born a grudge for so long”; there was 
intense anti-American propaganda disseminated before the Korean War; and finally, much of anti-U.S. 
propaganda is not about the Korean War, suggesting the origins of such propaganda are not strictly in 
response to the U.S.’s actions during the Korean War (See Meyers 2012, p. 150).  
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according to B.R. Meyers, has deeply racial overtones and portrays Americans as 
bastards, jackals, and swine, “who have snouts rather than noses and who croak rather 
than die” (D. Byman & Lind, 2010, p. 53; Meyers, 2012, p. Chpt. 5). School children are 
subject to nationalist propaganda at early ages. For instance, a primary school math 
textbook asks: “the brave uncles from the Korean People’s Army destroyed six tanks of 
the wolf-like American bastards. Then they destroyed two more. How many tanks did 
they destroy all together?” (quoted in Byman and Lind 2010, p. 54) In propaganda meant 
for domestic consumption, “U.S. Imperialism” and “America” “are used interchangeably 
and Americans are referred to routinely by the term ‘nom’ or ‘bastards.’” (Meyers 2012, 
p. 135).  
South Koreans are portrayed as being fundamentally compromised by their 
interaction with “impure elements” and as tools of American masters. Thus, the North 
can be the only true representatives of a pure Korean nationalism. The regime goes to 
great lengths to scrub the record clean of any evidence the North was aided or is 
somehow dependent on foreign powers. This is all the more striking because of the North 
dependence on the USSR in the early days of the regime and its dependence on external 
aid. Kim’s autobiography omits mention that it was the Americans and the Soviets that 
ultimately destroyed the Japanese empire.  
One can see this nationalism and xenophobia reflected not just in the regime’s 
propaganda, but also in the regime’s official policy. At the heart of the regime is its 
official Juche ideology, which is typically translated as “self-reliance, or as solving your 
own problems under all circumstances” (D. Byman & Lind, 2010, p. 52).65 It encourages 
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 Hymans notes another irony. The Juche ideology may have been borrowed from nationalist kokutai ideas 
of the Japanese, North Koreas’ former colonists. B. R. Meyers (2012) argues that race-based nationalism as 
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North Korean citizens to creatively solve various problems independently. In the 
economic realm it stresses the need to resist entanglement by capitalist enemies and the 
benefits of a policy of economic autarky. The South Koreans, in the North’s view, are 
guilty of the opposite of Juche, which is sadaejuui, meaning to be reliant on a foreign 
power (Hymans, 2008, p. 265).66 Aside from the Juche ideology, the North Korean 
regime implements other policies that signal the regimes desire to reject foreign influence 
of every sort and from every provenance” (Hymans, 2008, p. 266) For instance, after Kim 
came to power, the regime engaged in a major “Koreanizing” campaign of the language, 
which aimed to “extirpate all traces of the historic Chinese as well as Japanese influence” 
(Hymans, 2008, p. 266). Far from being a mirror image of the USSR, North Korea while 
nominally a “communist regime,” claimed to practice Korean or “our style” socialism.  
 
The Status Dimension   
  
The key feature for the status dimension “is how high ‘we’ stand relative to 
‘them’ in the international pecking order: Are we naturally their equal (if not their 
superior), or will we simply never measure up” (Hymans, 2006b, p. 23). According to 
B.R. Meyers, the North Koreans see themselves as “part of a uniquely pure and virtuous 
                                                                                                                                                                             
opposed to Juche's notions of self-reliance is much more prevalent than what Meyers sees as an incoherent 
Juche ideology; either way, both are evidence of the regime’s xenophobia and nationalism.  
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 Critics argue that the origins of the Juche ideology can be traced to Kim’s famous December 1955 
speech, which would postdate the Korean War. Furthermore, Scalapino and Lee (1973) argue that the 
formulation and articulation of the Juche ideology followed an internal logic: its aim was to consolidate 
Kim’s control and leadership by isolating the various Soviet and Chinese factions in the North Korean 
leadership. Regarding the timing of the Juche speech, “Kim’s nationalism was hardly new; he had spent his 
entire youth until the age of thirty-three as an anti-Japanese fighter…Nothing in his Juche speech was a 
radical departure from Kim’s earlier statements on Korean nationalism, going back to the immediate 
postliberation period” (Armstrong, 2013, p. 92). While the public articulation of the Juche ideology in 1955 
may have served an instrumental purpose, it does not mean that it did not accurately reflect Kim’s NIC, one 
of oppositional nationalism.  
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race” and that “racial pride always requires constant awareness of an inferior other” 
(Meyers 2012, p. 130). Meyers continues by adding, “if the child race is uniquely pure, it 
follows that no non-Koreans are to be regarded as equals” (Meyers 1012, p. 129). North 
Koreans exhibit “lofty moral attitudes” and are uniquely “virtuous.” This virtue can be a 
liability: To be “uniquely virtuous in an evil world but not uniquely cunning or strong is 
to be as vulnerable as a child” (Meyers 2012, p. 79). The race is vulnerable to evil 
outsiders in the absence of a great leader “who can turn its purity into a source of unity 
and strength” (Meyers 2012, p. 80). Meyers argues that the regime uses the color white in 
many of its depictions of Kim and features Kim with North Korean children as evidence 
of the purity of the Korean race. Kim is often photographed on a white horse, a purity 
symbol.  
 DPRK propaganda does not insist that Koreans are better at everything than 
outsiders; obviously some races are taller and more affluent than North Koreans. Indeed, 
some North Korean propaganda portrays South Korea as being affluent. Perhaps this was 
necessary after it became increasingly difficult to convince North Koreans that the 
rapidly developing South Korea was a “living hell.” However, the affluence masks 
“ethnic contamination,” which is all the more striking when compared to the North 
Koreans who are “as pure as the water they drink” (Meyers, 2012, p. 155). 
 States friendly to the DPRK are portrayed, in official DPRK propaganda for 
domestic consumption, as essentially being tributary states, sending congratulations to the 
great leader and the DPRK on their great achievements. For all the aid and patronage 
given to the DPRK from the USSR, the USSR gets little or no thanks in the propaganda 
meant for domestic consumption, and the USSR is certainly not portrayed as being 
superior or more advanced. Meyers argues that the USSR is “looked back upon with 
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contempt.” For instance, in a novel produced by the DPRK, Kim Il Sung “chuckles about 
how he learned Soviet secrets by getting Brezhnev drunk;” and there are “frequent sneers 
(in the novel) about how the USSR collapsed ‘without firing a shot’” (quoted in Meters, 
2012, p. 130). Tellingly, when foreigners and DPRK citizens interact, in official regime 
propaganda for domestic consumption, the foreigners are usually portrayed as being 
respectful and obsequious, while the locals (North Koreans) reply “informally as if to 
subordinates” (Meyers 2012, p. 131). In interactions between the DPRK and the U.S., the 
U.S. is usually portrayed in a manner suggesting that the U.S. is afraid of Pyongyang’s 
strength and unity; the U.S. is portrayed as being ready to negotiate, usually “kneeling 
down or waving the white flag” of surrender. Interestingly, in North Korean propaganda, 
North Korea is portrayed as being on equal footing with the U.S. In a propaganda novel, 
a fictional U.S. ambassador says to the North Korean envoy, “That’s right, you’re a 
superpower. A superpower like America!” (Meyers 2012, p. 144).   
 
Case Study: The Korean War  
 
The Pride Dimension 
  
Pride produces the need to act autonomously. Youngjun Kim argues, explaining 
the origins of the North Korean garrison state that Kim’s desire for a large army– which 
would take the form of the KPA— was not merely to safeguard North Korea’s security. 
But, a large army was necessary to safeguard North Korean independence and autonomy. 
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In an emotional speech announcing the establishment of a Pyongyang Academy in 1945, 
Kim expanded on the importance of the academy:
 67  
In former days when their country was lost to the Japanese imperialists because 
they had no powerful national army of their own, the Korean people were 
subjected to colonial oppression and cruel exploitation. A glimpse at the house 
here in Chiul-ri is a clear enough indication of the harsh humiliation the Koreans 
underwent under the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism. The Japanese 
discriminated against Koreans at every step even in dining rooms and lodging 
quarters and exploited Korean youth like beasts of burden. A person without a 
homeland is always destined to lead a life more miserable than a dog in a house of 
death. This is quite true. Under Japanese imperialist rule, our people were forced 
to live with pent-up grievances. Not only in Chiul-ri but everywhere else in our 
country you can find traces of the sorrowful, piteous life the Koreans had led 
under the tyranny of Japanese imperialism. Why, then, shouldn’t we be consumed 
with animosity towards the Japanese? Our people can never allow such 
humiliating slavery to be imposed on them again. We must not fail to build by our 
own efforts an independent and sovereign democratic state and found our 
powerful regular army (Youngjun Kim 2017, p. 123).  
 
Kim stressed the burning desire for autonomy and independence that would accompany a 
strong military, with emotionally salient language like humiliation and slavery. What is 
also noticeable in this speech is a lack of discussion of the need for world revolution, of 
capitalist exploitation, or of other concerns of the international communist movement. 
Notice that Kim did not mention the strong alliance nor military support from the USSR. 
Kim focused, as usual, on nationalist themes: such as national pride and independence.  
 Autonomy for the North Korean state could never be achieved without the 
unification of the peninsula. On the eve of the North’s invasion, Kim justified it in terms 
similar to those in his address to the Pyongyang Academy. During an emergency meeting 
he had called on the morning of June 25
th
, 1950 he declared that  
Rhee Syng’s puppet army invaded to North along all places along the 38th 
parallel. I sent a warning message to the enemy to stop their invasion, but the 
                                                          
67
 The Pyongyang Academy trained officers which would then populate the officer core of the KPA 
(Youngjun Kim, 2017). 
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enemy continually invaded 1-2 kilometers northern part of the 38
th
 parallel and 
tried to occupy all area of North Korea. We faced difficulties and dangers. We 
have to decide now whether we would be slaves of imperialist countries or 
peaceful people of independent country. We have to fight against Rhee 
Syngman’s army. We have to start our revolutionary war for liberation against 
them. Our army had to start counterattack against the enemy to win the war 
(Youngjun Kim 2017, p. 15).  
 
Kim’s explanation was technically incorrect. The North’s invasion was not a reaction to a 
South Korean invasion, as indicated by Kim himself in 1975, when he let slip “we will 
not invade the south again” (Kim 2017, 136). But an appreciation for how Kim 
conceptualized the war makes this distinction less important. As the revisionists stress, 
Kim thought a state of war already in existence in the summer of 1950. Before the start of 
the conventional war, both North and South engaged in intensive espionage and even 
assassination campaigns. Kim Il-Sung himself was almost the victim of a terror attack 
(Kim 2017, 136).  The prominent South Korean politician Yo Unhyong and Kim Ku were 
both assassinated. What is most telling is the language the DPRK used to describe the 
war. This was not a war between states: Kim and Kim Tu-bong, the nominal head of the 
DPRK, both stressed publically that the goal was to release the ‘captured’ South Korean 
government. South Korea was captured by traitors and “the objective of liberation war is 
to remove traitors to our nation and to liberate the South Korean people,” declared Kim 
Tu-bong.  The “South Koreans are our family” explained Kim Tu-bong (Kim 2017, p. 
136). Thus, according to Kim, true independence could only be achieved by removing the 
traitors and the imperialist puppet movement in South Korea. Kim’s lifelong goal was to 
resists foreign occupation. He clearly regarded the South Korean government as being 
captured by imperialist, alien, and foreign sources. When the foreign occupier was 
defeated, the South Koreans could then rejoin the Korean family. This interpretation 
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stresses that Kim likely would gain tremendous utility from achieving his goal of ridding 
the Korean peninsula of foreign occupiers.  
Just as in the cases of Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein, their actions offered 
undeniable material benefits. But certain actors tend to gain tremendous non-material 
utility that stems from a particular NIC. Leaders that conceptualize their nations as being 
‘great,’ likely gain more utility. For Fidel the weapons would allow Cuba to avoid being 
pushed around by the U.S., alleviating its subordinate status. For Saddam the war allowed 
him to act as the rightful leader of the pan-Arab movement, placing Iraq in its rightful 
‘place in the sun.’ And for Kim, unification would advance the goal that animated his life 
as a guerrilla fighter, namely: ensuring that Korea would not be dominated by foreigner 
aggressors.   
Pride can result in the decision maker seeing her state as possessing an 
exaggerated amount of relative power, leading to unfounded assumptions about the 
state’s ability to affect other states. Kim had ample reason to be confident about the 
KPA’s ability to defeat the ROK’s army. Because the KPA held a number of objective 
advantages, it is difficult to conclude that Kim saw his state as possessing an unjustified 
amount of relative power.  
 The KPA held a number of advantages. Broadly, they benefited from the largess 
of outside powers, specifically support from the Soviet Union and the return of fourteen-
thousand battle-hardened Koreans fighting in the Peoples Liberation Army. They also 
benefited from the active insurgency campaign in the South. More specifically, the KPA 
benefited from a more experienced officer core, better capabilities, and from readiness 
problems with the ROKA.  
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Soviet advisors that had served in the Red Army during WWII provided the KPA 
with combat-trained advisors. This advantage was limited, however. While the advisors 
took part in the planning of the attack, Stalin limited their involvement during the 
invasion to specific units, because he feared captured advisors could provide irrefutable 
evidence of Soviet collusion. Conversely, while some officers in the ROKA included 
veterans of the Japanese service, “these officers varied widely in professional skill, 
devotion to Korean nationalism, and character” (Millett, 2010, p. 29). Many of the best 
officers in the ROK were suspect due to either active collaboration with the Japanese 
occupation or because they had fled from the North. Of tremendous benefit to the KPA 
was the recent addition of three infantry divisions released and returned to Korea from 
the People’s Liberation Army providing combat-trained personnel.  
Soviet tanks and field artillery assets gave the North a distinct advantage in terms 
of mechanized warfare. As Millett documents, the medium T-34 tank armed with an 
85mm main gun and the self-propelled SU-76 gun were especially effective due to the 
ROKA’s lack of mechanized assets (Millett, 2010, p. 32). During the invasion, the South 
lacked weapons that could penetrate the “frontal hull armor or turret of the T-34” 
(Millett, 2010, p. 35). The ROKA lacked anti-tank mines and ROKA infantry platoons 
were forced to try to disable the tanks with other anti-tank demolitions in the “hands of 
sacrificial gun crews” (Millett, 2010, p. 35). In addition to the tank advantage, the Soviets 
provided field artillery assets with longer ranges than the field artillery assets provided to 
the ROKA by the United States, giving the KPA an advantage. Millett concludes that the 
coupling of the tank and field artillery advantages “doomed any” defensive position of 
the ROKA. Matthew B. Ridgeway provided the following description:  
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Considering the relative strength and combat readiness of the forces that faced 
each other across the 38
th
 parallel in June 1950, it was a marvel that the North 
Korean armies were delayed at all in their drive to overrun all of South 
Korea…Nor did the ROKs have any gun capable of slowing a tank. It was as if a 
few troops of Boy Scouts with hand weapons had undertaken to stop a Panzer unit 
(Quoted in Kim, 2017, p. 4).  
 
The ROKA was not combat ready. In June 1950, the Korean Military Advisory 
Group (KMAG) concluded that the ROKA had “serious readiness problems” (Millett, 
2010, p. 29). The KMAG concluded that the ROKA was not adequately equipped to repel 
an invasion from the North. Of particular concern was a lack of equipment, such as 
ammunition, spare parts, and other military equipment. KMAG concluded that in June 
1950, on the eve of the invasion, the ROKA could fight for no longer than 10 to 15 days. 
Additionally, the ROKA had difficulty training because a number of units were actively 
fighting an insurgency in South Korea. Four divisions of the ROKA patrolled in a 
campaign against communist subversion. Overall, Millett concludes, “that only about half 
the battalions in the South Korean army had any chance of fighting the North Koreans as 
a cohesive force, even at the battalion level, let alone in regimental and division 
operations” (Millett, 2010, p. 30) 
If the North possessed a number of advantages, it nevertheless had an Achilles 
heel: the North “had no logistical sustainability” (Millett, 2010, p. 37). This meant that 
the ROK had to either capitulate or collapse quickly after the North occupied key areas; 
absence such capitulation, the KPA would face serious logistical challenges. In a longer 
campaign, the KPA must capture the South Korean National Railroad to Pusan, also 
accompanied by a two-lane major road. Alternatively, the KPA had to control the East 
and West Seas to gain access to various ports, and, even in the event of controlling both 
seas, the ports were accessible only via an underdeveloped road system designed for 
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farmers’ carts. Controlling these assets was essential for the functioning of the KPA’s 
supply lines and to deny either the ROKA or the U.S. – in the case of U.S intervention— 
the use of these assets. “A long war, measured in months instead of weeks, worked 
against the North Koreans, even without the timely intervention of American air power 
and ground troops…the North Koreans planned for a short war since it was the only war 
they could win,” Millett concludes (2010, p. 37).   
Kim was reasonably justified in being confident about success. He was not 
“insane” or “crazy” in launching an attack to unify the country. Yet, Kim likely noticed 
the strengths while missing or glossing over various liabilities, such as the logistical 
challenges and the complications that would arise in the event that the South Korean 
Government did not collapse quickly or if the United States intervened.  
 Achieving the overall political goal of a military campaign may depend on 
avoiding the involvement of third parties (Blainey, 1988). Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait would have been successful in the absence of U.S. intervention, for example. The 
same is true of Kim’s goals in the Korean War: In the absence of U.S. involvement, the 
KPA held a number of advantages that predicted success for the North Koreans. Yet, if 
the U.S because involved, the KPA would face two crucial problems. First, while the 
KPA held a number of advantages, the U.S. had a distinct advantage in terms of air and 
naval support. Support from the Soviet Union could at best neutralize this type of support 
and Stalin in any case made clear that such support would be limited.68 Second, as already 
noted, a long campaign worked against the KPA. U.S. intervention had the potential to 
complicate the KPA’s plan for a quick and easy victory and to thwart Kim’s plan for 
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 Both Chen (1996) and Weathersby (1993) document Stalin’s reluctance to provide such support for fear 
of direct clashes with the U.S.  
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unification. Hence, a decision maker would seek to gather all available information 
regarding the likelihood of U.S. involvement. While Kim could find plenty of evidence, 
to be discussed shortly, that the U.S. would likely not intervene, Kim brushed aside 
warnings from Mao and did not appear to plan adequately for the possible contingency of 
a U.S. intervention.  
Kim thought U.S. intervention unlikely, telling Stalin that the U.S. would either 
not intervene or intervene too late to make any difference (Weathersby, 1993a; Zhihua, 
2000, p. 62). Did Kim have enough information to conclude that the U.S. was unlikely to 
intervene? On what did Kim base this belief? The theory offered suggests that 
revolutionary nationalists should shorten searches for information about such possible 
complications and take the leap regardless; the illusion of control, stemming from the 
emotion of pride, shortens searches for the possible consequences of a given decision. In 
this case, a possible consequence of the invasion was that the U.S. would intervene. 
Instead of adequately assessing the likelihood of U.S. involvement, Kim pushed forward 
with an irreversible full-scale invasion.  
 Did Kim have reason to believe the U.S. would become involved? A strong case 
can be made that the U.S. did not employ a successful strategy of deterrence (George and 
Smoke, 1974). This case of unsuccessful deterrence is well known. In March 1949, 
President Truman, based on the advice of the NSC, determined that 7,500 American 
soldiers stationed in South Korea should depart by June 1949 (W. Stueck, 1981, p. 154). 
President Truman declared, on January 5, 1950, that the U.S. would not challenge the 
claim that Taiwan was not part of China, signaling a less assertive U.S. in the region. In 
January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson left South Korea out of the ‘defense 
perimeter speech.’  Four months later, in May 1950, Senator Connally asserted that 
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“whether we want it or not,” South Korea may have to be abandoned to the Communist” 
(W. Stueck, 1981, p. 153), and Russia “could overrun Korea just like she would probably 
over-run Formosa when she gets ready to do it” (Stueck 1981, p. 153). As George and 
Smoke (1974) note, what is important was not Connally’s remark, but that “such 
statements often spark strong disclaimers, but Acheson responded merely by recounting 
American efforts to establish and maintain an independent republic below the thirty 
eighth parallel” (Stueck 1981, p. 153). In May 1950, U.S. intelligence services noted a 
large buildup of North Korean military assets on the border. Alexander Sachs, a 
consultant in the Office of Strategic Services, briefed Paul Nitze, director of Policy and 
Planning in the State Department, regarding the troop build-up, suggesting a likely 
invasion. Even in light of a likely North Korean invasion, the U.S. did not issue an 
explicit warning to the North Koreans. Stueck (1981) concludes that U.S. actions did not 
provide “a consistent pattern that conveyed deep American commitment” (p. 161). 
Hence, a decision maker may reasonably concluded that have concluded that South 
Korea was a low priority of the U.S., and predict no U.S. involvement.  
 Yet this would require the North Koreans to overlook signals that made the U.S. 
involvement more ambiguous. The State Department made significant efforts to signal 
interest in the peninsula. In the fall of 1949, the U.S. Navy visited South Korea with two 
destroyers and an American cruiser. In January of 1950, when the U.S. House of 
Representatives cut aid to the ROK, Acheson ensured that the funds were reversed. 
Ambassador-at-large Phillip Jessup visited Korea in January as well. Six months later, 
and shortly before the onset of hostilities, John Foster Dulles visited South Korea and 
spoke to the National Assembly. Dulles assured the South Koreans: “You are not alone; 
you will never be alone” (quoted in Stueck 1981, p. 154).  
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Much has been made of the infamous defense perimeter speech. According to 
Zhihua, Acheson speech “caught the attention of both Mao and Stalin” (2000, p. 54) 
during Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in February 1950. Stalin was impressed with the 
speech after he read it carefully (Zhihua 2000, p. 54). Because the speech stressed the 
imperial design of the Soviets on the Chinese border in an attempt to split the Sino-Soviet 
alliance, both Mao and Stalin were concerned about Acheson’s attempt to drive a wedge 
between the China and the Soviet Union. The speech did signal a less assertive U.S. in 
the region, which, according to Zhihua, may have been a factor in Stalin changing his 
mind about supporting an invasion. Yet, while Stalin may have interpreted the speech as 
signaling a less assertive U.S. in the region, Stalin was still very concerned about U.S. 
intervention to the point of taking a number of steps to preclude a clash between U.S. and 
the Soviet troops.  
How did Stalin and Mao gauge the likelihood of U.S. intervention? Goncharov, 
Lewis, and Xue (1995) argue that both Stalin (Stalin after January 1950) and Mao 
thought U.S. intervention unlikely. Some background is required as Stalin’s views about 
U.S. intervention changed over time. Zhihua (2000), on a close reading of declassified 
Russian documents, finds that in October of 1949, Stalin was reluctant to support a North 
Korean invasion because of two factors. First, the North Koreans were not prepared and, 
second, Stalin was concerned about possible U.S. intervention (Zhihua 2000, p. 51). By 
January 1950, Stalin’s views had changed.  Zhinhua argues that while the North Koreans 
still may have been unprepared, the “international situation” had changed, as a number of 
developments at the international level encouraged Stalin to agree to the attack. Zhihua 
sees role played by the changing relationship between Communist China and the USSR 
as explaining Stalin’s new perspective. The victory of the communists in China was both 
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an opportunity and problem for the USSR. The communist victory predicted further 
advances for the communist movement in Asia, but it also challenged Stalin’s leadership 
of the communist movement, as China could now make a leadership claim, or at the very 
least, force Stalin to treat China as an equal. Stalin was also concerned the Chinese would 
pursue rapprochement with the United States. This dynamic encouraged Stalin to offer 
concessions such as giving the Chinese Eastern Railway back to the Chinese, to ensure 
they did not move into the western camp. According to Zhihua, the concessions 
jeopardized the Soviets strategic position in the region and they forced Stalin to pursue 
new means with which to achieve Soviet objectives. The means involved reassessing the 
strategic importance of the Korean peninsula, specifically the warm water port of Pusan 
and the peninsula’s value as a ‘buffer zone’ in the case of Japanese revanchism. Thus, 
according to Zhihua, the Sino-Soviet treaty led to a reevaluation of the Soviet strategic 
position and to a decision to acquiesce to the attack.  
While Stalin’s views about the importance of Korea had changed and the defense 
perimeter speech signaled a less assertive United States in the region, Stalin was careful 
not only to limit Soviet involvement in the attack, but also to implicate the Chinese in the 
attack. He did so by making Kim gain Mao’s support for the invasion. He told Kim: “If 
you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the 
help” (Zhihua 2000, p. 63). Thus, while Stalin may have been more sanguine after the 
events in early 1950 about U.S. involvement, he was still hedging his bets and tried to 
minimize the consequences of a possible U.S. intervention.  
Because much of the case for the failure of deterrence emphasizes the importance 
of the defense perimeter speech, it is useful to see how the North Koreans interpreted the 
speech. The speech was far from being a pellucid signal of U.S. intentions, and, 
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according to Cumings (1990), the North Koreans misinterpreted the speech. Based on 
captured North Korean documents, “it turns out that the North Koreans thought Acheson 
included the ROK in his perimeter, a bit of a daunting fact for Acheson’s presumed 
failure of deterrence” (Cumings 1990, p. 423). The North Korean Press, ran an account or 
a summary of the defense perimeter speech, saying “Acheson’s view was that those 
countries inside what he called the defense line, meaning those subjugated countries, 
Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, such countries would be America’s direct 
responsibilities” (Cumings 1990, p. 424). Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the speech 
unequivocally signaled U.S. indifference to South Korea. In addition, it is a questionable 
assumption that—even if they translated the speech correctly to exclude S. Korea—the 
North Koreas would take the speech at face value. “The premise has always been 
stupefyingly improbable,” writes Cumings, “that Stalin of all people, or for that matter 
Kim Il-sung, would be misled by a public speech into thinking the United States would 
not defend South Korea.” Cumings elaborates, “Stalin’s usual modus operandi was 
probably to put negatives in front of Acheson’s public statements, a first cut at discerning 
enemy intentions”(1990, p. 410). Armstrong comes to a similar conclusion: “neither the 
Chinese nor the Soviet leadership believed the Acheson speech signaled that the US 
would not intervene in Korea” (Armstrong 2013, p. 17). The North Koreans likely 
scrutinized the speech harshly and did not take it at face value. Pyongyang labelled the 
speech full of “lies” and “demagoguery,” “’a noisy chorus’ that, the implication was, 
masked his (Achetson’s) real intention to ‘prepare a war against the national liberation 
struggles in Asia” (Cumings 1990, p. 426). 69   
                                                          
69 Some strategic empathy could have problematized other signals about U.S. intentions in the region. The 
removal of troops from South Korea may have been more a product of bureaucratic politics than a 
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In February 1950, Mao and Stalin met to discuss the Sino-Soviet treaty and had 
the opportunity to discuss Kim’s plans to unify Korea by force. According to Shi Zhe, the 
translator who accompanied Mao on his trip to Moscow, Stalin told Mao that he and Kim 
discussed Kim’s plans to unify the peninsula by force and asked Mao “if there existed 
any condition unfavorable to his plan, such as whether the Americans would intervene” 
(Chen 2010, p. 101). “Chairman Mao did not answer immediately,” according to Shi Zhe, 
but eventually replied, “The Americans might not come in because this is Korea’s 
internal affairs, but the Korean comrades need to take American intervention into 
account” (Chen 2010, p. 101). Mao held a number of reservations about Kim’s plan, but  
according to Shi Zhe, Stalin told Mao that “Kim Il-sung would attack the South no matter 
what happened” (Chen, 2010, p. 101). He went on to discuss Kim’s “mood.” “He will 
only listen to the voice of his idea, not the voice against his idea; he was really young and 
brave,” Stalin told Mao (Chen 2010, p.101). Based on this evidence, Mao thought U.S. 
intervention unlikely but possible, and thought that Kim and his “Korean comrades” 
needed to take a possible U.S. intervention into account.  
As mentioned, Stalin forced Kim to gain Mao’s approval for the invasion, which 
Kim did during a trip to Beijing in May 1950 (Zhihua, 2000, p. 66). During this meeting, 
Mao directly warned Kim about the possibility of U.S. intervention. Some context is 
necessary to understand Mao’s reasoning. Mao may have been disingenuous in issuing 
this warning, not because he was trying to dissuade Kim from invading, but because it 
would thwart Mao’s plans for invading Taiwan. Mao’s reservations voiced to Stalin 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reasonable signal of a U.S. lack of resolve. Regarding the perimeter speech, Acheson was in a strategic 
bind: He did not want to embolden Rhee and was concerned that if he transparently signaled his 
commitment to Korea, the ‘China Lobby’ would likely desire a similar pledge of support for Taiwan (see 
Cumings 1990, p. 428-9). The North Koreans may have not understood the nuances of U.S. foreign policy 
making.  
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about the need to account for U.S. intervention may have been disingenuous as well. 
When Kim, at Stalin’s behest, met Mao to ask for permission to invade, Mao raised a 
number of concerns about a North Korean invasion. Chinese Marshal Peng Dehuai who 
was present at the meeting recalled, “Mao raised the dire possibility of American 
intervention, but Kim did not take it seriously” (Thornton 2000, p. 107).  The North 
Korean leader insisted that “he would achieve victory within a month, and that the United 
States could not deploy its forces before then” (Thornton 2000, p.107-8). Interestingly, 
Kim stressed that he did not need assistance from the Chinese and that: “the NKA would 
‘solve the Korean problem’ on its own” (Thornton 2000, p. 108). While Kim’s comment 
to Mao may have been intended to stress the fact that this was a fait accompli, it does 
suggest an insouciance disregard of the possibility of outside involvement. While the 
reasons why Mao warned Kim may be complicated, Mao directly told Kim not to rule out 
U.S. intervention.  
According to Youngjun Kim’s, a faction of KPA leaders was concerned about 
U.S. intervention. North Korean Defense Minister Ch’oe Yong-gon worried that the 
North Korea War plan was infeasible due to the possibility of U.S. intervention. Ch’oe 
Yong-gon was close to Kim. They both served in Manchuria and Russia. Ch’oe was one 
of the few to refer to Kim by his first name in private, suggesting a close relationship. 
“Choe had had a skeptical view of the KPA’s preemptive attack of the South because of 
the possibility of American intervention” writes Kim Youngjun (2017, p. 17).  However, 
there are no primary source documents suggesting that Ch’oe discussed his concerns 
directly with Kim Il-sung. The Minister of Commerce, Jang Swoon, in an emergency 
Cabinet Council early in June 25, 1950, voiced his view directly to Kim Il-sung, stating 
that they should be careful “about starting an entire attack along the 38th parallel because 
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of an American intervention.” Kim Il-sung responded by “scolding him: ‘Siwoo, you are 
stupid. Think Again. How will the United States come without the Soviet intervention? 
You are such a fool!” (Kim, 2017, p. 17). Saddam Hussein would dismiss similar voiced 
by his inner-circle regarding the feasibility of his attack on Iran in 1980, flippantly 
dismissing their concerns without exploring their validity.  
Besides the possibility of U.S intervention, the war planners overlooked other 
important factors that diminished the likelihood that the North Koreans would achieve its 
objectives. Hindsight bias may make these limitations obvious only after the fact, yet 
another decision maker may have been more sensitive to the various problems in the 
North Korean plan. 
The illusion of control can explain some otherwise perplexing aspects of the 
North Korean invasion. Thornton (2000) argues that the North Korean war plans were 
“jejune,” meaning that the North Koreans envisioned a simple victory: NKA troops 
would seize Seoul, guerilla uprisings would envelop the country, and the South Korean 
regime would collapse. According to Yu’s recollection, the leadership was “bewildered” 
by the fact that the ROK did not collapse immediately following the invasion (Thornton 
2000, p. 231). The plan may have worked if either the South Korean government 
collapsed or if the U.S. did not intervene. Because the war plan did not take these 
possibilities into account, a number of logistical problems became apparent relatively 
quickly.  
It is important to discuss one caveat before proceeding. Thornton argues, 
provocatively, that this war plan was essentially formulated by the Soviet Union with 
Kim’s approval. According to Thornton, Stalin deliberately aimed for the North’s 
invasion to be unsuccessful. Stalin’s larger geopolitical goal was to push the Chinese into 
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the Soviet camp and away from the Americans. To that end, it was essential for the U.S. 
to intervene. Intervention by the U.S. would then invite Chinese intervention, predicting a 
clash between the Chinese and the U.S., pushing the Chinese into the Soviet camp.70 
Thus, according to Thornton, the logistical problem and strategic flaws make sense in 
light of Stalin’s deliberate aim to draw the U.S. into the conflict. While this complicates 
the analysis, it is still perplexing why Kim would have agreed to a plan with such obvious 
strategic flaws.  
Kim stressed that U.S. intervention was either unlikely or would be too late to 
make any difference. The North Korean assault would be done quickly, in blitzkrieg 
fashion. “Speed was the essence to prevent American lodgment,” writes Thornton (2000, 
p. 236). However, the North Korean advance proceeded slowly, which Appleman (1992) 
argues was a major strategic flaw. This is partly explained by the fact that the North 
Koreans did not have the proper equipment to cross rivers. Sophisticated equipment was 
not required to cross many rivers, yet some rivers, the Han River for example, required 
“floating bridges” or other “large scale river crossing equipment” (Thornton 2000, p. 
233). The Soviets did not provide this type of equipment and the North Koreans “were 
forced to devise time-consuming ad hoc measures to surmount Korea’s numerous river 
obstacles” (Thorton 2000, p. 233). While this may seem like typical ‘fog of war’ type 
miscommunication and poor foresight, if speed was of the essence to prevent U.S. 
intervention and precipitate the fall of the South Korean regime, it is perplexing why the 
North Koreans were not adequately prepared to cross such terrain.  
                                                          
70
 If Thornton is correct, Stalin may have been too clever by half: Prolonging the war may have left the 
Chinese and North Koreans dependent on the USSR, but what the North Koreans and Chinese perceived as 
the Soviet Union’s lackluster support—the Soviets provided air support but “neither the CVPA (Chinese) 
nor the KPA got the full support from the Soviet military that they hoped for” (Armstrong 2013, p. 47)—
may have contributed to Sino-Soviet split a mere two years after the Korean War’s conclusion. 
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The North Koreans did not move fast enough to occupy Pusan, an important port 
city, which would have precluded its use by the U.S. Denying the U.S. the use of this 
critical port could have both discouraged U.S. intervention and, in case the U.S. 
nevertheless decided to intervene, made it costly and time consuming for the U.S. to take 
the port. Thornton argues that the original Soviet plan did not call for the occupation of 
this critical port, evidence consistent with Thornton’s theory that Stalin aimed to 
encourage U.S. intervention. But it also raises questions why the North Koreans would 
have overlooked such important measures.  
The North Koreans experienced command and control problems stemming from 
the Soviet Union’s role in the planning and execution of the campaign. Before the attack, 
Stalin withdrew advisors from combat units and “along with them, their 
communications” (Thornton 2000, p. 230). The capture of Soviet advisors would provide 
the U.S. with tangible evidence of Soviet support, Stalin feared. It is ironic that the U.S.’s 
initial reaction was to implicate, correctly, the Soviets in the attack in light of Stalin 
limiting the USSR’s role in the conflict. The U.S. correctly understood that the North 
Koreans would not and could not take such a gamble without support from the USSR. 
But the U.S. incorrectly interpreted the campaign as part of a larger Soviet plot, not 
appreciating that while the USSR acquiesced to the attack, Kim was the prime mover 
pushing for an attack. Thus, the Soviets would likely have been implicated in an attack 
regardless of the degree to which they were actually involved. “Soviet complicity was 
therefore a foregone conclusion, with or without the presence of advisers in combat 
units,” writes Thornton, “But their absence would have a critical effect on the conduct of 
battle” (2000, p. 230). The withdrawal of Soviet advisors resulted in communication 
problems in the initial campaign. Thornton cites Ambassador Shtykov’s report of the 
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initial invasion. Communications were lost “from top to bottom. The General staff… 
already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication 
with a single division” according to Shtykov’s recollection (quoted in Thornton 2000, p. 
230). In addition to the communication problems, the removal of the Soviet advisors, 
deprived the North Koreans of valuable, experienced military commanders. “The 
command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of 
Soviet military advisors, they organized the battle poorly, they used artillery and tanks in 
battle badly and lose communications,” wrote Ambassador Shtykov (quoted in Thornton 
2000, p. 230). The removal of the advisors before the attack, produced a predictable 
problem with the campaign: trying to communicate with the units after the removal of the 
communication assets (see also Kim, 2017, p. 131).  
 
The Fear Dimension 
  
Kim Il-Sung had been urging Stalin to support an invasion since the fall of 1949. 
At this time, Stalin was reluctant to support an invasion unless it was in response to a 
South Korean attack. This suggests that the North Koreans should have had a plan for 
invasion already in 1949. However, according to Thornton (2000), based on Yu’s 
testimony, “the planning for the war was done quickly, literally at the last minute, and 
was not completed by the time the war began” (2000, p. 229). The plans were formulated 
“at the end of about one months’ work,” Yu recalled. Troops were already maneuvering 
for an “imminent assault” as the plans were being completed (Thorton 2000, p. 229).  
 Youngjun Kim (2017) argues that the KPA was not adequately prepared for the 
invasion of South Korea. The KPA engaged in a number of battalion-level exercises 
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before the ground invasion, but there were no exercises conducted at the division or 
regimental levels. With division and regimental exercises conducted over the course of 
several years, Youngjim Kim concludes that the war would have looked much different, 
and some of the problems—lack of supplies, logistical problems, and the general lack of 
preparation—woud have been attenuated. Ju Young Bak, a former KPA engineering 
officer, remembered on the eve of war “that the KPA needed more operational and 
strategic level exercises and more time to foster team work between the units coming 
from China in summer of 1949 and the spring of 1950” (Kim 2017, p. 209). “KPA 
needed one or two additional years for training and preparing its logistic, supplies, and 
reserve forces…the lack of preparation on the part of KPA was mainly because of 
mistakes in planning the timing to invade, not because of the quality of the KPA soldiers” 
writes Youngjun Kim (209).  “The KPA soldier and units should have bene trained fully 
before the invasion and spent more time preparing its logistics and reserve force. The 
KPA did not need to start its invasion in June of 1950” concludes Youngjun Kim (2017, 
p. 209).  
 Decision makers, when experiencing fear, are likely to act urgently to alleviate the 
associated discomfort, according to the theory offered in this dissertation. This appears 
consistent with Yu’s and Youngjun Kim assessments of the KPA’s war planning.  It is 
likely that Kim overlooked various flaws in the plan and also pushed ahead without 
higher level training exercises, because, while taking action may not decrease the danger 
an actor faces, it can decrease the associated discomfort with the experience of fear.  
A competing rational explanation makes it difficult to conclude this urgency had 
psychological origins. Mao Zedong’s designs on Taiwan encouraged both urgency and 
secrecy in the war planning. Mao correctly understood that Kim’s attack on the south 
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could jeopardize his plans for attacking Taiwan, resulting in Mao and Kim racing to be 
the first to unify their respective states. This dynamic surely contributed to the secretive 
nature of the war planning. The Yenan faction—a faction of Koreans close to the 
Chinese—had to be excluded from the planning, out of concern that if the Yenan faction 
was included, Mao may have been informed regarding the timing of the invasion. 
Numerous recollections suggest that Mao knew of the likelihood of an attack against the 
south, but not the timing. While the evidence is consistent with a psychological 
explanation, it is difficult to distinguish empirically the rational explanation—that Kim 
and Stalin were aiming to beat Mao to the punch and be the first to attack—from a 
psychological explanation, that Kim was acting to alleviate the uncomfortable experience 
of fear.   
An assumption of most, if not all, rational choice models is that actors update 
their beliefs with new pertinent information. Decision makers with low cognitive 
complexity have a difficult time making new or subtle distinctions when confronted with 
new information. This section will argue that Kim should have known that robust support 
from southern insurgents would have been unlikely to materialize as a result of an 
invasion.  
Kim’s plan involved a concomitant uprising of guerillas to hasten the fall of the 
Rhee regime. In April 1950, Kim persuaded Stalin to support the invasion because 
“guerrillas in the southern provinces would support the KPA” and “there would be an 
uprising of 200,000 communists in South Korea” (Weathersby, 1993a, p. 31). While Kim 
may have misled Stalin regarding the likelihood of an uprising, the KPA’s invasion plans 
incorporated such uprisings and/or support from southern communists, suggesting that it 
is unlikely that Kim disingenuously marshalled these arguments to gain Stalin’s approval 
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for the invasion. The head of the Korean Workers Party in the South, Pak Hon-yong, 
assured Kim that “once we … occupied Seoul, then 200,000 South Korean Workers Party 
members who were in hiding throughout South Korea would rise up and revolt, toppling 
the South Korean regime” (quoted in Thornton 2000, p. 229). According to Yu, a North 
Korean general involved in the planning of the attack, “assurances that uprisings would 
accompany the invasion was ‘one of the major factors in hardening Kim II-song’s resolve 
to invade” (Thornton, 2000, p. 230).71 Yu stresses that the assumption of an uprising can 
explain the failure to seize Pusan because the North Koreans had assumed that local 
guerrillas would seize it (Thornton, 2000, p. 230).  
 Such optimism regarding support from southern sympathizers hardly seemed 
warranted in the winter and spring of 1950, because this was a difficult time for the 
southern guerrillas. The ROKA, augmented with local police, cracked down on the 
southern insurrectionists, killing key leaders and displacing thousands of guerrillas. In 
November 1949, ROK forces killed “important guerilla leader Choe Hyon” (Cumings, 
1990, p. 402). Brigadier General Roberts, the leader of KMAG (Korean Military 
Advisory Group), claimed that 6,000 guerrillas were killed in November 1949 to March 
1950. Roberts characterized operations in March 1950 as an “all-out mop-up campaign 
(that) broke the backbone of the guerilla movement” (quoted in Cumings 1990, p. 402). 
While organizational dynamics may have encouraged Roberts to inflate that figure, 
Cumings finds internal reports that “put the total guerilla dead since October 1 at 4,996, 
so Robert’s figure seems plausible” (Cumings, 1990, p. 403).  
                                                          
71
 According to Thornton, General Yu Song-chol was a “former North Korean Operational Bureau 
Commander, who translated the Russian-designed plan into Korean and helped to formulate a war plan 
based on it, provided a unique insider’s account to that war plan and it hasty formation” (Thornton, 2000a 
p. 229) 
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 Northern attempts to help the southern partisans were unsuccessful. Two groups, 
sent to help the “sagging fortunes of the southern partisans” (Cumings, 1990, p. 403), 
were both destroyed. The first group was destroyed by the 10
th
 regiment of the ROKA in 
March and April of 1950. On April 9
th
 1950, in a clash with ROK forces, the second 
group was severely weakened, killing 76 guerrillas and their leader, Kim Tu-hyon.  In 
sum, Cumings concludes that May and June of 1950 marked a “new low” for guerilla 
activity in the south.  
 Cumings argues that “North Korea materials bear out the sense that the guerilla 
struggle was exhausted, if not destroyed by the spring of 1950” (Cumings 1990, p. 
404).Yi Sung-yup, a leader of the communists in the South, wrote in March explaining 
the reasons for the travails of the southern guerrillas. He stressed the loss of key 
commanders and tactical errors, such as being too harsh with the local population. Kim 
Sam-yong, a southern communist leader, in March of 1950, noted that the suppression 
forces—the ROKA forces—were “incomparably better armed” (Cumings, 1990, p. 404). 
Kim Sam-yong did mention that it was likely that guerilla activity could expand in the 
spring. Other scholars, echo Cumings conclusion. “…all communist organizations, 
except a few in the mountainous southwestern corner of South Korea, had collapsed by 
the time the Korean War broke out” (Nam 1974, p. 80). “Through many guerrilla battles 
for two years prior to June 1950, the ROK Army had weakened insurgency movements 
within the southern areas of Korea, and consequently faced few uprisings behind the front 
lines,” writes Kim (2017).  ROKA’s apparent successful ‘winter offensive’ combined 
with the southern communist reports to the North, should have provided Kim with 
evidence that his rosy prognostications regarding a southern insurrections were 
unfounded.  
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 Two alternative explanations should be discussed. One involved southern 
communists feeding Kim misleading information to encourage Kim to invade, deflecting 
attention away from the failure of the southern partisans to gain control over the south. 
According to this view, Pak Hon-yong, the communist leader in the south, provided Kim 
with misleading information regarding the likelihood of a southern insurrection. In this 
case, the faulty assumptions would have a rational explanation: Pak provided Kim a false 
expectation of support in the south. According to Cumings (1990), this explanation is 
unlikely. Pak had little or no military experience and little power in the North. 
Furthermore, in 1955, the Kim faction, accused Pak of manipulating the North into 
invading. Because the accusation was made after the completion of the war, Cumings 
argues Pak’s execution was largely to scapegoat Pak in light of the disappointing 
outcome of the war, and not due to his misleading prognostications (see Cumings, 1990, 
p. 404; see also Nam, 1974 p. 92-95).  
 A second explanation involves the failure of the southern campaign as actually 
precipitating an invasion. Kim stood to gain by reuniting the country while the Pak 
faction was weak, leaving the majority of the credit for unification to Kim. If this were 
true, this would still be a very risky gamble and would be all the bolder because Kim 
could not expect support from the southern partisans. While this would suggest a 
different underlying motivation—to solidify domestic control rather than to unify the 
nation—it then suggests that Kim would have been optimistic about unification without 
the support of the southern partisans.  
 What is likely is that Kim pushed ahead with his plans in light of the travails of 
the southern partisans, which makes sense if an actor is operating with low cognitive 
complexity. Another actor may have updated their information to reflect the fact that it 
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would be unlikely an uprising of southern partisans would greet the invasion; or, at the 
very least, the uprisings would be desultory. This had real consequences for the invasion, 
specifically the inexplicable lack of an attempt by the KPA to seize the port of Pusan. As 
Thornton notes, “Kim had not attempted to seize the key port militarily because he 
assumed that a locally inspired uprising would secure it for him” (Thornton, 2000a, p. 
230).  
 North and South Korean leadership both feared a preemptive attack from the 
opposite side. Syngman Rhee took increasingly aggressive stances toward the North after 
uprisings in the South, orchestrated by the communist South Korean Workers Party. Rhee 
feared a preemptive attack from the North and asked the U.S. for heavy weapons and 
equipment to address such a threat; the U.S. was reluctant to provide such weapons due 
to concerns that is would embolden Rhee to launch his own preemptive attack. While 
Rhee continually employed bellicose language toward the North, according to Youngjun 
Kim (2017), “the ROK Army did not prepare for preemptive strike anytime between 
1945 and 1950” (p. 135). However, even with the lack of preparation for an attack and 
lack of support from the U.S., the North Koreans still did not trust Rhee to abstain from 
attacking. North Korean agents in the South reported South Korean preparations for war 
and such reports resulted in “both North Korean and the Soviet Union overestimating the 
strength of the ROK Army and the danger of a first strike” (p. 135). Thus, there was 
exaggerated threat perceptions, but the source of the exaggerated threat perceptions rests 
with North Korean SKWP agents. The Soviets exaggerated the threats as well because 
they were highly dependent on the same reports from North Korean sources in the South. 
Youngjun Kim discusses the psychological dynamic—albeit on a small scale—explicated 
in this manuscript: not only did the North Korean agents overestimate the likelihood of an 
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attack from the South, they also overestimated their “capability to achieve a revolution in 
South Korea because of their revolutionary passion and aspirations” (Youngjun 2017, p. 
137). These agents in the South were essentially engaged in a guerrilla war and feared 
their survival due to persecution by ROKA. Due to the circumstances and the likely 
background of the agents, the agents were likely experiencing fear, which can explain 
why they both overestimated the threats the North faced from Rhee and overestimated 
their ability to realize their objectives with support from the North. “During the guerilla 
battle of 1948-49, the members of the SKWP and the guerilla forces…the pro-North 
leaders of guerrilla forces in South Korea, continually reported an overestimation of their 
achievements to Pyongyang and showed their unrealistic fantasy and revolutionary 
romanticism for their success of revolution in South Korea,” writes Yougnjun Kim (2017, 
p. 137) This section can offer partial support for the hypothesis of revolutionary 
oppositionalists exaggerating threat perceptions, yet it is difficult to document the same 
dynamic directly with Kim Il-sung.  
Conclusion  
 This analysis offers support for the identity driven model of decision making with 
some caveats. Some of the hypotheses were difficult to establish without eliminating all 
the confounding factors. For instance, many—including Stalin and Mao—thought U.S. 
intervention unlikely in the case of a Northern invasion, making it difficult to claim that it 
was an egregious display of an illusion of control. With that said, Kim did dismiss 
concerns voiced by both Mao and by members of his inner circle warning about the 
possibility of U.S. involvement, which may have induced a higher degree of caution in 
another actor. There appears to be clear evidence of an urgency to act: the initial ground 
invasion appeared to be ill-thought out and rushed. Lower cognitive complexity was on 
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display, with the failure of Kim to update information regarding the likelihood of a 
concomitant uprising of South Korean guerrillas. The need to act autonomously was on 
display as well, as it appeared that Kim stood to gain a tremendous amount of utility by 
achieving his goal of unification. In a striking parallel to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Iran in 1980, it does not appear that the North Koreans possessed the right materials, 
equipment, and training to effectively complete the objectives set out by the initial 
ground invasions, which is evidence for an illusion of control. In sum, this case offers 
partial support for the identity driven model of decision making.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION  
 
 This dissertation served as a plausibility probe. How well did the identity-driven 
model of decision making explain the empirical relationship between revolution and war? 
Some cases provide more support than others: The cases featuring Saddam Hussein 
provide strong support, while the Cuban and Korean cases both offer partial support due 
to a lack of evidence.  
 The initiation of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War both provide evidence for the 
identity-driven model of decision making. Saddam displayed exaggerated threat 
perceptions in both cases, overestimating the threat of Shia in the run-up to the Iran Iraq 
War and, in the case of the Gulf War, envisioning a conspiracy where none existed. In 
both cases, there was a clear urgency to act, leaving the military to scramble to prepare. 
Lower cognitive complexity was on display as well: Saddam relied on crude beliefs about 
how the U.S. would likely respond to an invasion of Kuwait—seeing the U.S. as being 
adverse to causalities, and persisted in holding this view even when the U.S. signaled its 
willingness to intervene and employ military means to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. 
In the case of the invasion of Iran, Saddam did not update his beliefs after the initial air 
skirmishes that took place before the invasion. These skirmishes, should have 
undermined his belief that the Iranian Air Force was essentially grounded.  
 The pride dimension was essential to explain both “leaps in the dark.” Saddam 
appeared to derive utility from defying the U.S. in the case of the Gulf War—“I was the 
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only one to stand-up to America”—and in acting as the leader of the pan-Arab movement 
in containing the “Persian Menace” in the Iran-Iraq War. The illusion of control was also 
evident. As Murray and Woods (2016) document, the initial air campaign in the Iran-Iraq 
War was nothing short of ambitious. It did not appear that the Iraqi Air Force had the 
capabilities to accomplish its goal, which was to destroy the Iranian Air Force on the 
ground. Invading Kuwait also hinged on a number of contingencies: The U.S. would not 
become involved; the Saudis would not allow the stationing of troops on Saudi soil; and, 
even if the U.S. did become involved, they would be unwilling to force the Iraqi military 
out of Kuwait. These contingencies suggest that Saddam underappreciated the possible 
consequences of his actions. He also overestimated his own capabilities. In the case of the 
Iran-Iraq War, Saddam overlooked a number of objective Iranian advantages, and 
thought Iran’s military was sufficiently weakened. The case of Kuwait is also telling: 
even after more information is revealed about U.S.’s will and capabilities, the tapes show 
that Saddam was still confident of victory.   
 Castro’s decision to accept nuclear weapons from the USSR offers partial support 
for the identity-driven model. Castro did not appear to be overly concerned about two 
major issues with the deployment of nuclear weapons on Cuban soil: The likelihood of 
the weapons being discovered by the U.S. before they were emplaced; and, if the 
weapons were discovered, what a likely U.S. reaction would be. Both of these facts 
suggest that Castro displayed an illusion of control: Castro was both unconcerned about 
important aspects of policy implementation and insensitive to an unintended 
consequence, a premature U.S. discovery and reaction. While Castro’s primary 
motivation was to deter an U.S. invasion, possessing the weapons offered Castro a degree 
of equality with the U.S., which had to be supremely gratifying.  Castro likely derived 
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utility from such an act, which may also explain why the deployment was larger than 
necessary to simply deter an invasion. In terms of the fear dimension, there was an 
urgency to act. Castro reacted quickly to the Soviet proposal and agreed to the 
deployment in a matter of days. Castro was trying to reduce the uncomfortable 
experience of fear as well, by doing something or anything, explaining why serious 
logistical and political challenges were overlooked. Doing something—even if unlikely 
to succeed— may help an actor alleviate the uncomfortable experience of fear. While it is 
difficult to conclude that this is a case of exaggerated threat perceptions, due to the clear 
hostile actions of the United States, Fidel did hold an entrenched enemy image of the 
United States that ensured that signals would be interpreted in a hostile fashion.  
The Korean case offers partial, caveated support for the identity driven model of 
decision making. The illusion of control was on display regarding assumptions about the 
initial invasion. Kim was warned that U.S. intervention was a possibility but dismissed 
the warnings, reasoning that U.S. intervention was either unlikely or would be too late to 
make any difference. The North Korean war hinged on speed: The North needed to 
advance quickly to precipitate the Southern government’s collapse and to make U.S. 
intervention less likely. Yet, the NKA did not possess the means to move as quickly as 
necessary: They lacked equipment to cross bridges and were forced to construct long 
supply lines that could not support all advancing units, which in turn suggests there was 
an inattention to the details of policy implementation, suggesting an illusion of control. 
Kim’s plan hinged on the invasion triggering an uprising of southern guerrillas in support 
of the North. However, in the spring of 1950, reports reached the North describing the 
southern partisan campaign as being exhausted. According to the assumptions of the 
rational choice school, an actor should update beliefs with new information. If Kim 
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updated his beliefs, he may have been less optimistic about the strength and level of 
support from southern partisans. The fact that he did not, is evidence that he was 
operating with a lower degree of cognitive complexity. Other aspects of the identity 
driven model of decision making are more difficult to test. For instance, because the KPA 
held a number of objective advantages, it is difficult to conclude that Kim saw his state as 
possessing an unjustified amount of relative power, making it difficult to concede that 
Kim had unjustified relative power perceptions. With that said, the North faced logistical 
challenges, which meant the South Korean government would have to collapse quickly 
for the campaign to be successful, possibly alleviating the North advantages. Overall, this 
case offers partial support for the theory. Table 4 offers a summary of the findings.  
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Table 4. Summary of Findings  
Cases         
 F1  
Urgency to 
Act  
F2 
Lower 
Cognitive 
Complexity  
F3 
Exaggerated  
Threat 
Perceptions  
F4 
Reducing of 
Fear 
P1 
Higher 
Power 
Perceptions  
P2 
The Illusion 
of Control  
P3 
Need to Act 
Autonomously  
P4 
Pride as an 
ends in 
itself 
Hussein  
Iran-Iraq 
War  
+++ +++ +++ ++ ++ +++ +++ + 
Hussein 
The Gulf 
War  
+++ +++ +++ ++ ++ +++ +++ ++ 
Castro 
The Cuban 
Missile 
Crisis  
+ ++ N/A +++ + +++ +++ ++ 
Kim 
The Korean 
War 
 ++   ++ ++ 
 
 
++ + 
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Plus signs (+) indicate strong support for the identity-driven model of decision making 
Blank spaces indicate an absence of support for the theory 
 N/A indicates non-applicability, due to the difficulty of attributing the behavior to the 
identity driven model of decision-making and not another source
72
 
 
Limitations of the Identity-Driven Model of Decision Making  
 
The Problem of Aggregation  
 
This dissertation focuses on individual leaders.73 However, the relationship 
ultimately needing explanation is the relationship between states that have experienced a 
domestic political revolution and conflict initiation; the empirical relationship established 
is one of state behavior.  Because we are explaining state behavior, there is an 
aggregation issue: individual behavior has to pass through other domestic political 
institutions to ultimately get to state behavior. This problem is not confined to this 
dissertation; a number of works that place causal primacy on the individual level face a 
similar problem.74  
 One way around this problem is to assume, as was done in this dissertation, that 
because the regimes discussed were essentially personal dictatorships and the leaders are 
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 Another source being a rational response to objective actions or conditions. For instance, Castro was 
correctly interpreting U.S. hostility; not a matter of exaggerated threat perceptions. Thus, it is difficult to 
attribute the behavior to the identity-driven model.  
 
73
 See Waltz (1959) for a discussion of the various levels of analysis. 
 
74
 See Hafner-Burton, Haggard, Lake, & Victor, (2017, S18-21) for a discussion of the aggregation issue. 
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acting in times of crisis, that it is a safe analytic wager to assume the causal primacy of 
individual traits. In many cases, this may be a reasonable assumption.75  
However, there is reason to believe that the decision making setting may be 
important in terms of explaining the foreign policies of revolutionary states.76 For 
instance, take Janis’s (1972) famous ‘groupthink’ formulation. This refers to the tendency 
for individuals to be reluctant to voice contrary views because it would diminish the 
cohesion of the group (Janis, 1972). Groups that are highly insulated and homogeneous 
ideologically are more likely to show the signs of groupthink, according to Janis.
 77 
Notice these are traits likely to apply to revolutionary states. In fact, most of the leaders 
in this dissertation relied on a small group of revolutionaries, individuals usually 
considered to be members of the vanguard of their respective movements. Castro, Kim, 
and Saddam, all relied on a small group of intimates that likely shared very similar 
ideological outlooks. Aside from the group think dynamic, groups that lack 
methodological procedures for decision making and groups composed of individuals that 
lacked experience, tended to make decisions in which all various options were not fully 
considered and they tended to not use all the available information when making such 
decisions (See Saunders, 2017).78 This research suggest that the decision making setting 
may exacerbate the quality of decision making and contribute to various misperceptions. 
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 See (D. L. Byman & Pollack, 2006; Jervis, 2013) for a discussion regarding when individual traits are 
likely to be important for outcomes in terms of foreign policy.  
 
76
 For an excellent book length discussion of decision making as applied to foreign policy analysis see 
Schafer & Crichlow (2010).  
 
 
77
 On group insulation see Hybel, (1993); Schafer & Crichlow, (1996, 2001.) On group homogeneity see 
George, (1980); and Schafer & Crichlow, (1996). 
 
78
 On methodological procedures see Dyson & Preston (2001), t' Hart, (2010), and ’t Hart, (1990); on group 
experience see t' Hart (2010); Schafer & Crichlow, (1996). 
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The important point to highlight is that in revolutionary states, the decision making 
setting may amplify some of the traits that push in the direction of risky actions; while the 
decision making setting in a non-revolutionary state—because there are more defined 
protocols for decision making and procedures to ensure all relevant data is scrutinized—
may encourage leaders to more thoroughly analyze data and slow down the decision 
making process, factors that may discourage hasty or risky decisions.  
 Another manner in which the decision making setting may fundamentally differ 
and influence decision making is in states that have been “coup-proofed.”  Making a 
distinction between state and regime security, Quinlivan (1999) noted that “coup-
proofing” is a conspicuous feature of many militaries in the developing world, including 
Iraq, which featured prominently in his analysis. Saddam was sure to place many regime 
loyalists from Tikrit in important military positions. In addition, Saddam’s reputation for 
ruthlessness made subordinates reluctant to deliver negative information or take the 
initiative on the battlefield for fear of retribution (Woods, Pease, Stout, Murray, & Lacey, 
2006). This hurt the quality of military expertise, because officers were reluctant to anger 
the dictator by suggesting his plans were unfeasible. Recall that Saddam had no prior 
military training, although he did grant himself a high military rank (Karsh & Rautsi, 
1991). According to this view, Saddam was not wildly optimistic but rather surrounded 
by sycophants, supplying inaccurate advice about the feasibility of his various plans.79  
Although there may be some truth to this, two points should be remembered. 
First, regarding the Iraqi case, although “sycophancy played a role in Iraqi decision 
making,” we should not exaggerate its importance (Baram, 2012). “Although most of 
Saddam’s advisers were willing to let his assumptions and assertions stand even when 
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 See K. M. Woods & Stout (2010) for a fascinating discussion regarding this dynamic.  
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they recognized them to be optimistic, there were usually at least some voices of dissent 
raised.” At key moments, according to Baram, “influential members of Saddam’s inner 
circle challenged his delusional propositions, and some even did so without suffering 
punishment. . . .(p. 77)” According to Baram, Saddam would either ignore the objection 
or just rationalize it away. Post makes a similar point: “Although Saddam’s advisors’ 
reluctance to disagree with his policies contributes to the potential for miscalculation, his 
advisors are able to influence the accuracy of his evaluation . . . by providing information 
and assessments” (Post, 1991, p. 220; see also Woods & Stout, 2010). 
Second, the NIC may cause an intelligence or security regime to take on certain 
characteristics. According to Christopher Andrews, an intelligence historian, “one of the 
main purposes of the intelligence services of a one-party state is to reinforce the regime’s 
misconceptions of the outside world” (quoted in Woods & Stout, 2010, p. 36). An 
example may be helpful. As Post notes, discussing the “crisis” in the regime during the 
Gulf War, Saddam dismissed a number of officials: “Technical experts” were replaced 
with family members and regime loyalists, sacrificing a degree of professionalization for 
members that were ‘intensely ideological and fiercely loyal’ (Post, 1991, p. 220). In light 
of this general dynamic, it is not surprising that members of Saddam’s inner circle would 
reflect Saddam’s general paranoia, reinforcing the siege mentality within the regime. 
Institutions were important and may have exacerbated the poor decision making, but they 
were outgrowths of Saddam’s sense of external persecution, which was the product of his 
NIC, hence reversing the causal direction. 
 Interaction between the individual level and the domestic political setting can be 
modeled. As discussed in this section, various decision making settings can exacerbate 
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poor decision making. As Saunders (2017) notes, however, often the decision making 
setting features explicit protocols and standards that aim to reduce hasty decision making. 
For instance, some bodies may have protocols to ensure that all stake holders are 
included in a particular decision and that all options are fully considered; such protocols 
may ensure that decisions are not made in haste (see Saunders, 2017). In this case, a 
focus on individual decision making may be less warranted. 
 A way to model this interaction is offered by Lake (2009) in the “boxes within 
boxes” approach.80 In this approach, political processes in one box (individual 
preferences) is treated as inputs into another box (decision making setting). This 
dissertation would explain the political preferences of revolutionary leaders (one box), 
which would then be traced to the decision making setting (another box). The interaction 
between the two may prove to be analytically valuable: Certain individual traits may 
interact with various decision making settings to greatly influence the decision making 
process. For instance, the NIC of various leaders may be highly important in certain 
decision making settings as some settings may amplify the decision making tendencies of 
leaders. Care should be taken to ensure that the setting is either unimportant in terms of 
lessening the causal primacy of individual traits or the box within boxes approach would 
be needed to model the interaction between individual traits and the setting to understand 
how the individual dispositions are (or not) influenced by the decision making setting.  
 
Fear and Risk Taking 
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In the Shattered Crystal Ball, political psychologist James Blight argues that 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, what ultimately discouraged the U.S. from launching an 
invasion or attack on the island was the fear of starting a nuclear exchange with the 
USSR (Blight, 1992). Fear resulted not in more risk taking but less—fear discourages 
leaders from taking leaps in the dark, according to Blight (1992). Subsequent research in 
social psychology has backed up this assertion: fear is, generally, associated with less risk 
taking (E. J. Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Dacher Keltner & Lerner, 2001; Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In  Damasio's (2005) card 
playing experiment, it was individuals, with damage to their limbic or emotional systems, 
that made extremely risky bets in the card playing game. Damasio concluded that fear 
provided valuable somatic information regarding the riskiness of the bets. Those with 
damaged limbic systems did not experience fear, and thus lost their monies earlier than 
the other players.81 It would appear that Hymans and Bright and are making the opposite 
behavioral predictions stemming from the same emotion. Future research would be 
necessary to resolve this apparent contradiction.  
 Hymans would likely respond that—as he stressed throughout The Psychology of 
Nuclear Proliferation (Hymans, 2006)—that it is not just fear, but fear accompanied by 
pride that pushes for risky behavior. It is the interaction between the two emotions—and 
not just fear alone that results in more risk taking behavior. While this may be true, this 
complicates the relationship between a specific emotion and a behavioral outcome. 
Researchers would have to document the mix of two emotions that result in various 
outcomes and not just one specific emotion. Another possible rejoinder is that, on closer 
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 As Mercer, (2010a) discusses, the somatic information can also influence how information is 
assimilated—if your beliefs are updated with new information—and the somatic information can influence 
the strength and resistance of such emotional beliefs.   
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inspection, the different behavioral predictions of Blight (1992) and Hymans (2006) may 
be more apparent than real. The only variable that is directly challenged by the claim that 
fear is associated with less risk taking is the greater urgency to act. The other variables—
lower cognitive complexity, actors trying to reduce the uncomfortable experience of fear, 
and inflated threat perceptions— do not directly predict more risk taking. But, the 
urgency to act clearly pushes actors in the direction of taking risky action.  
The case studies in this dissertation can shed some light on this controversy. In 
the two cases coded as being high on the fear dimension—the 1980 invasion of Iran and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis—only one involved relatively more risk. Saddam’s invasion of 
Iran was risky because this assured war with Iran. This would be inconsistent with fear 
being associated with relatively less risk taking. But, as noted, Saddam is high on the 
pride dimension. It is possible that pride overpowers the fear dimension’s tendency for 
less risk taking. Castro agreeing to place weapons in Cuba is conceptualized as involving 
less risk because, as Castro stressed, this was not an act of war and not a violation of 
international law. The risk involved a failure to appreciate a likely U.S. (over)reaction. 
This case would provide evidence of fear being associated with relatively less risk. 
Interestingly, Castro is also relatively lower on the pride scale than Saddam. This 
provides very tentative support for the idea that pride may be key to overpower the risk 
avoidance tendencies of fear.  
The two cases lower on the fear dimension—the invasion of Kuwait and Kim’s 
invasion of South Korea—are both relatively lower on the risk taking dimension. Both 
cases were acts of war, but the risk involved complications stemming from outside 
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intervention, to which there was various degrees of ambiguity about the likelihood of 
outside involvement. These two cases associate less risk taking with relatively less fear.  
If Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam's (2015) prognostication—that researchers 
will be increasingly able to link specific emotions to various action tendencies—proves 
true, researchers will be better able to understand how specific emotions induce specific 
behaviors, and the possible interactions of such emotions. Attention would then shift to 
try to understand how and when most people experience specific emotions and how such 
emotional experiences would vary depending on individual characteristics.  
The Outside-in Critique  
 Hunt (2009b) argues in Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy that the U.S. has 
displayed an antipathy towards leftist revolutions. Revolutionary states often threaten the 
norms and rules of the international system, which then encourages counter-revolutionary 
movements (Halliday, 1999b). Revolutionary states find themselves in hostile and 
unforgiving environments. In addition, leaders that take power via extra-legal means have 
to worry about being overthrown via a coup, orchestrated with or without external 
support. Castro’s Cuba qualifies as a state that found itself in a hostile environment: After 
a subsequent degradation of relations, the U.S. implemented economic sanctions and 
attempted to overthrow Castro via the Bay of Pigs invasion (See Bonsal, 1971; Pérez, 
2002). The NIC could be the product of such external hostility (Jervis, 2007). This 
suggests that NICs are instrumental and chosen for a specific purpose. In the absence of 
such hostility, revolutionary leaders would not form oppositional NICs. This dissertation, 
following Hymans, does not place special emphasis on the origins of such identity 
conceptions; Hymans argues that the origins of such NICs are “quite evidently highly 
196 
 
complex” (Hymans, 2006a, p. 208). Yet, future research would be necessary to discuss 
the origins of an individual’s NIC and to what extent such a conception is the product of 
an external hostile environment.  
 Related to both the idea of coup proofing and recognizing that revolutionary 
leaders may find themselves in hostile and unforgiving environments, is the idea that 
some of this ‘structural paranoia’ –which in this dissertation is conceptualized as 
exaggerated threat perceptions—is in fact, a rational response to real threats that most 
dictators face. Many dictators do face real threats via covert action either orchestrated 
internally, externally, or some combination of both. It may be a reasonable strategy to 
assume the worst in the face of likely external or internal threats. As discussed in this 
dissertation, Saddam may have erred in seeing a unified and coherent strategy to destroy 
the Baathist project, but many U.S. actions validate his, in some cases, correct 
interpretations of U.S. hostility. The U.S. did support a Kurdish rebellion in the late 
1970s in Northern Iraq, and the U.S. did provide Iran arms during the Iran hostage crisis 
(Brands, 2011c). In Baathist Iraq, where coups and counter-coups were relatively 
common, it may in fact have been a reasonable strategy to always assume the worst. In 
this case, the inflated threat perceptions would be structural—any leader in such a 
situation would display a structurally induced paranoia.82  
With that said, it is difficult to explain Saddam’s hostility to the U.S. without 
reference to his NIC. For instance, while the U.S. did destabilize the Iraqi state at times, 
official U.S. policy was aimed at helping Saddam at key points as well. During the Iran-
Iraq War, the U.S supplied valuable intelligence (which Saddam thought was ‘bad’) and 
assisted in reflagging oil tankers in the Gulf in the late stages of the Iran-Iraq War 
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(Murray & Woods, 2014b; Razoux, 2015b). Indeed, Murray and Woods (2014) stress that 
U.S. assistance during the Iran-Iraq War, may have ensured Saddam’s survival. It is a 
testament to the power of the NIC and human psychology that actors can discount pieces 
of evidence that signal a more nuanced policy—the U.S. may help or hurt Saddam 
depending on larger geopolitical circumstances—and pick out the hostile actions as 
reflecting “incontrovertible proof that Washington was indeed a dangerous strategic foe 
given to conspiring with Iraq’s worst enemies” (Brands, 2011c, p. 382).  
 
Policy Recommendations  
 
 A number of general policy recommendations stem from the lessons learned from 
the four cases. Firstly, in political systems where power is highly concentrated, it is more 
likely that individuals will be making key policy decisions. Understanding the NIC and 
belief system of leaders is therefore essential. Variables at the international level and the 
level of the domestic political system may provide various incentives for conflict, but, as 
this dissertation has shown, an understanding of individual psychology may be needed to 
explain certain conflicts.  
Secondly and related, analysts should not be overly reliant on assessing material 
capabilities when determining the likelihood of conflict and interpreting leaders’ 
intentions. Hoffmann (1968) notes that U.S. policy making often took on an “engineering 
approach”—trying to simplify complex problems by focusing on the technical 
capabilities of other states. It is striking that in the two cases of conflict initiation by 
Saddam Hussein, a number of his goals were incommensurate with his actual capabilities. 
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Saddam’s aim to destroy the Iranian Air Force and his belief that he somehow could 
prevail against the U.S. during the Gulf War are cases in point.  Researchers could take 
more seriously what other leaders say—typically dismissed by researchers as being 
‘cheap talk’ or aimed at domestic audiences—and not to rely too much on what are 
typically seen as costly signals and therefore more valid signals of a leaders’ intensions.83 
While leaders’ speech may not be clear indicators of future intentions, what leaders say 
can shed light on their NIC and how they likely will react to U.S. actions. For instance, 
while the Saddam’s “burn half of Israel” speech should not be taken literally, it can 
indicate that Saddam is highly concerned—or rather fearful—and would raise the 
likelihood of exaggerated threat perceptions, encourage an urgency to act, and decreased 
cognitive complexity; it is evidence of  the general fear dynamic and the behavioral 
consequences. According to Karsh and Rautsi, April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq 
preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, downplayed Saddam’s bellicose rhetoric because 
Glaspie assumed it was for the purposes of coercive diplomacy (Karsh & Rautsi, 1991, p. 
27).  
Thirdly, policy makers need to employ a healthy level of strategic empathy. This 
means that some leaders may view the world fundamentally differently than other 
leaders. Lessons leaders learn from significant events, may also vary wildly. Saddam did 
not learn from the Iran-Iraq War that wars are fundamentally unpredictable and costly, 
but instead learned other lessons that validated his view of his own strategic acumen (K. 
M. Woods & Stout, 2010). Historians have a large role to play: In order to empathize 
with a leader, it is essential to understand leaders’ experiences—specifically traumatic 
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assume that foreign leaders mean what they say publicly, no matter how odd these public pronouncements 
may sound. Saddam, it turns out, was quite sincere in this way” (p. 38).  
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life events that psychology highlights as being more available in one’s memory (Nisbett 
& Ross, 1980). Policy makers can be aided not only by historians but also by political 
psychologists. Leaders’ past experiences can become important parts of one’s identity. 
As discussed in this dissertation, the NIC becomes the raw fuel for emotional experience. 
Saddam’s view of the Kuwaitis as ungrateful and as not being sufficiently deferential to 
Saddam’s status, is based on his view of himself as the leader of the Arab world, 
defending the eastern flank of the Arab world against ‘Persian” advances.  Due to the 
psychological process tied to emotion and identity, as evidenced in the clear motivated 
biases displayed by Saddam at numerous occasions, there is clearly a role for political 
psychology in the analysis of foreign policy decision making.  
 
Be Aware of the Fear Dynamic 
  
 In both cases coded high on the fear dimension, leaders took action to alleviate 
the uncomfortable experience of fear. What this means is that if leaders feel that they are 
going to be attacked, they may take any action to decrease such fear. Note that such 
actions may not reduce the objective danger, but give the leader a palliative in the form of 
taking any action. Castro was clear on this point. Even if taking the weapons from the 
USSR did not objectively reduce the danger his regime faced, such action gave him the 
ability to try and control a dangerous situation. Policy makers should not be surprised 
when leaders take what appear to be strange actions in the face of threats. Thus, whatever 
gain could be made by threating regime change, would have to be tempered by the 
concern that such language could push such leaders into taking risky action.  
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 Often it is essential for leaders to signal their intentions regarding the actions of 
other states. Deterrence failures often involve states not adequately signaling that it is 
willing and able to come to another state’s defense.84 This dissertation contributes to a 
growing field that stresses how deterrence may not rest on rational foundations;85 
psychology needs to be incorporated to understand how leaders actually interpret threats 
and attribute behavior. While this may mean that deterring certain leaders is quite 
difficult, it also means that the U.S. does not have to be constantly concerned regarding 
its reputation for resolve and credibility, because some leaders will draw their own 
conclusions about U.S. behavior consistent with prior beliefs. This does not mean that the 
U.S. should never aim at deterring certain behavior. The U.S. should try to make its 
signals as clear as possible, because ambiguous signals provide more means for leaders to 
arrange the signals in a way consistent with their prior beliefs. U.S. policy-makers should 
find a middle ground between clear signaling and not threatening other states. Threats can 
exacerbate the fear dynamic; not clearly signaling provides room for the best possible 
interpretation via the pride dimension.  
 
Be Aware of the Pride Dynamic  
 
 Dominic Johnson (2009) argues that overconfidence is a baseline tendency in 
human psychology. However, Johnson also argues that a level of overconfidence can 
vary across individuals. Johnson does not assume all leaders will manifest the same 
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degree of overconfidence, and argues that the “Saddams” and “Hitlers” of the world 
would likely be on the extreme end. People with high self-esteem reinforce their positive 
illusion despite negative feedback (2009, p. 39). In addition, various situational factors 
may exacerbate overconfidence (D. D. P. Johnson, 2009, pp. 38–42). Positive illusions 
are more “likely to be engaged, and to become extreme, in threatening circumstance” (D. 
D. P. Johnson, 2009, p. 47). 
The lessons for policy makers is that individuals with grandiose visions may 
destabilize the international system. As this discussion has shown, there are a number of 
paths for such destabilization. The illusion of control may be especially apparent in 
leaders with grandiose visions. Kim’s invasion of South Korea serves as a useful 
example. Kim did not see an invasion of the south as potentially resulting in a number of 
unintended consequences, such as U.S. intervention. Kim’s plan also involved assuming 
various outcomes that were far from assured: That the Northern forces would move 
quickly enough to preclude U.S. involvement and that a concomitant southern uprising 
would greet the Northern invasion. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait serves as another 
example. Saddam’s plans were based on a number of assumptions. The important point to 
remember is that variation on the pride dimension can help policy makers understand that 
certain types of leaders are more likely to take leaps.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 One motivation for this dissertation was to highlight the problems with using the 
assumptions of rational choice as the de facto model of decision making to explain 
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outcomes in international politics. This dissertation offered a different model: an identity 
driven model of decision making. The identity model of decision making predicts that 
some leaders when making decisions that involve a high amount of uncertainty, are going 
to rely less on calculations—making a decision that approximates a rational choice— and 
will rely more on dispositional factors, such as a leader’s identity. The decisions, if 
consistent with the theory offered in this dissertation, should be hasty and ill-thought-out. 
For policymakers this means that leaders’ decisions may often appear strange or even 
delusional when judged by the standards of rational choice. This means that rational 
choice may be an inappropriate model for prediction and explanation. This may be 
disturbing for both academic and policymakers; another highly replicated finding in the 
field of psychology is that individuals crave certainty.86 But, understanding under what 
circumstances leaders are likely to engage in motived reasoning could prove to be 
extremely valuable. As Woods and Stout (2010) note, while Saddam was deluded, the 
U.S. was also deluded in in not understanding how Saddam was deluded.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
 See Gardner (2012) for a discussion about how analysist are often overconfident in their predictions and 
the underlying psychology that encourages people to crave certainty.  
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APPENDIX  
DICUSSION OF SOURCES  
  
The purpose of this section is to give the reader an understanding regarding the 
sources used to write this dissertation. Note that this is not a comprehensive list of works 
read or consulted; such a list would be far too long. This is merely a sampling of the most 
useful works and a brief discussion of their contribution to the topic at hand; what I found 
useful and the sources strengths and weakness in terms of methodology. A work not 
being mentioned in this discussion of sources does not mean the work was not used in 
this dissertation.  
 
Saddam Hussein: The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War  
 
A number of sources were used to explain Hussein’s most consequential decisions 
and his National Identity Conception (NIC). Works can be grouped into three broad 
categories. Biographies and works by area studies scholars were essential to provide the 
general information about Iraqi politics and Saddam’s background. The second category 
included works discussing the specific causes of both the Iran-Iraq and Gulf War and 
were equally valuable. And finally, I relied on primary sources via the Iraqi Perspective 
Project via the Conflict Records Research Center,87 in the form of transcripts and 
documents made available after the fall of the Baathist regime. Primary sources included 
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 See the CRRC for more information, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/ 
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transcripts of discussions with Saddam and his top officials; intelligence assessments; and 
other documents from the Baathist regime. The IPP and the Conflict Records Research 
Center provides access to the materials online. I also relied on works that used such 
transcripts, such as The Saddam Tapes (K. M. Woods et al., 2011a), works by Woods (K. 
Woods, Lacey, & Murray, 2006; K. M. Woods, 2008b), Brands (2011, 2012), and Brands 
and Palkki (Brands & Palkki, 2011b, 2012b),  that make use of such primary source 
documents.  
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime resulted in the recent availability of an 
abundance of new sources, resulting in a flurry of new scholarship on the Iran-Iraq War 
and works on Saddam in general. This dissertation benefits tremendously from the use of 
resources from the Iraqi Perspective Project, including transcripts of recorded 
conversations discussing a range of issues. Before the fall of Saddam’s regime, scholars 
were forced to analyze both decisions to invade from afar; the new transcripts allow 
researchers to understand the actual decision making process in the regime. With that 
said, this dissertation also consulted a variety of secondary sources and works published 
before the release of the new materials by area studies scholars and historians. The 
secondary sources proved to be extremely valuable as well, as the transcripts are difficult 
to ‘read’ outside of the larger context. The secondary sources provide the backdrop to 
understand the newly available materials.  
In constructing Saddam’s NIC, I relied on biographies of Saddam Hussein, such 
as (Aburish, 2000b) Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge and Karsh and Rautsi's 
(2002), Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, provided highly readable, pertinent 
background information of the famous dictator. Many forget Saddam’s life as a 
205 
 
revolutionary before his tenure as a dictator. The biographies document Saddam’s 
Spartan and violent childhood in Tikrit, an attempted coup and subsequent escape, exile 
in Egypt, and time in Iraqi prison for revolutionary activities, making for lively reading. 
Aburish, in particular, displays the revolutionary character of Saddam’s rule; Saddam 
engaged in large scale modernizing—such as programs to eradicate illiteracy in Iraq—
aiming for drastic change in Iraqi society. As with Kim Il-sung and other dictators, 
Saddam commissioned essentially hagiographic works. Matar’s (Matar, 1982b), Saddam 
Hussein: The Man, his Cause, and the Future, is such a work. Matar’s biography should 
be read with a heavy dose of skepticism, but does provide a view of how Saddam 
conceptualized Iraq and his views of other countries. Matar’s biography also is useful in 
that it features lengthy transcripts of dialogue with Matar. The transcripts should be read 
with a degree of skepticism as well, recognizing that it may have been edited.  
After the fall of the regime but before he was executed, the CIA and the FBI 
interrogated Saddam; such interrogations provide interesting insight into the workings of 
the Iraqi regime and the misperception leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and were 
useful for this work in documenting how Saddam viewed the U.S. Debriefing the 
President by Nixon (2016) discussed Saddam’s convoluted views of the U.S. Saddam—
perhaps understandably—did not understand why the U.S. and Iraq were not working 
together to combat Islamic extremism after The 9-11 Terror Attacks. Nixon’s work may 
problematize aspects of Iraqi foreign policy. According to Nixon, by 2003, Saddam was 
largely resigned from the daily governing of the Iraqi State, spending his time writing 
novels and poetry. Saddam considered himself a writer and artist (Sassoon, 2011b). 
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Saddam was actively involved in the start of both wars and, thus, this critique does not 
apply to the case studies in this dissertation.  
In a wave of new scholarship, Hal Brands, offers a series of highly illuminating 
articles discussing Saddam Hussein’s foreign policy write large, addressing a wide 
variety of subjects. Brands directly addresses why Saddam invaded Iran. In a striking 
parallel to the findings in this dissertation, Brands argues that Saddam’s motivation defies 
easy categorization: it was a mixture of defensive motivations and opportunism stemming 
from the appearance of Iranian weakness. Furthermore, stressing non-material factors, 
Brands argues that the invasion was influenced by Saddam’s own “exalted self-
perception,” again displaying the importance of ‘pride.’  Interestingly, Brands argues that 
Saddam envisioned using the victory in the war against Iran as a subsequent ‘spring 
board’ for an attack against Israel (Brands, 2011c). This latter finding is especially 
interesting in light of my assessment of Saddam’s NIC. The NIC of Saddam against the 
world can explain why he constructed collusion between Israel, Iran, and the U.S., when 
many actors would see collusion between Iran and the U.S. and Israel as being unlikely;88 
Saddam self-conception as being the leader of the pan-Arab movement can explain why 
he envisioned such a large role for Iraq the in region, safeguarding the Arab Nation 
against Persian or Israeli machinations.  
Brands and Pallki’s assessment of how Saddam viewed the U.S. and Israel also 
influenced my interpretation. What is absolutely clear in a reading of the transcripts and 
in Brands and Pallki’s interpretation, is the inherit distrust Saddam held towards the U.S.; 
Saddam consistently viewed Americans as ‘conspiring bastards.’ Support from the U.S. 
                                                          
88
 As usual, Saddam’s paranoia is often somewhat justified: the U.S. and Iran did collude during Iran-
Contra; Israel and Iran did share the same enemy—Iraq—opening space for some cooperation. However, 
the idea that the U.S. and Iran were somehow strong allies also misses the mark.  
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in the Iran-Iraq War and the fact that Saddam and the U.S. held some of the same 
strategic objectives did little to vitiate Saddam’s mistrust. With such a deeply entrenched 
enemy image of the U.S., Iran-Contra was all the evidence Saddam needed to verify his 
beliefs in the perfidy of the U.S.; Iran-contra solidified his view that the U.S. was a 
strategic enemy that could not be trusted (Brands, 2011a; Brands & Palkki, 2012b). This 
belief can help explain why, during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam thought the U.S. was 
feeding him ‘bad’ intelligence. But, also, and directly causally related the invasion of 
Kuwait as argued in this dissertation, why Saddam was able to construct a belief in an 
elaborate conspiracy by Kuwait, the U.S., and Israel, to destroy the Baathist’s project.  
 Brands and Palkki also discuss Saddam’s views of Israel. The transcripts help 
finally put to rest a number of canards about Saddam. Scholars often asserted that 
Saddam’s anti-Semitism was used in an instrumental fashion. As made clear in the 
transcripts and Saddam’s own fiction writing, Saddam was deeply anti-Semitic. The 
transcripts—the conversations were in private and thus not as likely to be used in such an 
instrumental fashion— document Saddam’s deep hostility towards Israel, the role Israel 
played in motivating Saddam’s nuclear program, and  Saddam’s fear of an attack by 
Israel before the initiation of the Gulf War (Brands & Palkki, 2011b).  
 The relationship with the Department of Defense, the Iraqi Perspectives Project, 
and the Conflict Records Research Center, poses minor methodological concerns. For 
instance, The Saddam Tapes, a collection of transcripts organized by topics with editorial 
introductions by the authors, were commissioned in order to be submitted to the U.S. 
Department of Defense. The transcript topics are obviously geared toward addressing 
issues pertinent to U.S. foreign policy—such as Saddam’s views of WMD and his views 
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of Israel and the U.S.  Aside from the edited volumes, I read hundreds of transcripts 
provided by the CRRC. The selection of transcripts offered online and the topics chosen 
to be translated, could be subject to such manipulation, in a similar fashion as The 
Saddam Tapes. I augmented a reading of the transcripts with secondary sources from 
other area specialists. This helped ensure the transcripts matched the conclusions of other 
area scholars. While it may be the case there is an abundance of material that the CRRC 
did not translate or make public due to its lack of relevance to U.S. foreign policy, these 
transcripts provide the best available information regarding the actual foreign policy 
decision making in the Iraqi regime.  
 Instrumental in providing a NIC of Saddam was (Bengio, 2002b) Saddam’s 
Word: Political Discourse in Iraq. Bengio aims to understand modern Iraq via an 
analysis of political discourse of the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein. Bengio does this 
with an in-depth analysis of Saddam’s public speeches. Jerry Long's (2009) Saddam’s 
War of Words, provides an  analysis of Saddam’s speeches in the run-up to and after the 
invasion of Kuwait. Long stresses the instrumental aspect of Saddam’s language: 
Saddam’s language involved invoking Islamic tropes and images from Muslim history. 
Saddam did this to try to gain and keep various Arab states out of the U.S. led coalition. 
Long takes the approach that Saddam’s language was largely employed instrumentally. 
The way language is used to justify, in an instrumental fashion ones rule, is a reason 
some discount political speeches as being disconnected to the actual beliefs of various 
political leaders; Bengio’s work, which takes Saddam’s language seriously, faces such a 
criticism.  If the only available information was Saddam’s public speeches, this critique 
would be more valid. However, critics error in assuming that just because language 
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advances another goal in an instrumental fashion, it is somehow not reflective of the 
leaders true beliefs. Secondly, it is also possible that beliefs that are formed originally for 
some instrumental fashion, over time, become part of the leaders belief system (see C. J. 
Fettweis, 2013) for a discussion of this dynamic.)  
With that said, my analysis is less subject to this criticism for a few reasons. I 
augmented Bengio’s analysis, in forming Saddam’s NIC, with records from the IPP. 
Transcripts included Saddam’s private discussions. Because many of the discussions are 
private, it is less likely that Saddam used such utterances for an instrumental purpose. It 
is likely that Saddam would only think the statements would be made public in the 
unlikely event that his regime was overthrown. Having read hundreds of Saddam 
speeches and uncountable pages of transcripts, including transcripts of private 
conversations, it is clear that Saddam was not merely employing his rhetoric in an 
instrumental fashion. Even after Saddam was captured, he steadfastly held to his beliefs 
about the greatness and uniqueness of the Iraqi nation. Furthermore, work by Brands and 
Pallaki should eliminate any doubt as well regarding Saddam’s views of Israel, the U.S., 
and Iran.  
Works discussing Iraqi politics writ-large were essential to understand the 
environment Saddam operated within. Tripp's (2002b) widely read, A History of Iraq, 
was my starting point for understanding Iraqi politics. Sassoon (2011b), using newly 
available sources, discusses Baath party politics. While this work was not specifically 
about Saddam’s foreign policy, Sassoon displayed the importance of the Baath party in 
Saddam’s era. Sassoon shows that membership in the Baath Party was often a 
requirement for employment in the Iraqi state. Such an understanding of Baath Party 
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membership could have informed subsequent U.S. occupation policy. Specifically, if 
Baath party membership was not an indication of ideological conviction but, instead, as 
Sasson argues, membership was more perfunctory for the purposes of patronage, the full 
scale de-Baathification, pursued by the U.S., would have been unnecessary. This work 
proved indispensable for an account of the general politics of Saddam’s Iraq.  
I consulted a number of works discussing the start of the Iran-Iraq War. 
According to Murray & Woods  (2014c), two military historians, the Iran-Iraq War was 
one of the largest contemporary wars in terms of deaths—conservative estimates put the 
death figure around 400,000, including both Iraqi and Iranian—and longest—lasting over 
8 years—yet, curiously, the least studied in modern history.  Before the availability of 
new sources, works such as Hiro (1990) and Karsh (2014), provided explanations 
stressing the deeper, structural forces that led to conflict.89 In the language of 
international relations theory, there are immediate and remote causes, the structural or 
remote causes provides the context in which an actor find herself situated; immediate 
causes explain the specific decisions in such contexts. Iran and Iraq’s historical enmity, 
often framed as being a Persian and Arab primordial hostility, and the regional balance of 
power and how that, in particular, prolonged the Iran Iraq War, both provided the context 
in which Saddam’s decision was made. While extremely valuable in outlining the larger 
structural forces, these works tend to neglect—perhaps due to a lack of sources— specific 
discussions of Iraqi and Iranian decision making, which is of particular importance for 
this dissertation. With the availability of new materials after the fall of Saddam and new 
                                                          
89
 There is a large literature on the Iran-Iraq War. See Hiro (1990), Khadduri (1988), and Takeyh (2010) for 
overviews.  
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research focusing on the Iranian side, recent works have, thankfully, focused more on 
both Khomeini and Saddam’s specific decision making and strategy.  
Two recent works incorporating new sources are (Razoux, 2015b) and Murray & 
Woods, (2014c). Murray and Woods aim to fill this void by focusing more narrowly on 
Iraqi and Iranian decision making and strategy. Murray and Woods work is highly 
valuable due to its use of sources and analysis of Hussein’s overall military strategy. The 
authors make use of the Iraqi Perspective Project resources, a U.S. sponsored program to 
capture and catalogue various documents, recordings, and transcripts left over after the 
fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime; they also had access to a tremendous amount of internal 
Iraqi archives and staff to translate and transcribe various documents. Part of the archives 
includes detailed discussions of internal Iraqi deliberations regarding invading Iran, 
offering rare access to a normally opaque regime. Additionally, the authors conducted 
interviews with members of the former regime. With that said, neither Woods nor Murray 
speak Arabic and, thus, some primary sources in Arabic are omitted; a notable memoir by 
Wafiq al-Samarra’I is not cited for instance.  
 Razoux (2015b) The Iran-Iraq War, is a valuable and needed addition to 
scholarship on the conflict. Razoux makes use of the same newly available materials 
from the Iraqi Perspectives Project as Murray and Woods, but also provides other 
valuable primary source documents. Of particular note is Razoux’s use of primary 
sources to provide a picture of both Iranian and Iraqi military assets and personal; Razoux 
documents the amount of support from Iran and Iraq from foreign sources throughout the 
conflict. Of particular interest is the drastically lopsided support for Iraq from Western 
powers. Razoux argues this robust support was key to prolonging the war. Interestingly, 
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Razoux documents how foreign support for Iraq resulted in Iranian terrorism aimed 
towards French and other targets, in retaliation for support for Iraq. Western support for 
Iraq, specifically funding the conflict, overlooking Iraq’s use of chemical weapons 
against Iran, and naval support from the U.S., can help explain features of Iranian foreign 
policy writ large after the Iran-Iraq War and Iran’s distrust of Western powers, persisting 
to this day (See Tabatabai and Samuel, 2017 for a fascinating discussion of this 
dynamic).  
 Western support for Saddam after the start of the war should not be taken as 
evidence that the U.S. approved of Saddam’s invasion. Both of these works offer 
conclusive documentation refuting the claim that the U.S. gave Saddam Hussein a ‘green 
light’ to invade Iraq. This explanation—perhaps reflecting a U.S.-centric analysis of the 
Iran-Iraq War and world history in general—was often part of scholarly writing about the 
start of the war. Dilip Hiro (1990) asserted that the U.S. induced Saddam to invade and 
provided a green light; Siad Abruish (2000) made a similar claim. With both of these 
works and a particularly interesting journal article by Hal Brands (2012), this canard can 
finally be put to rest. In fact, both Murray and Woods and Razoux, as discussed in this 
dissertation, display that the alliance system hardly determined Saddam’s actions. These 
works are essential to refocus attention back to the key actors, Saddam Hussein, from 
analysis that tended to conceptualize the U.S. as being the locus of activity and somehow 
determining many of the choices of leaders of peripheral nations.90  
                                                          
90
 This, perhaps, can be explained with reference to human psychology: most IR scholars have more access 
to decision makers in the U.S. and can better document U.S. foreign policy compared to foreign policy 
making in the developing world, and, thus, tend to overemphasize the U.S.’s causal role in many conflicts, 
seeing the U.S. as somehow responsible for everything that happens in the developing world. One 
explanation for an egocentric bias is that actors have more access to their own actions compared to others, 
thus they tend to overemphasize their own role when making causal attributions (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  
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 F. Gregory Gause's (2002; Gause, 2009) works proved to be extremely valuable 
for this dissertation in terms of explaining the start of both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf 
War. Gause argues that Saddam was motivated, in both cases, to address threats to his 
domestic political stability. Gause is an Arabic speaker and incorporated primary source 
documents in his book length treatment of the international politics of the Middle East 
and offers detailed analysis of both decisions. Gause constructs how Saddam and other 
high ranking Iraqi Officers interpreted the threat from the Iranian revolution and, based 
on Gause’s readings of works by Wafiq al-Samarra’I, a highly ranked general in the Iraqi 
Army who defected from the regime before the U.S. invasion, and testimony from a 
notable newspaper editor in Baghdad, how Saddam viewed Kuwait’s actions in the larger 
context of Iraq’s domestic political stability and the price of oil. In Gauses analysis, 
threats to domestic stability quickly get equated with a rationalist response to some sort 
of material or ideological threat; ideological in the form of fomentation of revolution by 
Iranians in Iraq by exploiting Iraq’s large Shia population—e.g. the Iranians did pose a 
genuine threat to Saddam’s domestic political stability. As this dissertation displays, and 
building on Gause’s work, objective threats have to be interpreted; and emotions colors 
such interpretation. Additionally, as argued, emotion was key to explain why Saddam 
was confident enough to take such leaps in the dark. Gauses implicit assumption 
regarding the rationality of such decisions has a hard time explaining the psychological 
dynamic explained in his dissertation. Why did he overstate the threat and why was he 
unjustifiably confident in victory in both cases? The psychological dynamic, which is 
beyond the scope of Gauses’s analysis and discussed in this dissertation, can explain why 
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and how such threats translated into action via the emotion of fear and can explain the 
essentially impulsive and hasty decision process.   
 In justifying my conclusion that Saddam overestimated such threats to his 
domestic political stability, I relied on Bengio's (1985b) discussion of the relationship 
between the Baathist regime and its Shia population and Walt's, (1996b) work regarding 
revolution and war. Bengio argues that Saddam employed a number of strategies to deal 
with the ‘Shia problem’—domestic repression, co-option, and patronage—and that 
Saddam blew the threat posed by the Iranian Revolution out of proportion. Hussein’s 
attack against Iran is seen by Walt (1996) as a textbook case of misperception, both about 
the threat posed by the revolution and about the ability of the Iranians to respond to Iraq’s 
attack. Even assuming that Saddam was reacting to an objective threat to his domestic 
political stability, the theory employed in this dissertation can explain why Saddam was 
confident enough to launch such an attack and why he also underestimated his 
opponent’s capabilities.  
 I relied on a number of works in my discussion of the start of the Gulf War. For 
general context, including the military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions of the 
conflict, Freedman & Karsh, (1995b) was extremely valuable. Bob Woodward’s The 
Commanders was helpful in providing detailed discussions of U.S. policy making after 
Saddam made his faithful decision. Regarding U.S. foreign policy in the run-up to the 
invasion, Jentleson, (1994b) offers an in-depth analysis of U.S. policy toward the Iraqi 
state, starting first with the ‘tilt,’ which refers to U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
War and up to the invasion of Kuwait. Jettleson offers a pointed critique of U.S. foreign 
policy, arguing that the U.S. could have sent clearer signals to the Iraqi dictator regarding 
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how the U.S. would react to an invasion. Karabell (1995b) also offers a journal length 
treatment of U.S. foreign policy during the late Regan administration (See also (J. R. 
Hiltermann, 2007). Both works find a U.S. Administration aiming to normalize relations 
with the Iraqi regime. In light of the aim for “constructive engagement” with the Iraqi 
regime, Saddam’s persistent belief in a U.S. orchestrated conspiracy to weaken his 
regime is especially interesting; as argued in this dissertation, it appears to be clear 
evidence of exaggerated threat perceptions.  
 I relied heavily on K. M. Woods (2008b) The Mother of All Battles for an 
assessment of Iraqi preparations for invading Kuwait. Woods served as a principal in the 
Iraqi Perspectives Project and was an analyst with the Joint Forces Command Institute for 
Defense Analysis, in addition to being a former U.S. Army officer. Woods offers some of 
the only detailed accounts regarding how the Iraqi regime prepared for the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait, based on materials made available after the fall of Saddam’s 
regime. As noted in the analysis in this dissertation, Saddam left his military quite 
unprepared for the invasion; the Iraqi Army did not have adequate maps of the small 
emirate and did not have any sort of adequate plan to occupy Kuwait (K. M. Woods, 
2008b). Norman Cigar (1992) offers valuable insight for some of Saddam strategic 
assumptions—such as the fragility of the U.S. led coalition. Woods and Stout (2010) 
document how—while not directly related to the questions in this dissertation but 
relevant for assessing Saddam’s actions in the run-up to the 2003 invasion—Saddam 
viewed the outcome of the Gulf War not as being a strategic defeat, but, in fact, evidence 
of the prowess of the Republican Guard. In Saddam’s view, the fact that the U.S. stopped 
short of overthrowing his regime was evidence both of his abilities as a military/strategic  
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thinker and, importantly, evidence of the U.S.’s lack of resolve and its sensitivity to 
casualties (K. Woods et al., 2006; K. M. Woods & Stout, 2010). All the works plaint a 
picture of Saddam highly engaged in the policy process and certainly not detached from 
the major decisions.  
 
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis   
The literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis91 is large and is accompanied by an 
equally large literature on U.S./Cuban relations.92 For the purposes of the Cuban case 
study, I focused on specific aspects of the crisis, which then subsequently guided my use 
of sources. However, I also had to gain an understanding of the larger geopolitical 
context, to provide the context in which various decisions were made; due to that 
consideration, I had to consult the larger literature on the crisis. Because this case study 
analyzed Castro’s decision to place weapons in Cuba, I use literature that focused on the 
motivations of the Soviets and Cubans for emplacing the weapons. Related to the 
motivations to place the weapons in Cuba, I was interested in understanding how the 
Cuban’s and Soviet’s viewed the risk involved, the overall feasibility of the plan, and 
how the policy was implemented, in order to address the psychological dynamic 
discussed in this dissertation.  To address Castro’s perceptions of U.S. policy, I used 
works discussing U.S. foreign policy before the crisis. In order to construct a NIC of the 
Cuban leader, I used numerous biographies of Castro and various works by area studies 
scholars.    
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 For general analysis see: (Grahm Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Allyn, Blight, & Welch, 1989; Nathan, 2016; 
White, 1995); for works that focus more on U.S. decision making see: (Grahm Allison & Zelikow, 1999; 
May & Zelikow, 2002; Stern, 2003, 2005).  
 
92
 For U.S./ Cuban relations see: Benjamin, (1992); Morley, (1987); Smith, (1988); Welch, (1985). 
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Often in international politics, there are a variety of both material and nonmaterial 
benefits for an action. This applies to the decision to place nuclear weapons in Cuba. In 
order to explain why Castro ultimately accepted the weapons, it was necessary to gain an 
understanding of the posited benefits the weapons offered. This task was doubly difficult 
because the weapons offered the Soviets and the Cubans different, but, at the same time, 
similar benefits. For instance, both may have gained from an increase in Soviet 
capabilities; strengthening the Soviet camp offered tangible benefits for both states. But, 
Cuba and Soviet preferences may have diverged as well: for the purposes of deterring an 
attack on the island, it may have made more sense for the Cubans to have operational 
control over the weapons, eliminating any ambiguity as to the likely use of nuclear 
weapons in reaction to a U.S. invasion; however, the Soviets may have been reluctant to 
concede too much control to the Cubans for fear of losing control in terms of crisis 
escalation. Due to these concerns, it was necessary to analyze both the material and non-
material benefits the weapons claimed to offer the Cubans and Soviets.  
A number of works focus on the Soviet decision to place weapons in Cuba. 
(Horelick, 1964b) offered one of the first analysis of the Soviet motivations for 
emplacing the weapons in Cuba. Horelick argues that the Soviets were likely motivated 
by a mélange of benefits the weapons offered, including the standard explanation that the 
primary reason for deployment was to deter a U.S. attack. Emplacing the weapons 
offered, from the Soviet prospective, a relatively cheap and easy means to vitiate U.S. 
superiority in a number of dimensions. As became increasingly clear, the USSR was far 
behind in the nuclear arms race; while the weapons would not drastically alter the nuclear 
balance of power, it would complicate a U.S. first strike capability. There was mounting 
218 
 
evidence the U.S. was advancing in terms of a number of technological, diplomatic, and 
strategic dimensions, according to Horelick. In this context, the weapons offered a 
solution to a “whole range of military-political problems confronting the Soviet Union” 
(Horelick, 1964b, p. 377). Horelick’s work was also useful in problematizing a number of 
aspects of the deployment. Horelick noted that the size of the deployment was larger than 
necessary for purely defensive purposes; the issue of who would control the weapons and 
how that related to the deterrent value of said weapons was discussed as well.  
 Fursenko and Naftali's (1998) work was extremely valuable for gaining an 
understanding of Soviet motivations and how the deployment was implemented. This 
work was based on U.S.-Russian collaboration and used Russian archival sources, made 
available after the fall of the Soviet Union. Regarding the decision to place weapons in 
Cuba, the authors find a great deal of evidence for the standard explanation: historians are 
justified in placing emphasis on the essentially defensive nature of the deployment. Yet, 
they stress other rationales, reinforcing the defensive motivation, in a similar fashion as 
Horelick. In the face of western advances on a number of dimensions, the deployment 
offered a means to remind the U.S of Soviet power. But, the authors highlight another 
motivation, often overlooked: Khrushchev wanted to reassure the Cubans of Soviet 
support. Fursenko and Nafali provide details regarding how the deployment was 
implemented. The authors provide evidence that Khrushchev was aware of overhead 
flights over Cuba conducted by the U.S.; they discuss the logistical challenges, sending 
such a large amount of resources 7 thousand miles without notice from the U.S. 
(Fursenko & Naftali, 1998, p. 191). Garthoff (1989b) offers a general account of the 
Crisis but with special emphasis on the Soviet side and his account was useful to 
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establish the broad strategic environment in which the Russian and Cubans operated; 
Garthoff interview numerous Soviet colleagues and used archival sources.93  
Brenner (Blight & Brenner, 2007; Brenner, 1990a) provide much needed insight 
into the Cuban’s desire for the weapons. As Brenner documents, Castro had ample reason 
to fear an U.S. attack. The Cuban’s believed that the U.S. would follow-up the Bay of 
Pigs invasion with a larger sustained attack and that the economic embargo and removal 
of Cuba from the Organization of American States was aimed to destabilize the regime; 
Cuban agents had infiltrated the Operation Mongoose teams and were, while not totally 
privy to the plan, aware of a possible invasion orchestrated by the U.S. Especially 
interesting for the purposes of this dissertation, is Brenner’s discussion of how the 
Cubans thought the U.S. would react to the emplacement of nuclear weapons. According 
to Brenner, the Cubans did not give much thought to how the U.S. would react nor 
developed a contingency plan to deal with U.S. reactions. Brenner notes that the Cubans-
Soviet relations were strained during this time and Castro desired to place Cuba under the 
Soviet nuclear umbrella. Castro also appeared insouciant regarding how the weapons 
would be deployed and held a certain faith in the USSR’s ability to emplace the 
weapons.94 
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 See also Operation ANADYR: US and Soviet generals recount the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Gribkov, 
Smith, & Friendly, 1993) 
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 It should be noted that while a number of accounts immediately after the crisis noted the essentially 
defensive nature of the deployment, the Kennedy Administration, at the time of the crisis, could not 
conceive that the weapons were emplaced for a defensive purpose. As (Weldes, 1999b) notes, U.S. 
policymakers viewed the deployment through the prism of their own belief system; including such beliefs 
as the USSR’s essentially aggressive nature, the Monroe Doctrine—making the deployment seem all the 
more provocative, and did not see Castro as a legitimate leader, discounting Castro’s agency in the 
decision.  
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Castro explained his actions and rational for emplacing the weapons, in person, in 
a conference organized by Blight, Allyn, and Welch—the Havana conference, which was 
part of a larger series of conferences.95 The Havana Conference took place over a series 
of three days in Havana and was accompanied by a subsequent book entitled, Cuba on 
the Brink (Blight, Allyn, & Welch, 2002b). The book included lengthy transcripts of 
dialogue accompanied by editor comments and analysis by Blight, Allyn, and Welch. The 
editors argue that they engage in critical oral history; this entails using actor’s experience, 
newly declassified materials, and critical oral examination, to illuminate and enlighten 
key historical events. The conference featured a number of U.S. academics and 
policymakers, such as McNamara (former Defense Secretary), the historian Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr, and academics such as Raymond Garthnoff and Wayne S. Smith; Russian 
Federation participants included Alexandr Alekseev (Soviet ambassador to Cuba) and 
General Gribkov. Various Cubans participated, the most notable being Castro himself. 
Castro spoke to a number of issues discussed in this dissertation at the Havana 
Conference. He noted that he essentially deferred to Soviet expertise regarding how the 
deployment would be implemented. This type of information is extremely valuable, yet 
should not, as the editors— Blight, Allyn, and Welch —note be taken at face value. 
Castro may have been deflecting blame away from the fact that he overlooked a number 
of the logistical vulnerabilities of the deployment. The editors provide lengthy written 
analysis problematizing much of Castro’s comments and are highly critical of many of 
Castro’s claims. At this conference, Castro again made the point that the weapons were 
                                                          
95
 Researchers Bright and Welch held a series of conferences with key actors from the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The Havana conference took place January 1992 and the transcripts are annotated in Cuba On the 
Brink, (Blight et al., 2002a). Blight and Welch also have provided transcripts for the Hawks Cay 
Conference, the Moscow Conference, and Cambridge Conference, provided in On the Brink, (Blight & 
Welch, 1990). 
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wanted primarily for defensive purposes. But, also and interestingly from the pride 
dimension, also asserted, that he viewed the deployment of the weapons as perfectly legal 
and not all that different from the U.S.’s deployment of similar missiles in Europe. This 
then prompts the question, if Castro believed the action to be legitimate, why did he 
acquiesce to the deployment being clandestine?  
 Acosta (2002b), provides a book length treatment of the crisis from Castro and 
Cuba’s perspective. Acosta interviewed key actors and conducted research in Cuban 
archives, documented in the appendixes of the work. Acosta documents operation 
Mongoose and the palatable fear the Cubans were laboring under before the weapons 
were emplaced in Cuba. Of particular interest was Acosta’s description of the logistical 
challenges of the deployment and he provides details regarding the size and scope of the 
deployment. Like much scholarship from the Cuban side, this work has to be taken with 
some skepticism. Acosta asserts, as Castro did at the Havana Conference, that they 
accepted the weapons to advance the global cause of communism. As noted, Bright, Ally, 
and Welch are skeptical of such claims; yet Acosta’s work does provide the context and 
much needed empathy for the Cuban side.  
A number of works looked at Cuban Foreign Policy96 in general and thus are 
helpful in explaining the Crisis. Dominguez’s work, To Make the World Safe for 
Revolution (Dominguez, 2009), is a valuable general overview of Cuban Foreign Policy. 
Dominguez makes clear that while Cuban may have operated under the confines of 
USSR hegemony, the Cubans had an autonomous foreign policy. Dominguez details that 
Cuba’s support for revolution abroad is based largely on Cuban priorities. Gleijeses 
(2002), using archival sources and based on information from interviews conducted in 
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 See also Erisman (1985) and T. Smith  (1988).  
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Africa and Cuba, offers a comprehensive history of Cuban policy toward Africa in the 
late fifties and thru the 1960s. Gleijeses argues that Cuba was motivated by ideological 
mission, identification with African independent movements, and self-interests in 
creating a bloc of Cuba friendly states, to stand guard against the encroachments of U.S. 
imperialism.  
Works about politics in revolutionary Cuba broadly were useful in either 
providing the context in which the decisions were made or in tangentially discussing the 
origins of the Crisis. Castañeda  (2012) argues in, Utopia Unarmed, that the Cuban 
Revolution was a disaster for Latin America, as it pushed a whole generation down the 
path of armed revolution, as opposed to electoral reform. Sweig (2009) uses Cuban 
archives to take a detailed look at the revolutionary political struggles before Castro took 
power; Bunck's (2010) work looks at cultural change in Cuba, documenting how difficult 
cultural change was to implement even in revolutionary Cuba. Lee Anderson's (2010) 
biography of Che Guevara was helpful as well. Anderson had access to previous 
unpublished diaries, letters, and other materials provided by Aleida March, a confidant of 
Che. Anderson also conducted interviews in over five countries. Works on Che were 
useful due to his close relationship with Castro.  
I consulted numerous biographies of Fidel Castro in constructing Castro’s NIC. 
Arguably, no other leader has received such attention from the American public, both in 
terms of scholarly fascination and interest from the general public. In addition to 
biographies, Playboy Magazine, Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes, and Barbara Walters have 
all interviewed the famous dictator. Like Saddam, many forget Fidel’s highly eventful 
life before ruling Cuba, which included a great deal of intrigue. A few notable 
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biographies place special emphasis on Fidel’s early life.  R. Quirk (1995) published a 
notable highly critical biography. Most of Quirk’s biography focuses on Fidel’s early life, 
including his early revolutionary period, most of the biography focuses on the 1950s and 
1960s. Quick does include a discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is difficult to 
downplay how critical this biography is; Fidel is consistently portrayed as being 
mercurial, impulsive, intellectually limited, and self-centered. I consulted Ted Szulc 
(1986) biography of Castro as well. If Quick’s erred in the direction of being critical, 
Szulc paints a much more sympathetic portrait. He was able to interview Castro number 
times, interviewed other key leaders in the Castro regime, and spend 9 months in Cuba 
conducting research. I found P. Bourne (1986) psychological biography of Castro 
particularly useful. Boure’s book was useful in illuminating three specific areas: Fidel’s 
view of the U.S, specifically the U.S. role in supporting Batista; his relationship with Che 
Guevara, and Che’s influence on Fidel; and, his powerful identification with the 
revolutionary hero, Marti. See also (Skierka, 2014) for a useful biography of Fidel.   
Lionel Martin published an interesting book with a more pointed political goal: 
arguing that Fidel Castro was a dedicated Marxist in the 1950s. When Fidel became a 
communist is of no small importance. One school of thought conceptualizes his migration 
to Marxist-Leninism as a necessary transformation to gain largesse from the USSR—
which was necessary due to the bristling hostility from the leader of the capitalist camp, 
the U.S. Martin argues and provides evidence that Fidel was a communist well before the 
U.S. could have possibly pushed Fidel into the arms of the USSR.  Liss (1994b) discusses 
Fidel’s belief system in toto. Liss agrees with Martin that Fidel was a dedicated 
communist before the onset of hostilities with the U.S. His work, although tangled in a 
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mess of Marxist-Leninist academic jargon to the point of being unreadable, was valuable 
in outlining Fidel’s belief system and was used in this dissertation.  
Memoirs from those close to Fidel offer insight into the famous dictator. Halperin 
(1972) spent six years in Cuba and offers descriptions of Fidel’s actions and comments/ 
statements attributed to Fidel; however, because memoirs of this type are based on access 
to the Cuban leader, it is likely that the authors are highly sympathetic to their subject. 
Franqui (1980), a member of Castro’s inter-circle until he broke with Fidel over the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, wrote a memoir. Franqui was a custodian of state archives 
and microfilmed numerous records and letters; he also interviewed numerous actors for 
his memoir. Journalists offer valuable yet informal analysis of Fidel and such works were 
useful on some topics, see Lockwood (2003) and Mankiewicz & Kirby (1975).  
In terms of U.S. policy preceding the Crisis, I found Bonsal's (1971) work 
extremely valuable. He offers an illuminating account of U.S. policy before the Crisis, 
Bonsal was ambassador to Cuba from January 1959 to late October 1960. He argues that 
U.S. policy was not overtly hostile to the Cuban state in the early years of the revolution, 
but Castro was vehemently nationalist and anti-U.S. Bonsals is critical of policy starting 
in early 1960; the refusal to refine Cuban oil and the reduction in the sugar quota, may 
have left Cuba with few options other than relying on support from the USSR. C. 
Robbins (1985) work was influential as well; she argues that, as a general theme, the U.S. 
consistently overestimated the ‘Cuban threat.’ It is difficult to discount the importance of 
Weldes (1999b) work. As one of the first works I read on the crisis, it shows how 
indispensable ‘social facts’ and shared understandings were in essentially constructing 
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why the Cuban Missile Crisis was, in fact, a Crisis; and how U.S. policymakers could not 
conceive of a defensive motivation for the deployment.  
 
Kim Il-sung and The Korean War 
 
 All the works used to explain the start of the Korean War are influenced by a 
number of factors, some of which may pose difficulties in researching Kim Il-sung’s 
decision to invade South Korea. Because of the general opacity of the regime, scholars 
have to employ a number of techniques to gain sufficient information and data. In 
addition, and a problem more specific to the Korean War, scholars differ in their 
emphasis on the importance of internal or international factors—was the Korean War 
fundamentally a civil war or an international conflict?—which then guides and focuses 
subsequent research. Research that sees the Korean War as fundamentally an 
international phenomenon, tends to focus on the actions of not just Kim, but other players 
as well—particularly Soviet and Chinese leadership, moving attention away from Kim’s 
decisions; indeed, much of the new information regarding the start of the Korean War is 
based on information from Russian and Chinese interactions and communication with 
Kim.    
This latter point touches on larger concerns in Cold War scholarship. Tony Smith 
(2000) argues that scholarship needs to be reoriented towards, what he labels 
‘pericentrism:’ to take the view of the periphery, non-great powers, when explaining 
major events.  According to Smith, for too long scholarship has focused on the major 
powers as being the prime movers of the major events in the Cold War. Smith argues 
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that, quite often, it is the smaller actors that have been the drivers of Cold War history 
and scholars have neglected this important aspect. Thanks to recent works based on 
declassified Soviet and Chinese sources, Kim’s role in the start of the Korean War cannot 
be discounted; Weathersby (1993) documents 48 cable appeals from Kim to Stalin 
seeking support for unification by military means. However, some scholarship still 
privileges the importance of the major powers; in Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and 
the Start of the Korean War (Goncharov, Lewis, & Xue, 1995b), Kim is notably absent 
from the title. Same for Thornton’s Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Start of 
the Korean War (2000). Kim, the main driver of invasion, does not appear in the title of 
either major work. This, of course, is understandable, as the great powers are obviously 
important—Kim could not act without Stalin’s approval. With that said, much needs to 
be done to explain Kim’s decision making. Some of the works in this discussion of 
sources used, aim to explain Kim’s decision; but some aim to explain Kim’s decision 
within a larger framework of Cold War politics, still implicitly suggesting that it is the 
great powers’ decisions that are ultimately of primary consequence.  
Few states are more difficult to research than the DPRK. The combination of its 
lack of transparency combined with the regimes diplomatic isolation leaves scholars with 
few resources to marshal. With that said, the obvious importance in explaining this state’s 
behavior requires researchers make do with the available resources. In order to ensure 
that research questions are problem or phenomenon driven, not data driven—scholars 
should not just research “where the light is good” but should focus on explaining actions 
of political importance. Few could argue that the Korean War is not worthy of such 
research.  
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Researchers have dealt with this challenge in a number of ways. Some rely on the 
testimony of North Koreans who have defected from the regime; others use diplomatic 
correspondence with the North Korean regime from other DPRK friendly states; while 
others have made use of captured documents and other resources found during the U.S. 
occupation of the North during a brief period in the Korean War.  
Nam (1976) offers a valuable and readable account of the North Korean 
Communist Leadership from 1945 to 1960. Initially, the leadership of the communist 
movement was composed of three major factions—the Yenan faction (Chinese 
Communists), the Soviet Faction (Kim’s faction of Korean-Soviet Communists, although 
Kim has differences and purges some within this faction as well; Nam refers to Kim’s 
group within the Soviet faction as a ‘sub group’), and the native communist cells that 
survived under Japanese occupation (domestic communists). Nam offers a detailed 
account of Kim’s steady consolidation of control as Kim methodically expelled and 
purged the non-Soviet factions from power over a fifteen year period. What is left is a 
group of leaders around Kim that share Kim’s guerilla, Manchurian military background.  
The book paints Kim as an adroit manipulator and savvy political operator, 
recognizing favorable moments to purge ‘disloyal’ members. Kim purged most of the 
domestic communist after the Korean War, a propitious moment to focus blame after the 
Korean War; Kim also survived challenges to his growing ‘cult of personality’ with 
attacks on his leadership in 1956. At times Kim patiently waits, recognizing when various 
factions have to be propitiated. For instance, Kim could not purge the pro-Chinese’s 
faction during and after the Korean War, because he was dependent on Chinese 
assistance. While the book offers an impressive bibliography, there is little new sourcing 
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that cannot be found in Scalipino and Lee’s massive Communism in Korea (Scalapino & 
Lee, 1973).  
Lankov's (2002) From Stalin to Kim ll-sung: the Formation of North Korea, 
offers an account of the Soviet’s role in the formation of the DPRK, based on newly 
declassified Russian materials. Like Nam, Lankov documents the factional struggles as 
being key to explain various political changes.  According to Lankov, Soviet influence 
after the Korean War declined, and a number of show trial and purges result in the further 
consolidation of Kim’s control. Lankov argues that until the late 1940s, Soviet policies 
aimed to minimize factional rivalries in the DPRK, but rivalries intensified as the USSR’s 
role declined.  
The North Korean Revolution by Charles Armstrong (2004) is a magisterial 
account of how North Korea moved from Japanese occupation to a Marxist–Leninist state 
with distinctive Korean particularities. Of particular importance for this dissertation are 
two topics for Armstrong: The Manchurian experience for both Kim and the DPRK 
leadership; and how, while dependent on Soviet largess, the DPRK would never become 
“the pliant and dependable satellite” (Armstrong, 2004, p. 242) of the USSR.  Regarding 
the first point, Armstrong notes how the Manchurian experience is an area of loss, 
sacrifice, and exile for Koreans. This time in exile is given ‘mythical’ status in North 
Korean official history and is centered on the activities of Kim. This experience fostered 
secrecy, determination, a fierce nationalism and anti-imperialism, and little tolerance for 
dissent, all in the name of safeguarding Korea’s autonomy. Arguably, much of the current 
regimes nationalism can be traced to the Manchurian experience.  
229 
 
The Manchurian experience was also Kim and his group’s first experience with 
local rule. The first experiences with land reform and other forms of local government 
were first tried in this area and subsequently exported to North Korea following Japanese 
occupation. These first experiences with local control proved to be far more lasting 
templets for governance than either Soviet or Chinese guidance, highlighting a theme of 
Armstrong’s book: “the DPRK represented to a significant extent the ‘Koreanization’ of 
Soviet communism, not the Sovietization of North Korea”  (Armstrong, 2004, p. 241).  
Chinese-Korean joint experience in Manchuria created deep bonds but also lasting 
distrust and hostility between the two. Armstrong documents the ‘Minsaendan incident,’ 
in which a number of Koreans—including Kim Il-sung97—were accused of being 
members of The Minsaengdan, a group of pro-Japanese Koreans seeking help from 
Japanese and recognition from the Japanese. Over one thousand Koreans were arrested 
and expelled from the CCP. Armstrong argues this incident helps explain “the Korean 
communists’ insistence on autonomy within the movement and their emphasis on 
national autonomy—despite close relations with the Chinese—after Korea was liberated” 
(Armstrong, 2004, p. 30).  
Regarding the second point, Armstrong stresses the continuity between the 
Japanese colonial experience and with deeper cultural norms in Koreans society. For 
instance, while Marxist-Leninist teaching stresses the need to diminish class or status 
distinctions, such distinctions where deeply ingrained in the Korean experience, and, 
thus, not changed even with the DPRK’s professed dedication to Marxist-Leninism, 
which can explain why, to this day, Korean remains a highly segmented, hierarchal 
society.  
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 Kim was exonerated in 1934.  
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Armstrong relies on a voluminous amount of documents captured form the DPRK 
in the short occupation by U.S. forces during the Korea War, housed in the U.S. National 
Archives (called RG 242). Such documents consist of US intelligence reports; record 
seized by U.S. forces in Korea; and CIA studies. RG 242 was declassified in the late 
1970s. Armstrong argues these documents provided the best view regarding how the 
DPRK built society from the ‘ground-up.’ 
One means to deal with the opacity of the DPRK is to rely on the few states that 
had or have diplomatic correspondence with the hermit kingdom. A series of works have 
made use of declassified Soviet and Chinese archives. A work that makes use of both 
Chinese and Soviet archives to discuss N. Korea’s foreign policy writ large is 
Armstrong’s, Tyranny of the Weak (2013). In this work, Kim is clearly in the driver’s seat 
of North Korean foreign policy; Kim took the lead planning and convincing both Stalin 
and Mao to support the invasion. The book documents how Kim manipulates and gains 
support from both the Chinese and Russians through the vicissitudes and changing 
alliance patterns of the Cold War, playing both the Soviets and Chinese off one another at 
various points—but always safeguarding Korea’s autonomy. The use of Russian and 
Chinese sources helps shed considerable light on a number of important aspects of North 
Korean foreign policy, such as its economic policy, the famines in North Korea, and how 
the North Korean navigated the foreign policy landscape after the fall of the USSR. 
However, in both of Armstrong’s works, only a few pages are dedicated to explain the 
start of the Korean War.  
Szalontai (2006) relies on Hungarian diplomatic archives, supporting his 
contention that the North Korean regimes unique characteristics are due to the particulars 
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of the North Korean leader—Kim Il-song. According to Szalontai, of particular 
importance was Kim’s intense nationalism. This nationalism caused Kim to discount the 
goals of the ‘communist’ or ‘Soviet bloc’ and focus more narrowly on the conflict with 
Seoul—“America’s puppet’ according to Kim. This intense nationalism resulted in the 
diplomatic isolation of the North Korean regime.  
Ree (1990) relies on Soviet secondary published sources to understand Soviet 
policy toward Korea during the immediate post war years, 1945 to 1947. Ree sees the 
Soviets playing a larger role; while the North Koreans retained the peoples committees 
(another export of the Manchurian experience), the Soviets were able to exercise as much 
control as the U.S. was providing in the South. Rees’ study is limited to its narrow 
chronological focus and its narrow use of sources and may have benefited from using 
other archival sources, such as RG 242 as  Cumings (1992) and Armstrong (2004) 
exploit.  
Uncertain Partners (Goncharov et al., 1995b) draws on both declassified Russian 
and Chinese sources and uses biographies, histories, and memoirs, to explain, primarily, 
Sino-Soviet cooperation and the origins of the Korean War. There is little doubt 
regarding Kim’s role as the prime mover regarding an invasion of the South thanks to 
Uncertain Partners. The authors marshal an impressive amount of evidence showing it 
was Kim, pressing a reluctant Stalin and Mao, for concessions and support for his 
invasion of the south. Stalin is concerned about U.S. involvement and is unwilling to risk 
conflict with the U.S. for Korean unification; Mao would prefer to focus and defeat the 
U.S. backed Kuomintang at home and pursue (or not preclude) the possibility of 
improved U.S.-Chinese relations. Kim convinces a reluctant Stalin that the U.S. will not 
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intervene and Mao, reluctantly, due to pressure from the Soviets and a similar assessment 
about U.S. intervention being unlikely, agrees. The authors’ claim Mao only reluctantly 
agreed to enter the conflict after the U.S. crossed the 38
th
 parallel, providing evidence for 
the orthodox interpretation that Mao was primarily motivated for defensive reasons, Mao 
could not tolerate an unfriendly state directly on its boarder and only acted when the 
Soviets were unwilling to provide more robust support.
 98  
From the Russian side, Katheryn Weathersby (1993) offers a number of works 
explaining Soviet foreign policy based on declassified documents from the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (CPSU). Weathersby argues that Soviet 
foreign Policy went through a number of distinct phases shortly before the Korean War. 
The first phase was based on the need to control strategically important areas, such as 
Pusan and Inchon. When it appeared control over these areas was not likely without 
confrontation with the U.S., Stalin aimed for firm control of North Korea, via a friendly 
North Korean government, headed by Kim. In March-April 1950, Stalin’s policy changes 
as he now supports Kim’s invasion of the South based on U.S. involvement being 
unlikely. Weathersby, in a similar fashion to Thornton, argues that, while not able to 
conclusively document, Stalin was motivated to support Kim due to concerns of a 
possible U.S.- Chinese rapprochement.  
A number of works address the start of the Korean War via declassified Chinese 
sources. After Leaning to One Side: China and its Allies in the Cold War (2011), Shen 
and Li, Chinese independent historians, use Chinese Foreign Ministry declassified 
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 Whiting's  (1960) seminal work: China Crosses the Yalu, stresses Chinese’ concerns about U.S. 
proximity to the Manchurian area as being key to explain, an essentially, defensive action by the Chinese. 
The U.S. crossing the 38th parallel, in the face of Chinese’ warnings, forced a reluctant action in order to 
preserve its territorial integrity, according to Whiting.  
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materials and Russian sources,  arguing that Mao’s entry into the Korean War was taken 
in response to American intervention—which Mao had not expected—and was not 
planned in advance. Overall, this work interprets Chinese Foreign policy as being 
primarily in pursuit of Chinese national interests and not driven by ideology to the degree 
Zhang and Chen suggest (to be discussed shortly). Other chapters document the bitter 
disagreements over strategy, command, and logistics, between the Chinese and Koreans 
and a discussion of Kim’s fear of the growing power of the Chinese Faction in Korea, 
which ultimately resulted in the ejection of Chinese forces in 1958.  
Chinese foreign policy looks much different in Zhang's (1995) Mao’s Military 
Romanticism, as Zhang stresses the importance of ideology guiding Chinese actions. Mao 
held a romantic view of China’s role in the region: viewing their revolutionary cohort as 
being liberators, ensuring foreign powers did not dominate the region. Mao held a belief 
in the power of violence to act as a catalyst for historical progression. What makes 
fascinating reading is Mao’s views of Chinese capabilities and their ability to confront a 
more powerful and technically sophisticated enemy, relying on surprise and superior 
moral. This has implications for an explanation of Mao’s involvement in the Korean War: 
far from being reluctant and only entering for defensive realists’ reasons—according to 
this view, the Chinese traditionally viewed Northern Korea as a ‘buffer zone’ and it was 
essential that this area not be controlled by hostile forces—Mao was spoiling for a fight 
and more than willing to enter the conflict to ensure that the Americans do not become 
‘dizzy with success.’ Zhang’s work was written largely from Chinese documentary 
collections, memoirs, and histories, sources from the Chinese military, and offers a 
valuable source for Chinese foreign policy.  
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Chen Jian (1996) emphasizes, as well, the fundamentally revolutionary nature of 
Chinese Foreign Policy. Chen’s work is based on published Chinese sources and 
interviews with the Chinese actors involved. Animating both Chinese intervention in the 
Korean War and the Sino-Soviet alliance, was Mao’s belief that the U.S. was an imperial 
power and an enemy; conflict could only be postponed and was inevitable. Mao 
supported Stalin and Kim’s plan to unify the peninsula, seeing U.S. intervention as 
unlikely. However, stressing the opportunity aspect of the conflict opposite the ‘crisis’ 
aspect, Chen in a similar fashion as Zhang, notes that the U.S. crossing the 38
th
 parallel, 
while a factor, was not a seminal event as originally portrayed. Chen argues that the 
warning to the U.S. regarding the importance to stop at the 38
th
 parallel, was essentially 
tactical. This warning allowed he Chinese to be seen as essentially acting defensively, 
possibly fracturing the cohesion of the enemy camp. Chen argues that Mao’s decision to 
intervene was made before the crossing of the 38
th
 parallel and even before the Inchon 
landing; Zhang (1995) also notes that Mao entertained entering the conflict well before 
the U.S. crossed the 38
th
 parallel.   
American historians have looked at the Korean War from a number of 
dimensions. In a broad sense, some stress the international dimensions of the conflict. For 
instance, Jervis (1980) argues for the seminal importance of the Korean War in terms of 
Cold War history: the Korean War pushed the Cold War into a new distinct phase of 
militarized competition and encouraged the Cold war to take on a contest for control of 
the entire world.  
U.S Foreign Policy preceding the invasion and the U.S.’s subsequent reaction to 
the invasion is the focus of much scholarship. Rosemary Foot (1985) argues that the 
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reaction of U.S. policy makers was to see the invasion as a product of a monolithic 
communist movement, advancing the goals of global communism, not a civil war 
initiated by Kim for national unification. Other discuss how the war was difficult to ‘sell’ 
to the American public because of its limited nature (Fehrenbach, 1995). British historian 
David Rees (1984) argues that the Korean War should been seen as a success: the U.S. 
fought a limited war to limit aggression.  
Of particular importance for this dissertation is an analysis of U.S. foreign policy 
immediately preceding the invasion. Stueck (1981)using archival sources from both the 
U.S. military and State Department, argues that while Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of 
State at the time of the invasion,  was certain of the need to demonstrate ‘credibility’ in 
the face of an expansive USSR, the military saw little strategic value in Korea and was 
wary of dedicating scarce resources to defend the Korean peninsula. Congress, largely 
due to the infamous ‘China lobby,’ was more concerned about protecting Taiwan from 
Chinese aggression. Due to such bureaucratic infighting, the Truman administration had a 
difficult time making clear signals regarding a possible military commitment to the 
peninsula. Yet, as Struck documents, a consensus emerged with Truman and Acheson 
regarding the need to resist communist aggression even in peripheral areas, such as 
Korea.  
Allen Millett (2015), an American military historian, has perhaps provided the 
most detailed account of the military history of the Korean War, in his trilogy, the first 
volume dealing with the outbreak of the conflict. Millett, echoing scholars such as 
Cumings, places emphasis on the civil nature of the conflict. In The War for Korea: 
1945-1950, A House Burning, Millett finds that the Korean peninsula was embroiled in a 
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civil war dating back to 1948 and the uprising on Cheju Island. Millet uses South Korean 
military record and oral testimony to claim that both the North and the South were 
engaged in a military competition to actualize their various ideals for the Korean nation.  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Aburish, S. K. (2000a). Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge. Bloomsbury 
Publishing USA. 
 
Acosta, T. D. (2002a). October 1962: The “Missile” Crisis as Seen from Cuba (1st 
edition). New York: Pathfinder. 
 
Alani, M. M. (1990). Operation Vantage: British Military Intervention in Kuwait, 1961. 
Surbiton: LAAM Ltd. 
 
Allison, Graham, & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (2 edition). New York: Pearson. 
 
Allyn, B. J., Blight, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1989). Essence of Revision: Moscow, 
Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. International Security, 14(3), 136–172. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2538934 
 
Andersen, P. A., & Guerrero, L. K. (1997). Handbook of Communication and Emotion: 
Research, Theory, Applications, and Contexts. Elsevier. 
 
Anderson, L. J. (2010). Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (Revised ed. edition). New 
York : Berkeley, Calif.: Grove Press. 
 
Appleman, R. E. (2016). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. St. John’s Press. 
 
Armstrong, C. K. (1995). Centering the Periphery: Manchurian Exile(s) and the North 
Korean State. Korean Studies, 19, 1–16. 
 
Armstrong, C. K. (2002). The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Armstrong, C. K. (2013). Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 
(1 edition). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Balfour, S. (2013). Castro (3 edition). Routledge. 
 
Bengio, O. (1985a). Shi’is and politics in Ba’thi Iraq. Middle Eastern Studies, 21(1), 1–
14.  
 
Bengio, O. (2002a). Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
238 
 
Benjamin, J. R. (1992). The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An 
Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation. Princeton University Press. 
Bessner, D., & Guilhot, N. (2015). How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and 
Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism. International Security, 40(2), 
87–118. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00217 
 
Blainey, G. (1988). The causes of war. New York: Free Press. 
 
Blight, J. G. (1992). The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Blight, J. G., Allyn, B. J., & Welch, D. A. (2002a). Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the 
Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Blight, J. G., & Brenner, P. (2002). Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the 
Superpowers after the Missile Crisis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Blight, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1990). On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. 
 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 24(1), 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420240104 
 
Bonsal, P. W. (1971). Cuba, Castro, and the United States. University of Pittsburgh Pre. 
 
Bourne, P. (1986). Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro (1st edition). New York: Dodd 
Mead. 
 
Brands, H. (2011a). Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate’, and the 
United States: Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 34, No 1. Journal of Strategic 
Studies.  
 
Brands, H. (2011c). Making the Conspiracy Theorist a Prophet: Covert Action and the 
Contours of United States–Iraq Relations. International History Review, 33, 381–
408.  
 
Brands, H. (2011d). Why Did Saddam Invade Iran? New Evidence on Motives, 
Complexity, and the Israel Factor. The Journal of Military History, 75, 861–885. 
 
Brands, H. (2012.). Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was 
there a green light?: Cold War History: Vol 12, No 2. Jouranl of Cold War 
History, 2012. 
 
239 
 
Brands, H., & Palkki, D. (2011a). Saddam, Israel, and the bomb: nuclear alarmism 
justified? International Security, 36(1), 133–166. 
 
Brands, H., & Palkki, D. (2012a). “Conspiring Bastards”: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic 
View of the United States*. Diplomatic History, 36(3), 625–659. 
 
Brands, H., & Palkki, D. (2012b). “Conspiring Bastards”: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic 
View of the United States. Diplomatic History, 36(3), 625–659.  
 
Brenner. (1989). The Cuba Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary Society. (P. Brenner 
& W. M. LeoGrande, Eds.) (First Edition edition). New York: Grove/Atlantic. 
 
Brenner, P. (1990a). Cuba and the Missile Crisis<a href="#fn01">*</a>. Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 22(1–2), 115–142.  
 
Bunck, J. M. (2010). Fidel Castro and the Quest for a Revolutionary Culture in Cuba. 
Penn State Press. 
 
Byman, D. L., & Pollack, K. M. (2006, March 29). Let Us Now Praise Great Men: 
Bringing the Statesman Back In [research-article]. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880151091916 
 
Byman, D., & Lind, J. (2010). Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian 
Control in North Korea. International Security, 35(1), 44–74.  
 
Carr, E. H. (1985). The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. 3. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Carter, Jeff, Bernhard, M., & Palmer, G. (2012). Social Revolution, the State, and War 
How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(3), 439–466.  
 
Carter, Jimmy. (1995). Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Fayetteville, AR: 
University of Arkansas Press. 
 
Castaneda, J. G. (1994). Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War 
(Vintage Books ed edition). New York: Vintage. 
 
Chanda, N. (1988). Brother Enemy: The War After the War. New York: Free Pr. 
Chen, J. (1996). China’s Road to the Korean War (Reissue edition). New York; 
Chichester: Columbia University Press. 
 
240 
 
Chen, J. (2010). In the Name of Revolution: China’s Road to the Korean War Revisited. 
In The Korean War in World History. University of Kentucky Press. 
 
Christensen, T. J. (1997). Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865–1940. International 
Organization, 51(1), 65–97.  
 
Cigar, N. (1992). Iraq’s strategic mindset and the gulf war: Blueprint for defeat. Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 15(1), 1–29.  
Cockburn, A., & Cockburn, P. (2000). Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam 
Hussein. HarperCollins. 
 
Cohen, R. (1978). Threat Perception in International Crisis. Political Science Quarterly, 
93(1), 93–107.  
 
Colgan, J. D. (2013a). Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict. World 
Politics, 65(04), 656–690.  
 
Colgan, J. D. (2013c). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Colgan, J. D., & Weeks, J. L. P. (2015a). Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and 
International Conflict. International Organization, 69(01), 163–194.  
 
Competence considered. (1990). New Haven, CT, US: Yale University Press. 
 
Cooper, T., & Bishop, F. (2002). Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988. Atglen, PA: 
Schiffer Publishing. 
 
Crawford, N. C. (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and 
Emotional Relationships. International Security, 24(4), 116–156. 
 
Cumings, B. (1990). The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the 
Cataract, 1947-1950. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
 
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014). Reputation and Status as Motives for War. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 17(1), 371–393.  
 
Damasio, A. (2005). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Reprint 
edition). London: Penguin Books. 
241 
 
 
Damasio, A. R., Everitt, B. J., & Bishop, D. (1996). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and 
the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex [and Discussion]. Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1413–1420. 
 
Debs, A., & Goemans, H. e. (2010). Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. 
American Political Science Review, 104(03), 430–445.  
 
Dinerstein, H. S. (1978). The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962 (1st edition). 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Dobbs, M. (2009). One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the 
Brink of Nuclear War (Reprint edition). Vintage. 
 
Domínguez, J. I. (1989). To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy. 
Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs. 
 
Draper, T. (1969). Castroism, theory and practice. Praeger. 
 
Dyson, S. B., & Preston, T. (n.d.). Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the 
Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Political Psychology, 27(2), 
265–288.  
 
Elster, J. (2000). Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior. MIT Press. 
 
Erisman, M. (1985). Cuba’s International Relations: The Anatomy Of A Nationalistic 
Foreign Policy (1 edition). Boulder: Routledge. 
 
Farouk-Sluglett, M., & Sluglett, P. (2001). Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship. I.B.Tauris. 
 
Fayazmanesh, S. (2008). The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of 
Dual Containment (1 edition). London ; New York: Routledge. 
 
Fehrenbach, T. R. (1995). THIS KIND OF WAR. Washington: Potomac Books Inc. 
 
Fettweis, C. (2015). ISSF Roundtable on The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, 
and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy | H-Diplo | H-Diplo | H-Net. Retrieved 
November 15, 2016, from https://networks.h-
242 
 
net.org/node/28443/discussions/63534/issf-roundtable-pathologies-power-fear-
honor-glory-and-hubris-us#_Toc413484654 
 
Fettweis, C. J. (2013). The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in 
U.S. Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fiske, S. T. (2012). Envy Up, Scorn Down: How Status Divides Us. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
 
Foot, R. (1985). The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean 
Conflict, 1950-1953 (1st Edition edition). Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr. 
 
Foran, J. (2005). Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. Cambridge, 
UK. ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Franqui, C. (1980). Diary of the Cuban Revolution (First Edition edition). New York: 
Penguin Books. 
 
Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1995a). The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Friedberg, A. (2010). The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905 (Revised ed. edition). Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Fursenko, A., & Naftali, T. (1998). One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and 
Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Gardner, D. (2012). Future Babble: Why Pundits Are Hedgehogs and Foxes Know Best 
(Reprint edition). Plume. 
 
Gardner, L. C. (2010). The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy 
from the 1970s to the Present (25606th edition). New York: The New Press. 
 
Garthoff, R. (1989a). Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revised to include New 
Revelations from Soviet & Cuban Sources (Revised ed. edition). Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
243 
 
Gause, F. G. (2002). Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990. Middle East Journal, 
56(1), 47–70. 
 
Gause, F. G. (2015). Revolution and threat perception: Iran and the Middle East. 
International Politics, 52(5), 637–645.  
 
Gause, F. G. G. (2009). The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gause, F. G., III. (2002). Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990. Middle East 
Journal, 56(1), 47–70. 
 
George, A. L. (1980). Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use 
of Information and Advice (1 edition). Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. 
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. (S. E. Miller & S. M. Lynn-Jones, Eds.) (Fourth Printing edition). 
Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 
 
George, A., & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Gleijeses, P. (2002). Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. 
Univ of North Carolina Press. 
 
Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Rage and reason: the psychology 
of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(5–6), 781–
795. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199908/09)29:5/6<781::AID-
EJSP960>3.0.CO;2-3 
 
Goldstone, J. A. (1996). Revolution, war, and security. Security Studies, 6(2), 127–151.  
 
Goncharov, S. N., Lewis, J. W., & Xue, L. (1995a). Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and 
the Korean War (1 edition). Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
 
Goodwin, J. (2001). No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-
1991 (1 edition). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gribkov, A. I., Smith, W. Y., & Friendly, A. (1993). Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet 
Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q. 
244 
 
 
Haas, M. L. (2005). The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989. Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Hafner-Burton, E. M., Haggard, S., Lake, D. A., & Victor, D. G. (2017). The Behavioral 
Revolution and International Relations. International Organization, 71(S1), S1–
S31.  
 
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
 
Halliday, F. (1999a). Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great 
Power. Duke University Press. 
 
Halperin, M. (1972). The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary 
History. University of California Press. 
Hart, P. ’t. (2010). Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-
making. University of Michigan Press. 
 
Hilsman, R. (1967). To Move A Nation (First Edition edition). Doubleday. 
 
Hiltermann, J. (2007). A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja 
(1ST edition). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hiro, D. (1990). The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1 edition). London: 
Routledge. 
 
Hoffmann, S. (1968). Gulliver’s Troubles: Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy. 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Horelick, A. L. (1964a). The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations 
and Behavior. World Politics, 16(3), 363–389.  
 
Horowitz, D. L. (2003). The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley, Calif. London: University of 
California Press. 
 
Houghton, D. P. (2001). US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (1 edition). 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
245 
 
Hunt, M. H. (2009). Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (2 edition). New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Huth, P. K. (1999). DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: Empirical 
Findings and Theoretical Debates. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 25–
48.  
 
Hybel, A. R. (1993). Power Over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf 
Crisis. SUNY Press. 
 
Hymans, J. E. C. (2006a). The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions 
and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hymans, J. E. C. (2008). Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A 
New Approach. Journal of East Asian Studies, 8(2), 259–292. 
 
Hymans, J. E. C. (2010). The arrival of psychological constructivism. International 
Theory, 2(3), 461–467.  
 
Izard, C. E. (1991). The Psychology of Emotions (1991 edition). New York: Springer. 
 
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy 
decisions and fiascoes. Oxford, England: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Jentleson, B. W. (1994a). With Friends Like These: Reagan Bush and Saddam, 1982-
1990. New York: W. W. Norton Co. 
 
Jentleson, B. W. (1994b). With Friends Like These: Reagan Bush and Saddam, 1982-
1990. W. W. Norton Co. 
 
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics (First Edition 
edition). Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
 
Jervis, R. (1980). The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 24(4), 563–592. 
 
Jervis, R. (1989). The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of 
Armageddon. Cornell University Press. 
 
246 
 
Jervis, R. (2007). [Review of Review of The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: 
Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by J. E. C. Hymans]. Political 
Psychology, 28(2), 269–272. 
 
Jervis, R. (2013). Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know? Security Studies, 22(2), 
153–179.  
 
Johnson, D. D. P. (2009). OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR. Harvard University Press. 
 
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.20 
 
Karabell, Z. (1995a). Backfire: US Policy toward Iraq, 1988-2 August 1990. Middle East 
Journal, 49(1), 28–47. 
 
Karsh, E. (2014). The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
 
Karsh, E., & Rautsi, I. (1991). Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Survival, 33(1), 
18–30.  
 
Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. Columbia University Press. 
 
Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: effects 
of sadness and anger on social perception. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64(5), 740–752.  
 
Keltner, Dacher, & Lerner, J. S. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81(1), 146–159. 
 
Khadduri, M. (1988). The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran 
Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Khong, Y. F. (1992). Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
 
Khrushchev, N. S., & Crankshaw, E. (1970). Khrushchev Remembers. (S. Talbott, 
Trans.). Little Brown & Company. 
247 
 
 
Kim, Y. (2017). Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People’s Army and the 
Korean War (1 edition). London ; New York: Routledge. 
 
Kissinger, H. (2011a). Years of Upheaval (Reprint edition). New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
 
Kurzman, C. (2005). The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Lai, B., & Slater, D. (2006). Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute 
Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political 
Science, 50(1), 113–126.  
 
Lake, D. A., & Powell, R. (1999). Strategic Choice and International Relations. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32(2), 311–328.  
 
Lankov, A. (2002). From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-
1960. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press. 
Lebow, R. N., & Stein, J. G. (1995). We All Lost the Cold War (Revised ed. edition). 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lechuga, C. (1995). In the Eye of the Storm: Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy and the 
Missile Crisis. Melbourne, Vic., Australia: Ocean Pr. 
 
Lee, C.-S. (1967). Kim Il-Song of North Korea. Asian Survey, 7(6), 374–382.  
 
Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security, 
24(2), 5–55.  
 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of Fear and 
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment. 
Psychological Science, 14(2), 144–150. 
 
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific 
influences on judgement and choice. Cognition and Emotion, 14(4), 473–493.  
248 
 
 
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and Decision 
Making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 799–823. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043 
 
Liss, S. B. (1994a). Fidel!: Castro’s Political And Social Thought. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
 
Little, D. (2004). Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the 
Middle East. Diplomatic History, 28(5), 663–701.  
 
Lockwood, L. (2003). Castro’s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel. Wipf and Stock Publishers. 
 
Lohmann, S. (1994). The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91. World Politics, 47(01), 42–
101.  
 
Long, J. M. (2009). Saddam’s War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait. University of Texas Press. 
 
Mankiewicz, F., & Kirby, J. (1975). With Fidel: A portrait of Castro and Cuba (1st 
edition). Chicago: Playboy Press. 
 
Maoz, Z. (1989). Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International 
Conflict, 1816-1976. International Studies Quarterly, 33(2), 199–231.  
 
Marr, P. (2018). The Modern History of Iraq. Routledge.  
 
Martin, B. K. (2004). Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and 
the Kim Dynasty (1St Edition edition). New York: Thomas Dunne Books. 
 
Matar, F. (1982a). Saddam Hussein: The Man, the Cause and the Future (1st edition). 
London: Third World Centre. 
 
May, E. R., & Zelikow, P. (2002). The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
249 
 
McDermott, R. (2004). The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific 
Advances for Political Science. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 691–706. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040459 
 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated edition). New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Mercer, J. (1995). Anarchy and identity. International Organization, 49(2), 229–252. 
Mercer, J. (2010a). Emotional Beliefs. International Organization, 64(1), 1–31. 
 
Mercer, J. (2010b). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. 
 
Mercer, J. (2013). Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War. International Organization, 
67(2), 221–252. 
 
Meyers, B. . (2012). The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It 
Matters (Reprint edition). Melville House Publishing. 
 
Millett, A. R. (2010). The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North (First 
Edition edition). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
 
Morley, M. H. (1987). Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-
1986. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Murray, W., & Woods, K. (2014a). The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nam, K. W. (1976). North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-65: A Study of 
Factionalism and Political Consolidation. University, Ala: The University of 
Alabama Press. 
 
Nathan, J. (2016). The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. Springer. 
 
Nathanson, D. L. (1994). Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self. W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
 
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings in 
Social Judgement (y First printing edition). Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall. 
 
250 
 
Nixon, J. (2016). Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein. New 
York: Blue Rider Press. 
 
Parry, B. (2004). Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (1 edition). London ; New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Paterson, T. G. (1995a). Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the 
Cuban Revolution. Oxford University Press. 
 
Paterson, T. G. (1995b). Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the 
Cuban Revolution. Oxford University Press. 
 
Perez, L. A. (1990). Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (1st US-1st 
Printing edition). Athens: Univ of Georgia Pr. 
 
Pérez, L. A. (2002). Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy Toward 
Cuba. Journal of Latin American Studies, 34(2), 227–254.  
 
Petersen, R. (2017). Emotions as the Residue of Lived Experience. PS: Political Science 
&amp; Politics, 50(4), 932–935.  
 
Petersen, R. D. (2002). Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in 
Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Petersen, R., & Zukerman, S. (2010). Anger, Violence, and Political Science. In 
International Handbook of Anger (pp. 561–581). Springer, New York, NY. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89676-2_32 
 
Pickering, J., & Kisangani, E. F. (2010). Diversionary Despots? Comparing Autocracies’ 
Propensities to Use and to Benefit from Military Force. American Journal of 
Political Science, 54(2), 477–493.  
 
Posen, B. R. (1986). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
Between the World Wars (N/A edition). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Pressman, J. (2001). September statements, October missiles, November elections: 
Domestic politics, foreign policy making, and the Cuban missile crisis. Security 
Studies, 10(3), 80–114. 
251 
 
 
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999). Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle 
East. International Security, 24(2), 131–165. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560202 
 
Quirk, R. E. (1995). Fidel Castro (Revised ed. edition). New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
 
Rathbun, B., Kertzer, J., & Paradis, M. (2017). Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method 
Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality. Iternational Organization, (S71).  
 
Razoux, P. (2015a). The Iran-Iraq War. (N. Elliott, Trans.) (Translation edition). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Belknap Press: An Imprint of 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Ree, E. V. (1990). Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947. Oxford 
England ; New York : New York: Berg Pub Ltd. 
 
Rees, D. (Ed.). (1984). The Korean War: History And Tactics (First Edition, Thus 
edition). New York: Crescent. 
 
Robbins, C. A. (1985). The Cuban threat. Philadelphia: ISHI Publications. 
 
Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 
51(1), 144–172. 
 
Sadr, A. A.-H. B., Bani-Sadr, A. H., & Deniau, J.-C. (1991). My Turn to Speak: Iran, the 
Revolution and Secret Deals With the U.S. (First Printing edition). Washington: 
Potomac Books Inc. 
Sapolsky, R. M. (2017). Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst. New 
York, New York: Penguin Press. 
 
Sassoon, J. (2011a). Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Saunders, E. N. (2017). No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and 
Information in Group Decision Making. International Organization, 71(S1), 
S219–S247.  
 
252 
 
Scalapino, R. A., & Lee, C.-S. (n.d.). Communism in Korea: (TWO VOLUMES) Vol. 1, 
The Movement & Vol. 2 The Society. 
 
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (1996). Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(3), 415–435.  
 
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (2010). Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in 
International Relations (13179th edition). New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (n.d.). The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy 
Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink. International 
Studies Quarterly, 46(1), 45–68. 
 
Shannon, P. V. P., & Kowert, P. A. (Eds.). (2011). Psychology and Constructivism in 
International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Shen, Z., & Li, D. (2011). After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold 
War (1 edition). Washington, D.C. : Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
 
Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict. 
American Journal of Sociology, 63(4), 349–356.  
 
Skierka, V. (2006). Fidel Castro: A Biography. (P. Camiller, Trans.). Cambridge, UK; 
Malden, MA: Polity. 
 
Skierka, V. (2014). Fidel Castro: A Biography. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Skocpol, T. (1988). Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. World Politics, 
40(02), 147–168.  
 
Sluglett, P., & Farouk-Sluglett, M. (2001). Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship (Revised edition). London ; New York: I. B. Tauris. 
 
Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity. University of Nevada Press. 
 
253 
 
Smith, T. (1988). “The Spirit of the Sierra Maestra”: Five Observations on Writing about 
Cuban Foreign Policy. World Politics, 41(1), 98–119.  
 
Smith, T. (2000). New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of 
the Cold War. Diplomatic History, 24(4), 567–591.  
 
Smith, W. (1988). Closest of Enemies (Reprint edition). W W Norton & Co Inc. 
 
Smolansky, O. M., & Smolansky, B. M. (1991). The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest 
for Influence. Duke University Press. 
 
Snyder, J. (1984). Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984. 
International Security, 9(1), 108–146.  
 
Snyder, R. S. (1999). The U.S. and third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the 
Breakdown in Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 265–290.  
 
Stein, J. G. (1992). Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or 
Impossible Task? International Security, 17(2), 147–179.  
 
Stein, J. G. (1994a). Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as uncommitted thinker and 
motivated learner. International Organization, 48(2), 155–183.  
 
Stern, S. M. (2003). Averting “the Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret 
Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. Stanford University Press. 
 
Stern, S. M. (2005). The Week The World Stood Still: Inside The Secret Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Stanford University Press. 
 
Stueck, W. (1981). The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and 
Korea, 1947-1950. The University of North Carolina Press. 
Stueck, W. W. (1981). The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and 
Korea (1st Edition edition). Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Suh, D.-S. (1995). Kim Il Sung (Revised ed. edition). Columbia University Press. 
 
Sweig, J. (2009). Inside the Cuban Revolution. Harvard University Press. 
 
254 
 
Szalontai, B. (2006). Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the 
Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (1 edition). Washington, D.C. : 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
 
Szulc, T. (2000). Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: Harper Perennial. 
 
’t Hart, P. (1990). Groupthink in government:  A study of small groups and policy failure. 
Lisse, Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers. 
 
Tabatabai, A. M., & Samuel, A. T. (2017). What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the 
Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal. International Security, 42(1), 152–185.  
 
Takeyh, R. (2010). The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment. The Middle East Journal, 64(3), 
365–383. 
 
Takeyh, R. (2011). Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the 
Ayatollahs (Reprint edition). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Taliaferro, J. W. (2000). Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. 
International Security, 25(3), 128–161. 
 
Thompson, S. C. (1999). Illusions of Control How We Overestimate Our Personal 
Influence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8(6), 187–190.  
 
Thornton, R. C. (2000a). Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the 
Korean War (1st edition). Washington, D.C: Brassey’s. 
 
Tilly, C. (1996). European Revolutions: 1492-1992. Oxford, UK ;Cambridge, Mass., 
USA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Tripp, C. (2002a). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). 
Rediscovering the social group:  A self-categorization theory. Cambridge, MA, 
US: Basil Blackwell. 
Van Evera, S. (1984). The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. 
International Security, 9(1), 58–107. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538636 
 
Van Evera, S. (2001). Causes of War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
255 
 
 
Vertzberger, Y. (1993). The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, 
and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Vu, T. (2016). Vietnam's Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of       
              Ideology. Cambridge University Press. 
Walt, S. M. (1992a). Revolution and War. World Politics, 44(03), 321–368.  
 
Walt, S. M. (1992b). Revolution and War. World Politics, 44(3), 321–368.  
 
Walt, S. M. (1996a). Revolution and War. Cornell University Press. 
 
Weathersby, K. (1993a). Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-
1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives. Cold War International History 
Project, 8. 
 
Weathersby, K. (1993b). The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New 
Documentary Evidence. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 2(4), 
425–458. 
 
Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation 
of International Conflict. American Political Science Review, 106(02), 326–347.  
 
Weeks, J. L. P. (2014). Dictators at War and Peace. Cornell University Press. 
 
Welch, R. E. (1985). Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban 
Revolution, 1959-1961. UNC Press Books. 
 
Weldes, J. (1999a). Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1 edition). Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
 
Weldes, J. (1999b). Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. U of Minnesota Press. 
 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
 
256 
 
White, M. (1995). The Cuban Missile Crisis. Springer. 
 
Whiting, A. S. (1960). China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (1 
edition). Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
 
Witte, K. (1996). Chapter 16 - Fear as motivator, fear as inhibitor: Using the extended 
parallel process model to explain fear appeal successes and failures. In P. A. 
Andersen & L. K. Guerrero (Eds.), Handbook of Communication and Emotion 
(pp. 423–450). San Diego: Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-
012057770-5/50018-7 
 
Woods et al. (2006). The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on 
Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U. S. Joint Forces Command Report. 
Annapolis, Md: US Naval Institute Press. 
 
Woods, K., Lacey, J., & Murray, W. (2006). Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the 
Inside. Foreign Affairs, 85(3), 2–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/20031964 
 
Woods, K. M. (2008a). The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for 
the Persian Gulf War. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press. 
 
Woods, K. M., Palkki, D. D., & Stout, M. E. (Eds.). (2011a). The Saddam Tapes: The 
Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Woods, K. M., & Stout, M. E. (2010). Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions: The 
Case of ‘Desert Storm.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 33(1), 5–41.  
 
Woodward, B. (2002). The Commanders (First Edition edition). New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
 
X. (1987). The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs, 65(4), 852–868.  
 
Yetiv, S. A. (2013). National Security through a Cockeyed Lens. JHUP. 
 
Zhang, S. G. (1995). Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953 (First Edition edition). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
 
Zhihua, S. (2000). Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s 
Strategic Goals in the Far East. Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(2), 44–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/15203970051032309 
 
 
 
         
